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Surrogacy agreements make nonsense of traditional notions of the family, and for the 
most part existing legal and social norms struggle to provide solutions to the problems 
posed by these agreements. Our legal system recognises the nuclear family unit, which 
comprises a man, a woman and their offspring, as the 'building block' on which familial 
relationships are based, and entrenches this family unit by way of laws relating to 
'marriage, divorce, adoption, and child care'.1 
The advent of assisted reproductive technologies has meant that it is now possible to 
separate the biological, genetic and social aspects of parenting. In the past, the mother 
of a child has always been presumed to be the woman who gave birth, and this 
presumption has been regarded as so self evident that, until recently, there was little 
need to examine how to identify the mother of a child. However, the '[n]ew 
reproductive technologies, such as artificial fertilisation, in vitro fertilisation, embryo 
transfers and surrogate motherhood have shaken the unshakeable'.2 Thus, it is possible 
for a child born of a surrogacy arrangement to have a different genetic, biological and 
social mother. It is also possible that the same child could have a different genetic and 
social father. In addition, the presumption of legitimacy assigns paternity to the 
I Ruth Deech 'Families and Fertility'. Unpublished Paper delivered at the Ninth World Conference of the 
International Society ofFamily Law, Durban, South African 28-31July1997 at 2 
2 Andrea E Stumpf 'Redefining Mother: A legal Matrix For New reproductive Technologies' (1986) 96 











husband of the biological mother. Where this happens, it is necessary to decide which 
of these people are recognised as the child's legal parents. 
The law has been slow to recognise the existence of those families that do not fit the 
traditional mould. Dolgin describes the ideology of family as 'a special, almost sacred, 
arena of social life grounded in inexorable natural relationships'.3 Surrogacy 
arrangements challenge the perception that a parent-child relationship is the inevitable 
result of a biological relationship. 'Ideologically, the transformation has involved 
acknowledgement that families and familial relationships are not natural or inevitable 
but constructed and contingent' .4 Consequently, legal systems tend to struggle when 
confronted by surrogacy agreements, as they allow people to construct families. Where 
surrogacy is permitted, there is often resistance to granting access to persons whose 
family patterns do not conform to those of the nuclear family. This is demonstrated by 
the comments of Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Warnock Committee), which are as follows: 'To judge from the evidence many believe 
that the interests of the child dictate that it should be born into a home where there is a 
loving, stable, heterosexual relationship and that, therefore, the deliberate creation of a 
child for a woman who is not a partner in such a relationship is morally wrong .... We 
believe that as a general rule it is better for children to be born into a two parent family, 
3 Janet L Dolgin 'The Law Debates the Family: Reproductive Transformations' (1995) 7 Yale Journal of 
Law and Feminism 31 at 40 
4 Janet L Dolgin 'The Law Debates the Family: Reproductive Transformations' ( 1995) 7 Yale Journal of 











with both father and mother, although we recognise that it is impossible with any 
certainty to predict how lasting such a relationship will be'.5 
Furthennore, not only do surrogacy arrangements challenge traditional notions of what 
comprises a family, they also pose a threat to traditional perceptions of women as 
mothers. So-called 'good mothers' are supposed to act selflessly in protecting the 
interests of their offspring. Ikemoto comments that ifthere were to be a code for perfect 
pregnancy, it would include the following commands: 'Thou shalt obey doctor's orders 
... Thou shalt not partake of alcohol or drugs potentially hannful to the ft o ]etus ... Thou 
shalt do whatever the state deems necessary during pregnancy to produce a healthy 
baby ... Thou shalt be a Good Mother'.6 Where surrogate mothers act for reasons of 
altruism, it remains possible to reconcile the surrogate mother's conduct with that of the 
'good mother'. However, surrogate mothers are often motivated by financial reasons. 
There is great resistance to a surrogate mother being pennitted to charge for her 
services, as the commercialisation of reproductive labour is regarded by some as 
repugnant, 7 and, accordingly, the sale of reproductive services in the context of 
surrogacy is likened by some to prostitution. 
Until recently women have been confined to the domestic sphere, where their primary 
function is to reproduce, motherhood being 'the natural, desired and ultimate goal of all 
5 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, Cmnd. 9314 (1984) at 
para 2.5. 
6 Lisa C Ikemoto 'The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the Ideology of Motherhood, the 
Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist Mindset of Law' (1992) 53(5) Ohio State Law 
Journal 1205 at 1206 
7 Jo Bridgeman and Susan Millns Feminist Perspectives on Law. Law's Engagement with the Female 











nonnal women, and women who deny their "maternal instincts" are selfish, peculiar or 
disturbed'.8 Traditionally, reproductive or gestational labour is unpaid, and 
consequently largely undervalued by society.9 However, surrogacy presents the 
potential surrogate mother with an opportunity to benefit financially from her 
reproductive labour. Trebilcock comments that 'surrogacy has the potential to transfonn 
the confining stereotype of "womanhood as motherhood" by removing the activity of 
reproductive labour from the private sphere, where it is largely an uncompensated and 
assumed duty borne by women, thereby allowing women the benefits of economic 
recognition of their labour' .10 
It may be helpful at this stage to examine what is meant by the tenn 'surrogacy'. There 
are many definitions,11 12 but, in short, surrogacy is characterised by an agreement 
whereby a woman undertakes to bear a child for another person or persons. The 
surrogate mother carries the child to tenn, but has no intention to rear the child as her 
own, and when the child is born will hand the child to the commissioning parent or 
parents. 
8 Jo Bridgeman and Susan Millns Feminist Perspectives on Law. Law's Engagement with the Female 
Body (1998) at 110 
9 M J Trebilcock The Limits of Freedom of Contract ( 1993) 51 
10 M J Trebilcock The Limits of Freedom of Contract (1993) 50-51 
11 A surrogate motherhood arrangement is defined as 'an agreement between a surrogate mother and the 
commissioning parents in which the surrogate mother undertakes to hand over the child to the 
commissioning parents upon its birth or within a reasonable time thereafter'. Clause l, Schedule A to the 
South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65: 1993) 
12 Pretorius describes that 'in an ordinary surrogate motherhood contract, an agreement is reached 
between a couple who are not capable of producing their own children in the nonnal way, and the 
surrogate mother who undertakes to bear a child from them and to hand it over to the commissioning 
couple after birth, tenninating any parental power she may have over the child'. Diederika Pretorius 











In practice, surrogacy arrangements may take various forms, the most common of 
which is partial and full surrogacy.13 In the case of partial surrogacy,14 the surrogate 
mother provides the ovum, whilst the commissioning father (or a donor) provides the 
sperm. There is no need for medical expertise to effect conception. 15 However, where 
conception is effected by sexual intercourse the arrangement is usually referred to as 
informal or natural surrogacy. The term partial surrogacy is more frequently reserved 
for those instances where artificial insemination is utilised to effect conception. 
Full or gestational surrogacy occurs when the commissioning parents (or donor(s}) 
provide the gametes. In this instance, the surrogate mother is not genetically related to 
the child. 16 This arrangement requires in vitro fertilisation in order to effect conception. 
'This delicate procedure requires professional skill, special equipment and sophisticated 
hospital facilities' .17 (This will also involve considerable financial input!) 
In South Africa, a Commission was established to investigate the legal and ethical 
implications of surrogacy agreements. In September 1991, the Commission published a 
Working Paper for comment, and in 1993 submitted its final recommendations, with a 
13 Douglas notes that partial surrogacy is most commonly used but as reproductive technologies become 
more reliable gestational surrogacy is likely to become more common. Gillian Douglas Law, Fertility 
and Reproduction ( 1991) 142 
14 This form of surrogate arrangement is sometimes called 'traditional' or 'natural' surrogacy. 
15 Michael DA Freeman 'Responding to the Reproductive Revolution Law Reform - Dilemmas and 
Difficulties'. In Sheila A M Mclean ( ed) Law Reform and Human Reproduction ( 1992) 5 
16 The situation where the surrogate mother bears a child that is not genetically related to either herself 
or to the commissioning parents is sometimes referred to as a commissioned adoption 











draft bill annexed thereto, to Parliament. In June 1995, the draft bill was gazetted, and a 
request was made for public comment. In the interim, the Report has been considered 
by the Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African 
Law Commission on Surrogate Motherhood, whose recommendations in this regard are 
the subject of a Draft Final Report. The Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee has 
recommended that the proposals of the South African Law Commission are not 
adopted, as the Commission's composition was not representative in respect of either 
race or gender, its consultation process was inadequate, and certain of its proposals are 
outdated. However, despite significant differences between the reports of the 
Commission and the Committee, the Committee nevertheless agrees with many of the 
Commission's recommendations. Accordingly, it is submitted that an examination of 
the Commission's proposals is still necessary. 
Surrogacy is not a single event but a collaborative process, progressing from contract, 
to conception and gestation and finally to the birth of the child. Therefore, the writer 
has structured the discussion by dealing with those issues that are most likely to occur 
at each stage of the process.IS 
In the chapter entitled 'Regulating Surrogacy', the South African Law Commission's 
recommendation that surrogacy arrangements are regulated is explored. The regulation 
of surrogacy is not the only possible response by the potential lawmaker. Alternatives 
to regulation exist, and include prohibition and private ordering. The regulation of 
18 Andrea E Stumpf 'Redefining Mother: A legal Matrix For New reproductive Technologies' (1986) 96 











surrogacy is a difficult task as it is almost impossible to provide for every situation and 
please all parties. However regulation has the advantage of conferring legitimacy on 
these arrangements, thereby making the control thereof that much easier. 
Although the regulation of surrogacy arrangements implies recognition on the part of 
the lawmaker, it is possible to argue that certain aspects of surrogacy are 
unconstitutional. In this regard, the impact of the Constitution in the context of 
surrogacy is explored, and the relationship between the right to equal treatment and the 
right to reproductive freedom is explored. 
In most surrogacy arrangements, the parties will reduce their agreement to writing, 
setting forth the terms of their respective rights and obligations. The chapter entitled 
'Access to Surrogacy: The Contract and Its Surrounding Circumstances' examines the 
contents of a surrogacy contract. The legal effect of surrogacy agreements is also 
explored. Lawmakers often include conditions that restrict access to surrogacy 
arrangements to those people deemed suitable. Clearly, any evaluation of the suitability 
or otherwise of the candidates is fraught with difficulties. Meyerson questions the 
legitimacy of this requirement, as the law does not require persons capable of 
conceiving without assistance to prove their suitability for parenthood. 19 
Assuming the parties have reached an agreement, and have reduced it to writing, the 
surrogate mother is then impregnated, and carries the child to term. The extent to which 
the surrogacy agreement has a restrictive effect on the surrogate mother's personal 
19 D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. In Christina Murray (ed) Gender and the New South African 











freedom is explored. The commissioning parents have an interest in ensuring as far as 
possible the birth of a healthy child, but enforcement of this interest may result in an 
unconscionable invasion of the surrogate mother's right to bodily autonomy. 
As already mentioned reproductive technology impacts on traditional notions of what 
constitutes a family. In the context of surrogate parenting a number of persons are able 
to claim the existence of a parent-child relationship. In the chapter 'Determining 
Parenthood', this aspect of surrogacy is discussed. The South African Law Commission 
permits only full surrogacy, and recommends direct parentage. This means that the 
commissioning parents are regarded from birth as the child's legal parents. The 
Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee permits both partial and full surrogacy, and 
also recommends direct parentage in the case of full surrogacy. However, where partial 
surrogacy is used, the commissioning parents must apply for a transfer of parentage 
(also known as 'fast track' adoption). In this instance, the surrogate mother is regarded 
as the child's legal mother at birth, and must agree to transfer parentage to the 
commissioning parents. 
Lastly, the extremely controversial aspect of commercial surrogacy is discussed. 
Opponents to the practice of commercial surrogacy argue that it wiH lead to the 
degradation of women and children, as well as their exploitation. On the other hand it 
is argued that surrogate mothers should be paid for their services, and that prohibition 
of payment is in itself exploitative. In addition, the role of commercial surrogacy 
agencies is explored. Although these agencies are generally regarded as undesirable, 











Serious thought should be given to the regulation of these agencies, as an alternative to 
prohibition. 
As mentioned above, in the context of surrogacy, it is almost impossible to do justice to 
all parties, and it is just as difficult to protect people from the consequences of their 
actions. In regulating surrogacy, it is submitted that the lawmaker should guard against 
enacting rules that go too far in interfering with the rights of individuals to make 
decisions concerning personal matters. However, the potential for harm as a 
consequence of exploitative practices calls for a degree of control. Surrogacy 
arrangements do benefit those who are otherwise unable to have children, but the 
lawmaker should not permit the commissioning parents to satisfy their desire for a 












REGULATING SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS 
2.1. Introduction 
A legal dispensation, confronted by surrogate motherhood arrangements, can respond 
in a number of ways. Lawmakers can choose to do nothing, prohibit the activity, or 
recognise the rights of individuals to order their own arrangements. Another option is 
to regulate the activity. In other words, the state would create an 'exclusive mechanism 
by which an activity may be carried out•.20 Freeman comments that among potential 
law reformers a 'shoot first, ask questions later' approach is all too common, especially 
in cases where legislation is a panicked response to a barely understood phenomenon•.21 
In order to avoid a too hasty response, 'the potential law reformer should ask whether 
law is needed or desirable at all'. 22 
It is submitted that the law should only interfere with the arrangements of private 
individuals, where such interference is necessary. Meyerson comments that 'freedom 
of contract and reproductive freedom are important aspects of personal freedom, and 
the law should respect them except to the extent that allowing them free sway harms 
20 Alta R Charo 'United States: Surrogacy'. In Sheila AM Mclean (ed) Law Reform and Human 
Reproduction (1992) 24I 
21 Michael DA Freeman 'Responding to the Reproduction Revolution: Law Reform - Dilemmas and 
Difficulties'. In Sheila A M Mclean ( ed) Law Reform and Human Reproduction ( 1992) 4 
22 Michael DA Freeman 'Responding to the Reproduction Revolution: Law Reform - Dilemmas and 











third parties, or impacts unfairly on one of the parties to a bargain'.23 Sedillo Lopez 
argues that whether or not the 'use of reproductive technology will be construed as 
within the zone of privacy, and, thus, a matter of individual autonomy, or a matter for 
grave social concern, will depend on the purpose to which technology is to be put•.24 It 
is submitted that where surrogacy arrangements are utilised for a legitimate purpose, to 
address the problem of infertility, they should be permitted. Thus, any form of 
regulation should be aimed at protecting the interests of the parties involved, and in 
particular the rights of the child and of the surrogate mother. 
After considering of the ways in which surrogate parenting could be addressed, the 
South African Law Commission concluded that regulation is the preferred legislative 
response. The Commission reasoned that a regulatory approach would draw on the 
experiences of other countries and would take into account, as far as is practically 
possible, a number of factors, including moral and ethical issues.25 Essentially, the 
Commission hoped to formulate a 'careful approach with the best interests of the child 
as the overriding factor'.26 
23 D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. In Christina Murray ( ed) Gender and the New South African 
Legal Order (1994) 145 
24 Antoinette Sedillo Lopez 'Privacy and Regulation of the New Reproductive Technologies: A 
Decision-Making Approach' (Summer 1988) 22(2) Family Law Quarterly 173 at 196-197 
25 Kilroe notes that a regulatory approach, in which legislative enactment seeks to regulate surrogacy 
agreements by balancing the interests of the child, the surrogate and the contracting party'. BA Kilroe 
Surrogate Motherhood: A Regulated Approach (no date) 1 











The Commission considers the efficacy of applying existing law to surrogacy 
arrangements, but ultimately rejects this option, concluding that existing law is unable 
to adequately address the problems posed by surrogacy arrangements.21 
The Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee accepts that generally people favour the 
practice of surrogate parenting,28 and notes that surrogacy is practised both formally 
and informally in this country.29 The Committee agrees with the Commission that 
existing laws are inadequate as they were not promulgated with surrogate parenting in 
mind.3° Accordingly, it also recommends that surrogacy arrangements are regulated.JI 
2.2. Approaches to Surrogacy Arrangements 
Regulation is by no means the only possible response to surrogacy. In addition to 
regulation, the following merit consideration: 
l) a prohibitory approach whereby legislation prohibits surrogate arrangements and 
sanctions offenders; 
27 South African Law Commission Report on Su"ogate Motherhood (Project 65: 1993) 138 
28 para 6.1.2, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 33 
29 para 6.1.3, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 33 
30 para 6.2. l, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 33-34 
31 para 6.2.2, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 











2) a private ordering approach whereby the privacy of individuals is paramount and, 
consequently, the individuals concerned will order their own arrangements; and 
3) a status quo approach where existing laws based on the biological relationship 
between parent and child are applied to any problems posed by surrogacy. 
The following discussion is aimed at providing an explanation of the most common 
legislative approaches to the problems posed by surrogacy arrangements. 
2.2.1. Prohibitory Approach 
The prohibitory or punitive model is characterised by its hostility toward surrogacy 
arrangements. Legislative response based on this approach seeks to prohibit such 
arrangements, and to enforce the prohibition with criminal sanctions. 
An example of a prohibitory approach is contained in the Waller Commission Report 
of the Australian state of Victoria,32 which recommendations were incorporated in the 
Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act. The Act prohibits all surrogacy arrangements 
whether for compensation or not,33 and provides that both altruistic and commercial 
surrogacy arrangements are void and unenforceable . In addition, where an arrangement 
is entered into for reward, the parties (commissioning parent(s), surrogate mother or 
32 Victoria Committee to Consider the Social Ethical and Legal Issues Arising from In Vitro Fertilisation 
- Interim Report (1982); Report on Donor Gametes in Vitro Fertilisation (1983); Surrogate Mothering 
(1984); Report on the Disposition of Embryos Produced by In Vitro Fertilisation (1984) 
33 Part V of the Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act, 1984, which came into operation on 10 August 
1986. In terms of section 30(1), surrogacy is prohibited 'whether formal or informal, and whether or not 











intennediary) are guilty of an offence.34 The Act also prohibits any fonn of advertising 
with respect to surrogate arrangements.35 Pretorius submits that this Act is 
unsatisfactory. It is not comprehensive enough in achieving its goal in preventing the 
practice of surrogacy, as it does not impose sanctions on altruistic surrogate 
arrangements.36 
Another example of legislation incorporating prohibitory provisions can be found in 
the United Kingdom, where the Surrogacy Arrangements Act outlaws commercial 
surrogacy.37 This Act was hastily promulgated in response to public outcry over the 
payment of a large sum of money by an American couple to a British surrogate 
mother.38 The Act drew strongly on the recommendations of the Warnock Committee, 
which paid particular attention to the problem of commercial surrogacy.39 While the 
Act does not declare all surrogate arrangements illegal, it is a criminal offence for 
intennediaries to act as agents for a fee. However, 'altruistic' surrogacy arrangements 
are pennitted, and even where money is exchanged amongst the immediate parties to 
34 Section 30, Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act, 1984 
35 Section 30( 1 ), Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act, 1984 
36 Diederika Pretorius Surrogate Motherhood: A Worldwide View of the Issues ( 1994) 54 
37 Section 2, Surrogacy Arrangements Act (1985) 
38 Re C [1985] F.L.R. 846, also known as the 'Baby Cotton' case 
39 In July 1984, the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology ,which was 
established under the chairmanship of Dame Mary Warnock to examine the social, ethical and legal 
imp I ications of developments in the field of human assisted reproduction, published its report. In the case 
of surrogacy, the Committee found the prospect of exploitation to far outweigh any potential benefit. The 
Committee was particularly concerned as to the consequences of commercial surrogacy and 
recommended that commercial surrogacy be prohibited. Committee oflnquiry into Human Fertilisation 












the agreement they do not face criminal sanction so as to 'avoid children being born to 
mothers subject to the taint of criminality'.40 
It is submitted that a prohibitory approach should be avoided. For a start, prohibition is 
not practical. The desire to have children is a powerful one, and it is foolish to try to 
wish away the reproductive technologies that may provide a solution to infertility. The 
technology exists, and is likely to be utilised - whether or not it is sanctioned by law. 
Surrogacy need not involve complicated medical technologies. Consequently, it is 
possible for the parties to arrange a surrogate pregnancy, without help from medical 
science. It is likely that outright prohibition would merely drive the practice of 
surrogacy underground, where the dangers faced by the parties are significantly 
increased.41 
Meyerson comments that arguments favouring prohibition often refer to moral 
concems.42 Moral arguments are characterised by reference to highly speculative harms 
and a failure to evaluate any benefit that permitting the practice might have.43 'The 
reason they offer for forbidding paid surrogacy is not that it has harmful consequences 
which are unfair to the contracting parties, or harmful to third parties in any 
straightforward sense, but rather that it is, according to them, immoral, or degrading, or 
40 para 8.19, Committee oflnquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology Report on the Committee 
of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Cmnd. 9314: 1984), quoted in Jo Bridgeman and 
Susan Millns Feminist Perspectives on Law. Law's Engagement with the Female Body (1998) 150 
41 M J Trebilcock The Limits of Freedom of Contract (1993) 53 
42 D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. In Christina Murray (ed) Gender and the New South African 
Legal Order (1994) 123 
43 D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. In Christina Murray (ed) Gender and the New South African 











that it expresses an inferior conception of human flourishing'.44 It is submitted that in 
the absence of some other compelling factor, moral concerns are not sufficient to 
justify prohibition of surrogacy. Surrogacy arrangements provide a legitimate 
alternative for those people who are otherwise unable to have children.45 Thus, to opt 
for prohibition on the basis that the practice may cause some hypothetical harm is too 
drastic a solution. 
2.2.2. Private Ordering Approach 
The private-ordering (or laissez faire) approach is in direct contrast to both the 
prohibitory and regulatory approaches. It sees the state's role as being facilitative of the 
arrangements of private individuals46 A surrogacy contract, entered into voluntarily by 
consenting adults, should be enforceable, and the role of the state is to provide the 
means to enforce the agreement. This approach is advocated by those who believe that 
the law of contract provides a solution to the problems posed by surrogacy.47 However, 
few jurisdictions are comfortable with this approach for the reason that there is an 
increased risk of both commercialism and exploitation.48 
44 D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. In Christina Murray (ed) Gender and the New South African 
legal Order (1994) 123 
45 R Pretorius 'A Comparative Overview and Analysis of a Proposed Surrogate Mother Agreement 
Model' (1987) CILSA 275 
46 See Alta R Charo 'United States: Surrogacy'. In Sheila AM Mclean (ed) law Reform and Human 
Reproduction ( 1993) 41-57. See also B A Kilroe Surrogate Motherhood: A Regulated Approach (no 
date) 
47 See Richard Epstein 'Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement' (1995) 81 Virginia law 
Review 2305-2341 











2.2.3. Status Quo Approach 
Traditionally, familial relationships are forged from biological or marital ties. 
Surrogacy upsets these assumptions as it permits parenthood to be construed as having 
genetic, biological and social components. This approach looks to existing legal 
precepts, and is essentially conservative in nature.49 It advocates that the parent-child 
relationship should continue to be defined by a biological relationship. In essence, a 
blood relationship 'is the key to parenthood and all its accompanying rights and 
duties'.50 The effect of adopting this response to surrogacy is that a 'brake' is placed on 
the practice.51 The assignment of parentage to the biological mother is contrary to the 
intentions of the parties, which leaves the parties in a precarious position, and without 
legal remedies to their enforce their contractual rights should things go wrong. 
2.2.4. Regulatory Approach 
Many legislatures have opted for a regulatory model in which the state creates an 
'exclusive mechanism by which an activity may be carried out'.52 In short, the lawmaker 
stipulates the manner in which the surrogacy arrangement is to be carried out, and in 
this way not only controls it, but also legitimises it. 
49 Michael D A Freeman 'Responding to the Reproduction Revolution: Law Reform - Dilemmas and 
Difficulties'. In Sheila AM Mclean (ed) Law Reform and Human Reproduction (1992) 5 
50Michae1 DA Freeman 'Responding to the Reproduction Revolution: Law Reform - Dilemmas and 
Difficulties'. In Sheila A M Mclean (ed) Law Reform and Human Reproduction ( 1992) 5 
51 Michael D A Freeman 'Responding to the Reproduction Revolution: Law Reform - Dilemmas and 
Difficulties'. In Sheila A M Mclean ( ed) Law Reform and Human Reproduction ( 1992) 5 
52 Alta R Charo 'United States: Surrogacy'. In Sheila AM Mclean (ed) Law Reform and Human 











The Ontario Law Reform Commission published its recommendations in 1985.53 
Dickens comments that its approach to surrogacy is an exercise in 'damage control', as 
it was felt that surrogacy would not go away.54 Thus, the Ontario Law Reform 
Commission recommended that surrogacy be permitted where there is a genuine need, 
but that surrogacy arrangements should be subject to comprehensive regulation so as to 
'legitimise and regulate the practice of surrogacy'.55 
The Ontario Law Reform Commission recommended that the parties first submit their 
written contract to the relevant court for its approval. Although the parties have a 
measure of contractual freedom, it is recommended that the contract include certain 
terms, which are summarised by Pretorius as follows. The contract should contain 
provisions relating to: 
'l) health and life insurance for the prospective surrogate mother; 
2) arrangements for the child should any one or both of the intended parents die or 
cease to live together; 
3) arrangements regarding the manner in which the child should be surrendered after 
birth; 
4) the right, if any, of the surrogate mother to obtain information regarding or to have 
contact with the child after birth; 
53 Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Human Artificial Reproduction and Related Matters 
(1985) 
54 Bernard Dickens 'Canada: The Ontario Law Reform Commission Project on Human Artificial 
Reproduction'. ln Sheila AM Mclean (ed) Law Reform and Human Reproduction (1992) 84 











5) the regulation of the surrogate mother's activities before and after conception, 
including dietary obligations; and 
6) the conditions under which prenatal screening of the child may be justified or 
required, for example, ultrasound, fetoscopy, or amniocentesis'.56 
In addition, the Commission makes recommendations for screening to assess the 
suitability of the parties to participate in a surrogacy agreement. It recommends that a 
Children's Aid Society play a role in assessing the suitability of the parties, and that the 
Court is able to review its decision, should there be a change in circumstance or if new 
information comes to light pertaining to the suitability of the commissioning parents. 
Furthermore, no payment may be made without prior approval of the court. 57 
The most controversial of its recommendations relates to the parentage of the child. 
The child is regarded as that of the commissioning parents from birth, and should 
immediately be surrendered to the commissioning parents. Should the surrogate mother 
refuse to do so, provision is made for the court to order delivery to the commissioning 
parents. In other words the surrogate mother can be compelled to surrender the child.58 
In Israel, legislation was recently enacted to regulate surrogacy arrangements. The 
Surrogate Agreements (Approval of Agreement and Status of the Child) Law makes 
56 Diederika Pretorius Surrogate Motherhood: A Worldwide View of the Issues (1994) 37-38 
57 Bernard Dickens 'Canada: The Ontario Law Reform Commission Project on Human Artificial 
Reproduction'. In Sheila AM Mclean (ed) Law Reform and Human Reproduction (1992) 72 
58 Bernard Dickens 'Canada: The Ontario Law Reform Commission Project on Human Artificial 











failure to comply with the provisions of the Law a criminal offence.59 60 Schuz 
comments that the parties must initially meet certain requirements before the agreement 
is approved by a Statutory Committee.61 These requirements are as follows: that all the 
parties must be of age and resident in Israel;62 that the surrogate mother must be 
unmarried (the Committee can approve the use of a married surrogate where there is no 
other choice of surrogate);63 and that the surrogate mother must be unrelated to either 
of the commissioning parents.64 
If the parties meet these criteria, they can then apply to the relevant Statutory 
Committee for its approvaJ.65 Schuz explains the procedure the parties must follow 
when making their application: 'The parties must attach to their application copy of the 
surrogacy agreement, a medical report confirming that the prospective mother cannot 
bear children or that pregnancy would seriously endanger her health; medical and 
psychological reports as to the suitability of all the parties to the agreement; 
confirmation from a psychologist or social worker that the prospective couple have 
59 Surrogate Agreements (Approval of Agreement and Status of the Child) Law 5746 - 1996 
60 Section 19( 10), Surrogate Agreements (Approval of Agreement and Status of the Child) Law 57 46 -
1996 
61 Rona Schuz 'The Right to Parenthood: Surrogacy and Frozen Embryos' (1996) International Survey of 
Family Law 237 at 240 
62 Section 2(2), Surrogate Agreements (Approval of Agreement and Status of the Child) Law 5746 -1996 
63 Section 2(3)(a), Surrogate Agreements (Approval of Agreement and Status of the Child) Law 5746 -
1996 
64 Section 2(3)(b), Surrogate Agreements (Approval of Agreement and Status of the Child) Law 5746 -
1996 
65 Schuz describes the Committee as comprising seven members - two gynaecological doctors, a doctor 
of internal medicine, a clinical psychologist, a social worker, a lawyer and a minister of the parties' 
religion. Rona Schuz 'The Right to Parenthood: Surrogacy and Frozen Embryos' ( 1996) International 











received appropriate counselling including discussion of other possibilities for 
parenthood, and (where the surrogacy has been organised by an agency) the agreement 
with the agent'.66 Once the Committee has approved the agreement, it may nevertheless 
reconsider its decision in the event of a substantial change of circumstances provided 
that conception has not yet taken place.67 
Matters concerning procreative liberty are generally regarded as falling within the 
private sphere, and it would seem that the choice of an appropriate legislative response 
must to some extent be governed by the question of how far the state should be 
permitted to intervene in the affairs of private individuals. No freedom can be 
completely free from limitation. Therefore, it is submitted that where state control in 
the form of regulation will prevent harm, then regulation of an activity is acceptable. 
Dickens comments on the reasoning f the Ontario Law Reform Commission's 
approach are applicable: 'The Commissioners approached their task regarding surrogate 
motherhood in no sense as supporters of the practice, but as undertaking an exercise of 
damage control. Surrogate motherhood was seen as an option that could not be 
eliminated, or suppressed ... The risk that particularly poor women or vulnerable 
relatives might be overinduced, manipulated and abused to serve in surrogacy 
agreements seemed to be aggravated rather than prevented by rendering surrogate 
66 Rona Schuz 'The Right to Parenthood: Surrogacy and Frozen Embryos' ( 1996) International Survey of 
Family Law 237 at 241 












motherhood illegal and driving it underground into the hands of unscrupulous 
operators'.68 
2.3. The Approach of the South African Law Commission 
2.3.1. Introduction 
It is clear from the content of its proposals, that the Commission has drawn upon the 
experiences of other jurisdictions in attempting to provide solutions to the problems 
posed by surrogacy. Despite the world-wide trend toward prohibition of surrogacy 
arrangements, the South African Law Commission has recommended that these 
arrangements be regulated. In doing so, the Commission has chosen to reject a 
prohibitory approach. However, the parties are not free to contract as and how they 
wish. It is recommended that the High Court approve only those pre-conception 
agreements that adhere to the provisions of the proposed bill.69 Should an agreement 
fail to comply with same, the arrangement is of no legal effect, and consequently, is 
unenforceable.70 Where there is compliance, the commissioning parents are to be 
68 Bernard Dickens 'Canada: The Ontario Law Reform Commission Project on Human Artificial 
Reproduction'. In Sheila AM Mclean (ed) Law Reform and Human Reproduction (1992) 85 
69 The South African Law Commission provides that no surrogate motherhood agreement shall be valid 
unless 'the agreement is confirmed in writing by a court within whose area of jurisdiction the surrogate 
mother is domiciled or habitually residing. Clause 2(d), Schedule A to the South African Law 
Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65: 1993)' 
The Court with jurisdiction is the High Court of South Africa. Clause l, Schedule A to the South African 
Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65: 1993) 
70 The proposals provide that any 'surrogate motherhood agreement that does not comply with the 
provisions of this Act shall be invalid and any child born as a result of any action taken in execution of 
such an arrangement shall, subject to the provisions of section 5 of the Status of Children Act, 1987 (Act 











regarded as the child's legal parents from birth, and if necessary the surrogate mother 
can be compelled to surrender the child to whom she has given birth.71 
Before considering the precise contents of the Commission's proposals, it is prudent to 
examine its choice of approach, and to ask whether regulation is indeed the best option. 
The disadvantages of adopting a prohibitory approach, as well as those of a private 
ordering approach have already been canvassed in this chapter. It is submitted that 
prohibition is neither practical nor appropriate, as it ignores the fact that surrogacy has 
much to recommend it. By contrast, a private ordering approach allows individuals too 
much freedom, thereby increasing the possibility of commercialism and exploitation. 
The Commission does consider the efficacy of the existing law with respect to 
surrogacy arrangements, but submits that existing law is unable to address the problems 
posed by surrogacy arrangements adequately. The Commission states that 'since the 
existing law is inadequate to cope with the problems surrounding surrogate 
motherhood it would be better to regulate the matter in such a way as to achieve legal 
certainty'. 12 
Nevertheless, it is argued that legislatures should avoid acting too hastily, and should 
attempt to clarify the law with regard to surrogate parenting within the framework of 
well established legal principles. Garrison states that legislatures 'should focus on 
8(2), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65: 
1993) 
71 Clauses 8(l)(a)-(e), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate 
Motherhood (Project 65: 1993) 











achieving compatibility with the family law principles governing parental agreements 
and custody/visitation and with the basic policy goals of the adoption statutes'.73 
2.3.2. South Africa: Existing Law 
2.3.2.1. Legislation 
What of existing legislation - is it truly as inadequate as the Commission fears? 
Certainly, no statute expressly addresses the question of surrogacy, although there is 
legislation that deals with assisted human reproduction technologies. However, it is 
uncertain to what extent these provisions are applicable in the case of a surrogacy 
arrangement. The following Acts are applicable, but their effect is piecemeal. 
The Human Tissue Act permits the use of donor gametes for the purposes of artificial 
insemination. 74 Although this Act was not enacted to specifically deal with surrogacy it 
does not expressly exclude it from its sphere of operation.75 
73 Martha Garrison' SUJTogate Parenting: What Should Legislatures Do?' (Summer 1988) 22(2) Family 
Law Quarterly 149 at 160-161 
74 Human Tissue Act 65 of 1983 
75 Artificial fertilisation is defined as being 'the introduction by other than natural means of a male 
gamete or gametes into the internal reproductive organs of a female person for the purpose of human 
reproduction, including a) the bringing together outside the human body of male and female gametes 
with a view to placing the product of a union of such gametes in a womb of a female person; or b) the 
placing of the product ofa union ofa male and a female gamete or gametes which have been brought 
together outside the human body, in the womb of a female person for such purposes'. The definition 
section does not specify whose gametes should be used. From this an inference can be made that the use 
of donor gametes is possible. The words 'a female person' ins l(b) are again not specific and would not 











The Children's Status Act addresses the position of illegitimate children in South 
African law,76 and regulates, inter alia, the status of a child born by means of artificial 
fertilisation. Provided that both the woman and her husband consent to the artificial 
fertilisation, the resultant child is the legitimate child of the couple to whom he or she 
is born.77 The Act specifically provides for the termination of gamete donors' parental 
rights and duties.78 
This implies that in the case of surrogate parenting, the surrogate mother and her 
husband are to be regarded as the child's legal parents. The Act expressly provides that 
'no right, duty or obligation shall arise between any child born as a result of the 
artificial insemination of a woman and any person whose gamete or gametes have been 
used for such artificial insemination and the blood relations of that person, except 
where (a) that person is the woman who gave birth to that child; or (b) that person is 
the husband of such a woman at the time of such artificial insemination'.79 This is 
contrary to the purpose of a surrogacy arrangement and places the commissioning 
parents in an invidious position. It is particularly troublesome in the case of full 
surrogacy, where the Act provides for the termination of all rights and duties that may 
arise between the child and the gamete donor or donors. Thus, the commissioning 
parents have no legal entitlement to the child. In addition, the surrogate mother is 
placed in a difficult position if the commissioning parents reject the child, as the law 
76 Children's Status Act 82 of 1987 
77 Children born as a result of artificial insemination with donor sperm or ova are considered the 
legitimate children of the woman giving birth and her husband, provided that both the woman and her 
husband consent to same. Section 5( l)(a), Children's Status Act 82of1987 
78 Section 5(2)(a) & (b ), Children's Status Act 82of1987 











considers her to be the child's legal parent, despite the existence of a surrogacy 
agreement. 
The Child Care Amendment Act makes it possible for commissioning parents to adopt a 
child who is genetically related to one or both of them.80 Prior to the amendment, 
section 17 of the Child Care Act had a restrictive effect on any attempt by the 
commissioning parents to adopt the child as the section was worded in such a way as to 
make it impossible for a person to adopt a child 'born or them.81 It was, therefore, 
impossible for a parent to adopt his or her own child, a situation which is now 
permitted. 
The Child Care Act prohibits money changing hands in the case of adoption, and 
makes it a criminal offence to give or receive payment. s2 Parallels exist between 
surrogacy and adoption, and prohibition of payment in this statute implies that payment 
of the surrogate mother for her services is likely to fall foul of these provisions. 
The child would be registered as the legitimate child of the surrogate and her husband, 
which as mentioned above would be contrary to the wishes of the parties. Furthermore, 
80 Section 7, Child Care Amendment Act 86 of 1991 
81 Child Care Act 14of1983 
82 The Act provides that 'no person shall, save as prescribed under the Social Work Act 1978 (Act No. 
110 of 1978), give, undertake to give, receive or contract to receive any consideration, in cash or kind, in 
respect of the adoption ofa child'. Section 24(1) Child Care Act 14of1983 
In addition 'any person who contravenes any provision of subsection (I) shall be guilty of an offence and 
on conviction liable to pay a fine ofR2000 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years or 











the Births and Deaths Registration Act makes it a punishable offence to intentionally 
furnish false infonnation when registering the birth of a child. 83 
This examination of the relevant legislation reveals that it is less than satisfactory. All 
parties to the arrangement are in a precarious position. Clearly, additional measures are 
needed to address the issues raised by surrogacy contracts. However, legislation is by 
no means the only source of potentially applicable law, and there has been some 
suggestion that the principles of the common law may provide some solutions. Those 
writers who adopt this view fall into two camps. One group sees surrogacy as the 
appropriate subject of the law of contract, whereas the other views surrogacy as being 
an issue for family law. 
2.3.2.2. The Law of Contract 
Surrogacy arrangements are characterised by an agreement that requires the active 
involvement of another woman to solve the infertility problems of the commissioning 
couple. The parties agree that the surrogate mother will conceive and carry a child to 
tenn (usually genetically related to at least one or both of the intended parents). The 
child is handed over at birth to the intended parents who then arrange to adopt the 
child. Thus, it could be said that the essence of the arrangement lies in contract. It is, 
therefore, logical to look to the existing principles of the law of contract in order to 
evaluate their potential efficacy with respect to surrogacy arrangements. 











In the context of a surrogacy arrangement, the tension that exists between the right of 
the individual to contract as and how he or she pleases, and public policy is 
pronounced. As discussed above, it is feared that by allowing individuals complete 
freedom to enter surrogacy contracts will result both in exploitation and increased 
commercialism. However, for the right to individual autonomy to mean anything, 
lawmakers should be careful not to intervene too hastily in the arrangements of 
individuals. 
The question of whether or not surrogacy arrangements are legally enforceable 
contracts has received much attention. Pretorius discusses the validity of surrogacy 
contracts and concludes that these arrangements may well be contra bonos mores.84 A 
contract is contra bonos mores if its purpose is immoral or where it is against public 
policy,85 and is only valid if it does not contravene an Act of Parliament or other 
statutory provision and is not considered contra bonos mores.86 The Courts have 
established categories of contracts which are traditionally regarded as being against 
public policy, and thus void. These categories include contracts which are injurious to 
marriage, as well as contracts which encourage unlawful acts.87 Surrogacy 
arrangements give rise to many concerns, but contracts which include the following 
obligations may well be contra bonos mores: 
84 Pretorius suggests that commercial, not altruistic surrogate contracts, will most likely be found to be 
contra bonos mores and thus unenforceable. Altruistic surrogacy arrangements 'pose no threat to the 
public or the public morals, especially since it is mostly utilised in a family relationship or a relationship 
between close friends'. She does argue that the surrogate mother should be entitled to receive 
compensation for necessary expenses and possibly for loss ofincome. Diederika Pretorius Surrogate 
Motherhood: A Worldwide View of the Issues (1992) 95 
85 Diederika Pretorius Surrogate Motherhood: A Worldwide View of the Issues (1992) 82 











1) an agreement which provides for the permanent transfer of parental rights; and 
2) an agreement to compensate a person for terminating their parental rights. 
Of importance is the notion of severability of contracts. If it is possible to separate the 
provisions that are void from the other contractual provisions, then these remaining 
obligations may still be enforceable, provided that these terms are reasonable.BB If this 
doctrine is found to be applicable in the case of surrogacy contracts (and there seems to 
be no reason why it should not), then this may mean that a court could strike out the 
offending provision(s), and uphold the rest of the contract, which would otherwise be 
void. 
However, those courts which have been faced with the prospect of pronouncing on the 
validity of surrogacy contracts, have been reluctant to do so.B9 The Californian case of 
Johnson v Calvert is an exception, as the court upheld the surrogacy agreement, and in 
effect specifically enforced its terms.90 
The Court was swayed by the commissioning parents' intention to be parents. In terms 
of Californian law, both the surrogate mother and the commissioning mother were able 
to adduce evidence supporting their claims to parentage. The Court took into 
B7 Diederika Pretorius Surrogate Motherhood: A Worldwide View of the Issues (1992) 82 
BB Pretorius considers the test for reasonableness and refers to the case of Magna Alloys & Research (SA) 
(Pty.) Ltdv Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A). The Court will determine what is reasonable not only between the 
parties but will also consider the public interest at the time of the action. Diederika Pretorius Surrogate 
Motherhood: A Worldwide View of the Issues (1992) 94 
B9 For example, see Re C [1985] F.L.R. 846. See also In The Matter of BabyM217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 
A 2d 1128 1132 Ch Div (1987), affd in part, rev'd in part In The Matter of Baby M 109 N.J. 396 537 A 











consideration the commissioning mother's intention to bring the child into the world 
and raise it as her own. Panelli J (Lucas CJ, Mosk, Baxter, George and Arabian JJ 
concurring) held that 'when one woman is the genetic mother of a child and a different 
woman is its gestational mother, the issue of who is the child's 'natural mother' at law is 
to be resolved by enquiring into the parties' intentions as manifested in the surrogacy 
agreement. The woman who intended to procreate the child - she who intended to bring 
about the birth of a child who she intended to raise as her own - is the natural mother 
under California law'.91 The application of a test to determine parentage based on the 
intent of the respective parties results in the enforcement of the contract, as the parties 
will always intend at the time of contracting for the commissioning parents to be vested 
with parentage.92 
A surrogacy contract will contain provisions that set out the parties expectations as to 
the manner in which the arrangement will proceed. The contract will usually contain a 
number of essential provisions relating to the conception of the child, the surrogate 
mother's conduct during the pregnancy, payment of the surrogate mother, and the 
parties' arrangements regarding the child's surrender. Assuming that the contract is of 
legal effect, the enforcement of its terms could cause difficulty because of the personal 
nature of the contract. 
90Johnson v Calvert 851 P 2d 766 (1993) 
91 Jo Bridgeman and Susan Millns Feminist Perspectives on Law. Law's Engagement with the Female 
Body ( 1998) 162 
92Jo Bridgeman and Susan Millns Feminist Perspectives on Law. Law's Engagement with the Female 











In terms of the principles of contract an aggrieved party is entitled to claim specific 
performance. However, the Court has a discretion to refuse the claim .93 In Farmers' 
Co-op Society (Reg) v Berry,94 Innes J stated that 'primafacie every party to a binding 
agreement who is ready to carry out his own obligation under it has a right to demand 
from the other party, so far as it is possible, a performance of his undertaking in terms 
of the contract. ... It is true that the Courts will exercise a discretion in determining 
whether or not decrees of specific performance will be made. They will not, of course 
be issued where it is impossible for the defendant to comply with them. And there are 
many cases win which justice between the parties can be fully and conveniently done 
by an award of damages. But that is a different thing from saying that a defendant who 
has broken his undertaking has the option to purge his default by the payment of 
money .... The election is rather with the injured party, subject to the discretion of the 
Court'.95 
The Court will exercise its discretion to refuse a claim for specific performance, where 
performance is impossible or where an order would cause undue hardship. Thus, 'where 
it would operate unreasonably hardly on the defendant, or where the agreement giving 
rise to the claim is unreasonable, or where the decree would produce injustice, or 
would be inequitable under all the circumstances',96 the court would refuse to grant an 
order for specific performance. The courts have been reluctant to grant orders for 
specific performance where the contract is for personal services. This is not to say that 
93 RH Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 579 
94 1912 AD 343 
95 Farmers' Co-op Society (Reg) v Berry 1912 AD 343 at 350 











such an order will always be refused where the contract is for personal services. 
However, the merits of each case must be examined to see whether the circumstances 
are such that the aggrieved party's claim for an order of specific performance should be 
refused.97 In National Union of Textile Workers v Stag Packings (Pty) Ltd, 98 the Court 
corrected the tendency to regard the court's reluctance to grant an order for specific 
performance of an employment contract as a rule of law. The Court has good reason for 
generally refusing to grant such an order as a contract of employment requires the 
performance of services of a continuing nature. In addition the parties must continue to 
maintain a personal relationship. Consequently, there is a constant danger that disputes 
will arise and the Court is in no position to supervise these disputes to prevent them 
from arising or to adjudicate them once they have arisen.99 
As mentioned above, surrogacy contracts are of a personal nature. Should the court 
refuse to grant an order for specific performance because to do so would, for example, 
be inequitable or because the court is unable to supervise performance, the aggrieved 
party has a claim for damages. However, it is debatable whether either the 
commissioning parents or the surrogate mother would regard damages as adequate 
compensation should the other party be in breach of the contract. 
Nevertheless, some writers maintain that the law of contract has some advantages. An 
approach which recognises the validity of the underlying contract introduces certainty 
97 RH Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 585 
98 1982 (4) SA 151 (T) 












to the arrangement. In the event of a dispute, the first question is one of validity. Once 
this hurdle has been successfully negotiated, the next step is to interpret the contract 
and thereafter to apply it. This should be a mechanical process.1°° Following these 
steps introduces certainty to the arrangement, and from the outset the parties will be 
aware of their rights and remedies should a breach of contract occur. 
In addition, a binding contract 'sorts out the parties who choose to participate in the 
venture in the first place'.1°1 Thus, if the parties are aware that there is no escape from 
the consequences of their pact, they will think carefully before entering into it. 
How successfully does the law of contract solve to the problem of surrogacy 
arrangements? Broekhuijsen-Molenaar examines several worst case scenarios in the 
context of Dutch law, and argues that contractual principles are able to deal with most 
scenarios. She admits that certain aspects of surrogacy contracts are likely to be 
contrary to public policy, 102 but raises the notion of severability of contracts, thereby 
concluding that absolute avoidance of the contract need not take place as long as there 
is no order of specific performance for an act that offends public policy. She argues that 
in the context of surogacy contracts the main obligation involves the child's surrender 
100Brinig comments that '[u]nder a contract law analysis, the issues are whether the arrangement between 
the parties satisfies the requirements for an enforceable contract, and if so, how the contract is to be 
interpreted, applied, and enforced'. Margaret Friedlander Brinig 'A Materialistic Approach to Surrogacy: 
Comment of Richard Epstein's Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement' (1995) 81 
Virginia Law Review 2377 at 2377 n 1 
IOI Richard A Epstein 'Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement' (1995) 81 Virginia Law 
Review 2305 at 2339 












by the surrogate mother. This obligation should not be specifically enforceable for 
reasons of public policy, and a claim for damages would be an adequate remedy.103 
What is to happen if the surrogate mother refuses to surrender the child? The 
commissioning parents may have a claim for damages, calculated according to 
contractual principles. 104 (When damages are calculated according to positive interesse, 
one compares the situation in which the party currently finds himself with the situation 
he would have found himself in should the contract have been fulfilled.) 
If the prospective parents refuse to accept the child, the surrogate mother could claim 
damages from them (again the measure of damages to be calculated according to 
positive interesse), as she is now responsible for maintaining a child she would 
otherwise not have had to support if the contract had been fulfilled.105 
Broekhuijsen-Molenaar argues that provisions relating to the payment of the surrogate 
mother is a secondary obligation, and as such the surrogate mother should be allowed 
to claim compensation for the pain and effort of her pregnancy. In other words, 
provisions relating to payment of the surrogate mother in excess of actual costs 
incurred would be valid and enforceable.106 
103 A M L Broekhuijsen-Molenaar 'Contractual Aspects of Surrogate Motherhood in the Netherlands' 
505 
104 AM L Broekhuijsen-Molenaar 'Contractual Aspects of Surrogate Motherhood in the Netherlands' 
505 
!OS AM L Broekhuijsen-Molenaar 'Contractual Aspects of Surrogate Motherhood in the Netherlands' 
505 












She also maintains that any restraints on the lifestyle and conduct of the surrogate 
mother during pregnancy are invalid and unenforceable for reasons of public policy. 
Lastly, provisions restraining the surrogate mother from aborting the child are most 
certainly invalid and wholly unenforceable, because to enforce such a term would 
constitute an unacceptable restriction of individual freedom.107 
It appears from the above that with some ingenuity the principles of contract can be 
utilised in order to cope with any, or at least most, of the worst case scenarios likely to 
arise from surrogacy contracts. However, it is arguable whether the law of contract 
does provide the parties with adequate remedies to the problems of surrogate parenting. 
The courts are reluctant to grant the remedy of specific performance in the context of a 
contract for personal service, and it is doubtful whether the parties would regard 
damages as an adequate remedy in the case of breach, particularly where a surrogate 
mother refuses to hand over the child. 
2.3.2.3. Family Law: 
Advocates of a static approach (that is, leaving things as they are) argue that the 
problems presented by surrogacy should be resolved according to the established 
principles of family law. Garrison writes that '[t]he novelty of surrogate parenting has 
seemingly blinded many commentators to the ordinariness of the basic legal issues - a 












contract between unmarried parents regarding a future stepparent adoption, and the 
custody/visitation rights of these same parents. These are not altogether novel issues, 
and there are potentially applicable legal principles, derived both from case law and 
statutes'. 108 The established principles of family law are most likely to be utilised when 
deciding issues pertaining to custodial and access rights. 
An area of particular concern in the context of surrogate parenting is the determination 
of parenthood. The relevant principles of the common law were formulated before the 
advent of advanced medical technologies that allow the separation of parentage into its 
genetic, gestational and social components. 
The effect of common law presumptions and relevant legislation is that a surrogate 
mother and her husband are regarded as the child's legal parents, 109 and, are unable to 
hand the child to the commissioning parents. (It is generally contra bonos mores to 
enter into a contract in which one agrees to terminate one's parental rights. Moreover, it 
is a criminal offence to abandon one's child).11° In order to terminate their parental 
rights, the birth mother and her husband would have to put the child up for adoption in 
the usual manner. 
Even where the commissioning father is the biological father, he has no inherent rights 
to the chi Id. If the surrogate is married her husband is irrebuttably presumed to be the 
108 Martha Garrison 'Surrogate Parenting: What Should Legislatures Do?' (Summer 1988) 22(2) Family 
Law Quarterly 149 at 157 
109 Section 5, Children's Status Act 82of1987 











father, provided that he has consented to the procedure. 111 Furthennore, the Children's 
Status Act expressly provides that no right, duty, or obligation shall arise between a 
child born of the artificial fertilisation of a woman and the gamete donor except where 
the donor is the birth mother or is the husband of the birth mother .112 Thus, the 
biological father has no automatic right of access, guardianship or custody to the child, 
although he may apply to court for these rights. 113 The application will not be granted 
unless the court is satisfied that the granting of the application is in the child's best 
interests.I 14 
Incorporated in the principles of family law is the notion that whenever a decision is 
made concerning a child, its best interests are to be taken into account. The standard of 
'best interest' is well established in our law, and in detennining the best interests of a 
child, 'the Court will take into account all the circumstances into account in deciding 
what is in the best interests of the child: the age, state of health and social and financial 
circumstances of each of the spouses; their characters, temperaments and past 
behaviour towards the child, the age, sex, state of health and character of the child and 
its educational and religious needs and personal preferences. The conduct of the spouse 
will be taken into account in so far as it may be indicative of his or her suitability to 
look after the child'.115 
111 Section 5 ( 1 )(a), Children's Status Act 82 of 1987 
112 Section 5(2), Children's Status Act 82of1987 
113 Section 2(1), Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act 86of1997 
114 Section 2(2), Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act 86of1997 
115 Nazeem MI Goolam 'Constitutional Interpretation of the 'Best Interests' Principle in South Africa in 
Relation to Custody'. Paper delivered at the Ninth World Conference of the International Society of 











Not only is the best interests test reflected in South African family law, it is now 
enshrined in our Constitution which states that the in every matter concerning a child 
its best interests are of paramount importance.116 In a recent case involving a father's 
right of access to his illegitimate child, Wunsch J observed that the international 
perspective is to only enforce parental rights where it is in the child's best interests.117 
However, application of the best interests test can be problematical. The test is to a 
large extent undetermined in that it does not have a fixed content. This can be 
advantageous as it affords the court a certain amount of flexibility in deciding which 
factors it should give weight to in a particular instance. However, Goolam evaluates the 
test as applied in South Africa and criticises it for its eurocentricity. 'In a multicultural 
society such as South Africa's, the indeterminacy of the 'best interests' principle is 
exacerbated. The divergent social values of our diverse cultures will result in differing 
approaches to the principle' .118 
The best interests standard is closely linked to the concept of children's rights. King 
criticises the emphasis placed on children's rights. He argues that there is a perception 
that the mere existence of children's rights will result in an utopian situation where all 
116 Section 28(2), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996 
117 Chodree v Vally 1996 (2) SA 28 (WLD) 
118 Nazeem MI Goolam 'Constitutional Interpretation of the 'Best Interests' Principle in South Africa in 
Relation to Custody'. Paper delivered at the Ninth World Conference of the International Society of 











the evils that children face will fall away.11 9 He maintains that children's rights are 
formulated in such a way as to go beyond the scope of what may be called law. 'They 
are formulated as law, because there is no other mode (or code) for modern society to 
make generally available its fears and hopes for children and their future and, at the 
same time, to hold out the possibility of allaying those fears and realising those 
hopes•.120 In short, children's rights are unable to prevent a child from suffering 
injustice. King notes that children's rights are most effective where the law is able to 
offer procedural protections. 
Goolam discusses other criticisms of children's rights. He describes a rights approach 
as being unnecessarily adversarial (the interests of the child have preference to that of 
its parents),1 21 and suggests that a child's interests may be better served by developing 
the obligations of those charged with the care of children.122 
The application of family law to surrogacy arrangements amounts to the adoption of an 
approach based on the status quo. The surrogate mother and her husband would be 
regarded as the child's legal parents and the commissioning parents would have to 
adopt the child in order to become its legal parents. This approach does not recognise 
the parties' intentions. Should the surrogate mother refuse to relinquish the child, the 
11 9 Michael King 'Against Children's Rights' (1996) Acta Juridica 28 at 29 
12o Michael King 'Against Children's Rights' (1996) Acta Juridica 28 at 38 
121 Nazeem MI Goolam 'Constitutional Interpretation of the 'Best Interests' Principle in South Africa in 
Relation to Custody'. Paper delivered at the Ninth World Conference of the International Society of 
Family Law, Durban, 28-31 July 1997 at 11 
122 Nazeem MI Goolam 'Constitutional Interpretation of the 'Best Interests' Principle in South Africa in 
Relation to Custody' Paper delivered at the Ninth World Conference of the International Society of 











commissioning parents can theoretically apply to court for an order awarding them 
custody of the child. They would have to establish that this is in the best interests of the 
child. The surrogate mother would be in a very strong position as not only is she the 
biological mother but would presumably be able to demonstrate adequate parenting 
skills. Unless, the surrogate mother was unfit, it is doubtful that the 'best interests' test 
would operate in favour of the commissioning parents. Furthermore, family law 
principles do not protect the surrogate mother should the commissioning parents decide 
that they no longer wish to take the child. 
2.4. Conclusion 
It is hard to deny that in certain circumstances, surrogacy arrangements are valuable. 
Although surrogacy arrangements may be abused, the right of individuals to enter into 
these arrangements should be protected. The role of the lawmaker is to ensure that any 
abuse is prevented. A blanket prohibition goes too far in preventing abuse as it would 
deny certain individuals the opportunity to procreate. It is submitted that in the context 
of surrogate parenting, a regulatory approach is the only practical solution. 
An examination of existing legislation and of the common law suggests that the 
situation in South Africa is unsatisfactory. Present legislation is applicable to surrogacy 
arrangements by chance and not by design, with the result that the position of all parties 











While our common law may well be able to provide some solutions to the problems 
raised by surrogate motherhood arrangements, too much reliance on common law 
principles may be disadvantageous. A contractual approach assumes equality of 
bargaining power, which may not be the case. Furthermore, the remedy of specific 
performance may not be available to the parties. As previously stated, the court may be 
reluctant to enforce contracts for personal services, especially where it is difficult for 
the court to enforce its decision.123 
The nature of the surrogacy arrangements suggests that damages will not adequately 
compensate the parties in the case of breach. For example, where the commissioning 
parents decide that they no longer wish to take the child, the surrogate mother is left 
with the responsibility of raising the child. Although the commissioning parents can 
provide compensation to the surrogate mother for the maintenance of the child, this can 
not be regarded as adequate compensation for the additional responsibilities the 
surrogate mother will have to assume in raising the child. 
Family law is another possible solution, but one that is unlikely to provide certainty. It 
is submitted that litigation should be avoided at all costs. Uncertainty may lead to 
increased litigation, which is undesirable. Yet another criticism is that family law 
leaves too much to the discretion of the judiciary. The issues that can arise out of a 
surrogacy arrangement are complex and may have consequences far beyond the lives of 
the immediate parties to the arrangement and as such are not easily justiciable. 
Moreover, family law does not recognise the intentions of the parties to the 











arrangement, which leaves the parties in a precarious position should there be a breach 
of the contract. 
Thus in the interests of all concerned, it would seem sensible that surrogacy 
arrangements are comprehensively regulated by means of legislation. The legislation 
should first and foremost address the question of the legality of surrogate arrangements, 
and should also provide clear instructions to the parties with regard to how they are to 

























The Constitution has had an enonnous impact on every aspect of South African law.124 





















It contains a Bill of Rights,125 which guarantees the human rights of all persons and 
affirms such democratic values as human dignity, equality and freedom.126 While a 
right is a statement of entitlement which may give rise to an action in law, it may also 
serve as a blueprint for the ideal society. Thus, 'a claim of right can transmit a powerful 
message concerning the kind of society we want to live in, the kinds of relations among 
people we wish to foster, and the kind of behaviour that is to be praised or blamed•.121 
Almost without exception, legal recognition of family relationships is founded on 
biological kinship. As surrogacy poses a challenge to the precepts on which kinship is 
based and has far reaching implications for women and children, the impact of the 
Constitution on the proposals of the South African Law Commission,12s and on those 
contained in the draft final report of the Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on 
the Report of the South African Law Commission, must be examined.129 
The rights contained within the Bill of Rights clearly bind the State vis-a-vis the 
individuaJ.130 In other words state action must be in accordance with the provisions 
125 The Bill of Rights is contained in Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 
108of1996 
126 Section 7( 1 ), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 provides that '[t]his Bill of 
Rights is the cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all people in our 
country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom' 
127 Elizabeth M Schneider 'The Dialectics of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's 
Movement'. In Martha Albertson Fineman and Nancy Sweet Thomadsen (eds) At the Boundaries of Law 
- Feminism and Legal Theory ( 1991) 312 
128 South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65: 1993) 
129 Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law Commission on 
Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 
130 Section 8( l ), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 provides that '[t]he Bill of 











contained in the Bill of Rights. However, individuals are also bound by the Bill of 
Rights vis-a-vis other individuals (in so far as the nature of the right enables an 
individual to be bound).131 In the case of surrogate motherhood arrangements it is 
likely that reliance will be placed on certain of the provisions of the Constitution in 
actions both against the State and other individuals. 
3.1.1. Rights of Potential Application in the Context of Surrogacy Arrangements 
There are a number of rights which are of potential application to surrogate 
motherhood arrangements, including (but not limited to) the right to equality,132 the 
right to human dignity, 133 the right to freedom and security of person, 134 the right to 
reproductive autonomy, 135 the right not to be subjected to slavery, servitude or forced 
labour,136 the right ofprivacy,137 and the rights of children.138 
l31 Section 8(2), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996 provides that '[a] 
provision of the Bill of Rights binds natural and juristic persons if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, 
taking into account the nature of the right and of any duty imposed by the right' 
132 Section 9, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996 
133 Section 10, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996 
134 Section 12, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996 
135 Section 12(2), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996 
136 Section 13, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 
137 Section 14, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996 











The equality provision states that everyone is equal before the law and has the right to 
equal protection and benefit of the law.139 The State may not unfairly discriminate 
directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, 
sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language, and birth.140 Also, individuals 
may not discriminate against other individuals on any of the grounds enunciated 
above. 141 In addition, section 9(5), which provides that discrimination on one or more 
of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it can be shown that the 
discriminatory act is in that instance actually fair. Thus, once an individual has 
established the existence of a right, it is incumbent on the opposing party to show why 
that right should be limited. 
The right to human dignity states that everyone has inherent dignity, and the right to 
have their dignity respected and protected.142 The right to freedom and security of 
person guarantees everyone the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which 
includes the right (a) to make decisions concerning reproduction; (b) to security in and 
control over their body; and (c) not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments 
without their infonned consent.1 43 No one may be subjected to slavery, servitude or 
139 Section 9(1), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996 provides that '[e]veryone 
is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law'. 
140 Section 9(3), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996 
141 Section 9(4), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996 
142 Section 10, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996 











forced labour,144 Everyone has the right to privacy.145 Section 28 lists a number of 
rights with regard to children, and section 28(2) enshrines the principle of the best 
interests of the child, providing that a child's best interest is of paramount importance 
in every matter concerning the child. 146 
3.1.2. Limitation Clause 
The rights contained in the Constitution are not absolute. Once a party has established 
the existence of a right and its infringement, it falls to the opposing party to show why 
the right should be limited. These rights are subject to the limitation clause which sets 
out the factors which a court must take into account in deciding whether the 
infringement or limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.147 
3.1.3. Interpreting the Bill of Rights 
When interpreting a provision contained within the Bill of Rights, a court or tribunal is 
directed to interpret a provision in such a way as to promote the underlying principles 
144 Section 13, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 . 
145 Section 14, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996 provides that '[e]veryone 
has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have - (a) their person or home searched; (b) their 
property searched; (c) their possessions seized; or (cl) the privacy of their communications infringed'. 
l46 Section 28(2), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996 
147 Section 36, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 provides that '[t]he rights in 
the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors including (a) the nature of the right; (b) the 
importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and the extent of the limitation; (d) the relation 











of an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.148 
The Constitution encourages reference to sources of law outside South Africa itself 
such as human rights treaties and international covenants.149 Thus, the provision 
implies that reference must be made to the contents of international covenants, such as 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1so and the United Nations Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.1s1 
148 Section 39(1)(a), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996 
149 Section 39( 1), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996 provides that when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, 'a court, tribunal or forum (a) must promote the values that underlie an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must consider 
international law; and (c) may consider foreign law'. 
ISO The Convention was ratified by South Africa on 16 June 1995 and as such our domestic legislation 
and policy will have to comply with the norms and standards set by the Convention. Nazeem M I 
Goolam 'Constitutional Interpretation of the 'Best Interests' Principle in South Africa in Relation to 
Custody'. Paper delivered at the Ninth World Conference of the International Society of Family Law, 
Durban, 28-31 July 1997 at 3 











3.2. Application of the Bill of Rights to Surrogacy Arrangements 
In this section a number of rights of potential application to surrogacy arrangements are 
examined. In doing so it is hoped to demonstrate that the Constitution, in fact, provides 
powerful arguments both for and against the practice of surrogacy. 
Those opposed to surrogacy argue that despite the existence of legislation, which 
appears to be gender neutral, the social and legal control of women's reproductive 
capacities has been a principal source of gender inequality. Surrogacy does not pose the 
same problems for men as it does for women. In other words, equality is not always 
about treating individuals alike. Surrogacy allows women, as a class, to be turned into 
something for use by others. While a single case of surrogacy may not be exploitative 
and may even benefit the surrogate mother, it is possible to argue that the 
commodification of reproductive capacities may have negative implications for women 
and children in general. It may contribute to gender inequality in that it reinforces the 
view of women as second class citizens. Thus, it is argued, the law should take steps to 
ensure that morally irrelevant characteristics (for example, race, religion, gender) are 
not transformed into systematic sources of social disadvantage.152 
152 See Cass R Sunstein 'Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, 











On the other hand, it is possible to argue that the harms discussed above are 
speculative, and the advantages of affording an infertile couple the opportunity to 
become parents should not be ignored.153 
3.2.1. Equality Clause 
The equality clause is central to the Bill ofRights.'54 In a decision of the Constitutional 
Court, O'Regan J states that 'it is not surprising that equality is a recurrent theme in the 
Constitution. As this Court has said in other judgements, the Constitution is an 
emphatic rejection of our past in which inequality was systematically entrenched'.155 
The Constitutional Court has stressed that gender discrimination should not take a 
backseat to racial discrimination.156 
The provisions of section 9 are of crucial importance to unmarried persons wishing to 
utilise surrogate motherhood arrangements. This aspect is examined more closely 
elsewhere but, briefly, the South African Law Commission proposes that only 
heterosexual married couples have access to surrogate motherhood arrangements. This 
would appear to be an infringement of the equality clause as unmarried persons as well 
153 See D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. In Christina Murray (ed) Gender and the New South 
African Order (1994) 121 
154 Section 9, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 
155 Brink v Kitsho.f!NO 1996 (6) BCLR 752 (CC) at para 34 
156 O' Regan J states that, '[a]lthough in our society, discrimination on grounds of sex has not been as 
visible, nor as widely condemned, as discrimination on grounds of race, it has nevertheless resulted in 
deep patterns of disadvantage. These patterns of disadvantage are particularly acute in the case of black 
women, as race and gender discrimination overlap. That all such discrimination needs to be eradicated 












as homosexual and lesbian couples are discriminated against by virtue of their marital 
status and/or sexual orientation. Thus, in order to restrict access to surrogacy to married 
heterosexual couples, the State would have to establish that the limitation is reasonable 
and justifiable in an open and democratic society.157 It should be noted that the 
regulations to the Human Tissue Act have been amended to allow unmarried women 
access to artificial fertilisation techniques.158 
The Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee appears to recognise that access to 
surrogacy arrangements should not be restricted to married couples, as it proposes that 
any competent and suitable person or persons may commission a surrogacy 
arrangement.159 This indicates that a person's marital status should not prevent them 
from becoming a commissioning parent. However, the requirement that the 
commissioning person or persons be 'suitable' is problematic. How is suitability to be 
determined? It is possible that this requirement may be interpreted in such a way that 
lesbian and homosexual couples are prevented from being commissioning parents. For 
example, in the United Kingdom, although there is no formal requirement that a 
woman be married or have a male partner to receive infertility treatment from a 
licensed centre, section 13(5) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act requires 
that' [a] woman shall not be provided with treatment services unless account has been 
taken of the welfare of the any child who may be born as a result of the treatment 
(including the need of that child for a rather), and of any other child who may be 
157 Section 36, Constitution of the Republic of SouJh Africa Act 108 of 1996 
158 Human Tissue Act 65of1983 
159 para 6.4.2.3, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee of the Report of the South African Law 











effected by the birth'. 160 This section acts as a screening device in respect of access to 
infertility treatment. It should be noted that Parliamentary Ad Hoc Committee 
expressly provides that marital status or sexual orientation should not disqualify a 
person or persons from becoming a parent or parents.161 {The Committee notes the 
view of the National Party which is that surogacy should not be available to 
homosexual persons, whether single or in a relationship).162 
Section 7(2), indicates a commitment to substantive equality. The section reads as 
follows, 'the State must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of 
Rights'. Thus, there is a duty upon the State to see that real equality as opposed to 
formal equality is achieved. 
The commitment to substantive equality is also of importance as far as women's rights 
are concerned. Formal equality in the form of gender neutral rules or laws can often 
disguise bias. An approach that is premised on formal equality, seeks to treat all 
individuals alike. In the context of women's rights, this means that women are to be 
treated the same as men, with no regard to women's specificities. Sunstein objects to 
this particular view of equality as 'these notions see discrimination only in explicit legal 
160 Section 13( 5), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
161 para 6.4.2.4, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee of the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Drqft Final Report dated October 1998 at 36 
162 para 6.4.2.4, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee of the Report of the South African Law 











distinctions based on race and sex, and never in legal rules that operate to disadvantage 
blacks and women because they are rooted in white or male norms' .163 
That this idea of equality is inherently unfair is illustrated by the approach of the 
United States Supreme Court when deciding cases concerned with reproductive choice. 
The Court has reasoned that as pregnancy is unique to women, any decision concerning 
pregnancy cannot be the appropriate subject of the equality clause.164 Thus, it has based 
its decisions on the right to privacy under the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment.165 In doing so the Court failed to acknowledge that, historically, the 
dichotomy between the public (work) and private (home) sphere has contributed to the 
oppression ofwoman.166 
3.2.2. The Right to Make Decisions Concerning Reproduction 
This right may be relied upon by persons wishing to utilise surrogacy to procreate.167 
However, reliance on this provision is subject to challenge on a number of grounds 
relating to harm suffered by the parties to a surrogacy arrangement and to society as a 
whole. 
163 Cass R Sunstein 'Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, 
Abortion, and Surrogacy)' (Jan 1992) 92(1) Columbia Law Review 1 at 2 
164 See Cass R Sunstein 'Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, 
Abortion, and Surrogacy)' (Jan 1992) 92(1) Columbia Law Review 1 
165 See Cass R Sunstein 'Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, 
Abortion, and Surrogacy)' (Jan 1992) 92(1) Columbia Law Review 1 
166 Diana Majury 'Strategizing in Equality' In Martha Albertson Fineman and Nancy Sweet Thomadsen 
(eds) At the Boundaries of Law - Feminism and Legal Theory (1991) 324 











Of interest is that the Bill of Rights makes separate provision for the right to make 
decisions concerning reproduction. As mentioned above, the notion of equality is 
central to an understanding of the Bill of Rights, and in fact, it is possible to consider 
many of the other rights as specific manifestations of this clause. Certainly, the right to 
reproductive autonomy is closely linked to that of equality, and in so far as women's 
rights are concerned, these rights are co-dependent. 
Birenbaum writes that 'as long as women are socially disadvantaged by their 
childbearing capacity and the gender roles entrenched in South African society, it 
remains impossible for most South African women to make free and uncoerced 
decisions concerning reproduction'. 168 In other words, women need to achieve 
substantive equality for the right to reproductive autonomy to mean anything. 
Reproductive freedom is still a key issue in the ongoing struggle to redress the 
oppression of women. As with all the reproductive technologies, surrogacy raises 
questions about the role of women in society. Stanworth voices her fears with regard to 
reproductive technologies as follows. 'In contemporary societies, where women not 
only bear children but are defined predominantly in terms of their reproductive 
capacities, what impact will changes in reproduction that may accompany the new 
technologies have on women's lives?'169 
168 Joanna Birenbaum 'Contextualising Choice: Abortion, Equality and the Right to make Decisions 











Reproductive technologies are not only concerned with the prevention or control of 
fertility. Stanworth identifies four groups of reproductive technologies, two of which 
are of concern for the purposes of this discu~ion. The first is aimed at fertility control, 
and is in direct contrast to the group concerned with conceptive technologies. 170 While 
the section would clearly apply to those technologies aimed at fertility control, it is less 
clear that it provides a right to procreate as and how one pleases. Since the enactment 
of the Constitution, the issue of reproductive rights has yet to receive much legislative 
attention.111 While the law is committed to reproductive freedom, it is debatable 
whether at present reproductive technologies which promote pregnancy are a priority. 
In countries such as South Africa, where resources are scarce, assisted reproduction 
will be eclipsed by 'the harsh realities of population control through one parent 
families, semi-voluntary sterilisation programmes and debates about the value of 
lactation, family planning and infanticide'.172 
Whether or not the right to reproductive freedom encompasses a right to use 
reproductive technologies to conceive has to some extent been considered by writers in 
the context of the American constitutional law. Robertson has argued that it may prove 
as harmful to deny a person the right to have a certain experience, as it is to force an 
169 Michelle Stanworth 'Introduction'. In M Stanworth (ed) Reproductive Technologies: Gender, 
Motherhood and Medicine (1987) 3 
170 Stanworth identifies two other groups of reproductive technologies which are concerned with 'the 
management oflabour and childbirth', and with 'improving the health and the genetic characteristics of 
foetuses and of newborns'. Michelle Stanworth 'Introduction'. In M Stanworth (ed) Reproductive 
Technologies: Gender, Motherhood and Medicine (1987) 10-11. 
17 1 Of note are the new laws with respect to abortion, which are contained in the Choice on Termination 
of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1997. Furthermore, the regulations to the Human Tissue Act 65 of 1983 have 
been amended so as to allow single women access to artificial reproductive technologies. 
172 MD A Freeman 'Responding to the Reproductive Revolution: Law Reform - Dilemmas and 











unwanted experience upon them. He argues that the American Constitution protects 
the right to procreate and that this right encompasses not only the freedom to avoid 
reproduction but would also extend to the 'freedom to reproduce when, with whom and 
by what means one chooses'.173 However, while the American Supreme Court has 
considered the right to procreate, its decisions have been confined to the issues of state 
ordered sterilisation, contraception and abortion. Nevertheless, these cases establish 
that the individual (regardless of his or her marital status) is to some extent protected 
from unwarranted state intervention with his or her right to procreative freedom.174 
Although this is an ill defined area of the law, Robertson argues that the right to 
reproductive freedom confers a positive right to procreate.J7S 
173 John A Robertson 'Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth' 
(1983) 69(3) Virginia Law Review 405 at 406 
174 In the earlier half of this century the United States Supreme Court considered two cases on the 
legality of state ordered sterilisation. Although, in Buckv Bell 274 U.S. 22(1927), the Court found that 
sterilisation of mentally retarded persons without their consent violated neither the due process nor the 
equal protection clause of the American Bill of Rights, this decision is now largely regarded as being 
incorrect. In Skinnerv Oklahoma 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the Court found that a criminal statute that 
ordered the sterilisation of criminals who had repeated felony convictions but which exempted 'white 
collar' criminals fell foul of the equal process provision contained in the Bill of Rights. The Court 
commented on the importance of procreative liberty. This right 'involves one of the basic civil rights of 
man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race ... [The 
person sterilised by the State] is forever deprived of a basic liberty.' (at 541) In Griswold v Connecticut 
381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court found that a ban on the use of contraceptives by the state of 
Connecticut violated marital privacy. However, the case of Eisenstadt v Baird 405 US. 438 (1972) 
extended this reasoning to unmarried persons. The Court stated at 453 that 'if the right of privacy means 
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child.' In Roe v Wade 410 US. 113 (1973), the Court considered the right to terminate a pregnancy. In 
Cleveland Board of Education v La Fleur, 414 US. 632 (1974), the Court remarked at 639-640 that, 'this 
court has long recognised that personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the 
liberties protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment'. Anon Reproductive 
Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried' (1986) 99 Harvard Law Review 1936 at 675-
677 
175 John A Robertson 'Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth' 











If one assumes that the right to reproductive freedom does go so far as to confer a 
positive right to procreate by using reproductive technologies, is there any reason to 
limit the right? In other words assuming the existence of a prima facie right, is there 
reason to limit the right in terms of section 36? 
Many of the proponents of surrogate motherhood employ the libertarian arguments of 
freedom of choice and bodily autonomy to justify surrogate arrangements. Gary 
Skaloff, the lawyer who represented the commissioning parents in the Baby M case, 176 
argued from a libertarian perspective when he stated that if you 'prevent women from 
becoming surrogate mothers and deny them the freedom to decide, ... you are saying 
that they do not have the ability to make their own decisions, but you do. It is being 
unfairly paternalistic and it is an insult to the female population of this country' .177 In 
other words, proponents of this point of view advocate 'identical treatment in all 
circumstances' .1 78 179 
Feminist writers have criticised this sort of reasoning because it ignores the realities of 
inequality, and as such promotes formal, not substantive, equality. It disregards the fact 
'76 Jn the Matter of Baby M 525 A.2d 1128 , 217 NJ Super. 313 (Superior Ct. Chancery Division 1987), 
reversed on appeal, 537, A.2d 1227, 109 NJ 396 (NJ S. Ct. 1988) 
177 Gena Corea 'Junk Liberty'. In H Patricia Hynes (ed) Reconstructing Babylon: Women and 
Technology (1990) 166. 
178 Majury argues that an 'equal treatment' model requires absolute adherence to gender neutrality in the 
wording of rules and laws, and to a lesser extent, in their effect. Under an equal treatment analysis, any 
acknowledgement of women's specificity is characterised as "special treatment" and dismissed as 
practically dangerous and theoretically inconsistent'. Diana Majury 'Strategizing in Equality' In Martha 
Albertson Fineman and Nancy Sweet Thomadsen (eds) At the Boundaries of Law - Feminism and Legal 
Theory (1991) 321 
179 Diana Majury 'Strategizing in Equality' In Mar.ha Albertson Fineman and Nancy Sweet Thomadsen 











that men cannot fall pregnant, and ignores the differences between women and men 
and the complex nature of the unequal treatment experienced by women. 
Although it is possible to argue that adults should be able to exercise their rights to 
procreative liberty as and how they like, it has been argued that the liberty to do so 
results in the commodification and objectification of women, and is the inevitable 
result of an inherently unequal relationship. Corea goes as far as to label these rights as 
'junk'.J80 It is argued that this view is hannful to women as a class, and is the antithesis 
of what our society should be striving towards. Although the rhetoric inherent in 
criticism of the libertarian point of view may seem extreme, the argument highlights 
the problems of adopting a libertarian philosophy where the principle of self 
determination confronts feminist theories of the common good, in other words where 
the benefit experienced by the individual is considered of lesser importance than the 
interests of women as a class. In the case of surrogacy, many feminist writers feel that, 
while the individuals concerned may benefit from the arrangement (the commissioning 
parents get a desperately wanted child and the surrogate earns money or the act of 
carrying a child for others fulfils some other need of the surrogate mother), it is not 
clear that surrogate arrangements offer much toward the advancement of women as a 
class, and may well even have an adverse effect.181 
180 Gena Corea 'Junk Liberty'. In H Patricia Hynes (ed} Reconstructing Babylon: Women and 
Technology(l990) 182. 
181 Alta R Charo 'United States: Surrpgacy'. In Sheila AM Mclean (ed) Law Reform and Human 











Sunstein suggests that any discourse, based on the right to liberty, and which favours 
surrogacy, is potentially flawed.182 In order to understand the nature of the flaw it is 
essential to understand the difference between formal and substantive equality. Implicit 
in the notion of substantive equality is an awareness of the reality of difference. Formal 
equality treats everyone alike, but displays no awareness of difference. Thus, if one 
applies a formal notion of equality, it becomes possible for unfair discrimination to 
occur despite the application of a law in a seemingly gender neutral manner. While the 
recognition of individual liberty would certainly favour the use of surrogacy, and 
discourage state intervention into the private sphere, a more substantive notion of 
equality makes it clear that surrogacy may cause harm to women and children in 
general. As Sunstein argues, 'the social legitimation of exchanging women's 
reproductive capacities, and the children who result, in return for cash', 183 may well 
affect attitudes towards women thereby perpetuating inequality by keeping women in 
the position of 'second class citizens'. Comparing surrogacy to slavery, Sunstein points 
out that it is impossible to be free without being equal, and it is therefore possible to 
argue that surrogate arrangements undermine the equality right by creating an image of 
women as reproductive vehicles.184 
182 Cass R Sunstein, 'Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, 
Abortion and Surrogacy)' (Jan 1992) 92(1) Columbia law Review lat 44-48 
183 Cass R Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion 
and Surrogacy) (Jan 1992) 92(1) Columbia law Review lat 46-47 
184 Cass R Sunstein, 'Neutrality in Constitutional Law(With Special Reference to Pornography, 












3.2.3. The Right to Human Dignity and The Right not to be Subjected to Slavery, 
Servitude or Forced Labour 
These rights might be used to advocate the prohibition of surrogacy on the ground that 
it is inconsistent with the core of human dignity to allow one human being to be used to 
satisfy the desire of another human being, albeit where that desire is for a child.185 
Raymond writes that 'it violates the core of human dignity to hire a woman's body for 
the breeding of a child so that someone else's genes may be perpetuated'.186 She argues 
that if humans are not always allowed to do as they like with their bodies (for example, 
there are laws which regulate organ donation as there is some feeling that unrestricted 
practices may lead to the unwanted commodification of body parts), then why should 
the practice of surrogacy be allowed.187 
Arguments relating to the commodification of women and children may find support in 
the right not to be subjected to slavery, servitude or forced labour. It is feared that to 
allow the practice of surrogacy is to lend support to the view that women are no more 
than reproductive vessels. With this further degradation of women's status, it is feared 
that exploitative practices are sure to follow. This fear is not wholly unfounded when 
considered in the light of certain statements made by so called 'baby brokers'. One 
writer tells of plans to set up a women's clinic in Mexico with the aim of luring women 
into participating in surrogacy arrangements. The motive was purely financial -
185 Sections 10 and 13, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 
186 Janice G Raymond 'Testimony Before the House Judiciary Committee, State of Michigan'. In H 
Patricia Hynes (ed) Reconstructing Babylon: Women and Technology ( 1990) 163. 
187 Janice G Raymond 'Testimony Before the House Judiciary Committee, State of Michigan'. In H 











surrogate mothers in the United States are just too expensive. There are greater profits 
to be had in a poorer country.188 
There is also some concern that surrogacy may become yet another factor in the 
international traffic of women and children. In other words, real reproductive slavery or 
servitude may occur. Again accounts tend to show that these fears are not wholly 
unfounded. In India, a study documented parents selling unborn female children into 
prostitution.'89 Nor should the practice of inter-country adoption be ignored. In Sri 
Lanka, for example, so called 'baby farms' are known to operate and it is estimated that 
approximately 1500 children leave the island per annum as a result of baby 
trafficking.190 
A further consideration is that surrogacy in a first world country such as the United 
Kingdom raises different concerns to its utilisation in countries where women's rights 
are less firmly established. Women in poorer countries are generally less well educated 
about their rights and have fewer resources available to them in resisting exploitative 
practices. 
However, these arguments can be criticised as being highly speculative and, as such, 
not sufficient to justify the prohibition of surrogacy, especially where other measures 
188 Gena Corea 'Junk Liberty' In H Patricia Hynes ( ed) Reconstructing Babylon: Women and Technology 
(1990) 183n5. 
189 Janice G Raymond 'The International Traffic in Women: Women Used in Systems of Surrogacy and 
Reproduction'. In H Patricia Hynes (ed) Reconstructing Babylon: Women and Technology (1990) 117. 
19o Janice G Raymond 'The International Traffic in Women: Women Used in Systems of Surrogacy and 












may be employed to control prospective harm. Nonetheless, the concerns mentioned 
above are grave and merit careful consideration when formulating an approach to 
surrogacy. 
3.2.4. The Right to Privacy 
The right to privacy recognises that every person is entitled to a sphere of personal 
autonomy in which the law may not interfere. While the clause makes specific mention 
of certain situations in which the individual is entitled to rely on this right, it is not 
exhaustive and does not exclude someone from relying on it in order to defend their 
right to utilise surrogation. In the United States, decisions on reproductive autonomy 
have in fact been decided on the grounds of privacy and not on equality. 
The privacy right is by its very nature individualistic and as such does not take into 
account communal rights. Thus, in the context of surrogacy, it ignores the harmful 
effects of surrogacy on women and children. The division of life into public and 
private, hides the nature of the relationship between these two spheres. They are not 
independent realms but are actually co-dependent. In fact, the very existence of a Bill 
of Rights is recognition of the reality of this dependence. 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that this right is unlikely to be utilised in the context of 
surrogacy, as individuals wishing to assert their right to reproductive freedom are more 











However, should an application be brought under section 14, much of the reasoning 
that surrogacy poses risks to the interests of women and children, and which I have 
already discussed above, is applicable. 
3.2.5. Children's Rights 
Section 28(2) provides that in all matters concerning children, their best interests are of 
paramount importance.191 This particular clause is of great importance in the context of 
surrogacy arrangements as surrogacy is frequently challenged as potentially harmful to 
the children involved. 
In addition to the discussion surrounding the harm present in the commodification of 
children, one can question whether a surrogacy arrangement can be in the best interests 
of the child to be born as a result thereof. One should not forget the interests of the 
children exposed to a surrogacy arrangement. Little is known about the bonding 
process that exists between mother and child during pregnancy and it is possible that 
the separation of the child from its birth mother could be extremely traumatic to the 
child, causing considerable psychological problems at some future stage. 
What of the surrogate mother's other children? It is possible that their sense of security 
would be undermined after the loss of their sibling. Even if one decides that the 
potential for harm is too speculative, the question arises as to how it is possible to 
ensure that a child's interests are best protected. 











The Constitution does not provide a definition of 'best interest' and, thus, when 
interpreting this phrase our courts will have to look elsewhere. While the concept of 
'best interest' is well established in South African law, it is criticised as being 
eurocentric, in that it fails to take into account the perceptions of other cultures as to 
what is in the best interests of a child.192 In other words beliefs with respect to the best 
interests of a child differ from one culture to another. In future, however, mediators, 
judges and cultural councils' commissioners will have to take into account the 
culturally diverse approach to the issue in South Africa if the values that underlie an 
open and democratic society are to be truly promoted and respected')93 In other words 
beliefs with respect to the best interests of a child differ from one culture to another. 
King criticises the emphasis placed on children's rights. He argues that children's rights 
are formulated in such a way as to go far beyond the scope of what may be called law. 
'They are formulated as law, because there is no other mode (or code) for modem 
society to make generally available its fears and hopes for children and their future and, 
at the same time, to hold out the possibi.lity of allaying those fears and realising those 
hopes'.194 In short, children's rights are not necessarily able to prevent a child from 
suffering injustice. King notes that children's rights are most effective where the law is 
able to offer procedural protections. If this is so, then officials such as the Family 
l92 Nazeem MI Goolam 'Constitutional Interpretation of the 'Best Interests' Principle in South Africa in 
Relation to Custody'. Paper delivered at the Ninth World Conference of the International Society of 
Family Law, Durban, 28-31 July 1997 at 1 
193 Nazeem MI Goolam 'Constitutional Interpretation of the 'Best Interests' Principle in South Africa in 
Relation to Custody'. Paper delivered at the Ninth World Conference of the International Society of 
Family Law, Durban, 28-31 July 1997 at 1 











Advocate are vital in ensuring that the objectives of section 28 are achieved. The 
Family Advocate already plays a role in assisting the courts in their assessment of 
matters that involve children. The Family Advocate can ensure that the court has 
enough information to make a decision that is in the interests of the child. Of course, 
the Office of the Family Advocate can only be effective if it is adequately staffed, its 
personnel properly trained and supervised, and is allocated sufficient resources. 
3.3. Conclusion 
While the above discussion can provide no concrete answers to the problems posed by 
surrogacy, it is hoped that it shown that our Constitution has considerable application 
in the in the context of surrogate motherhood. Not only is the practice of surrogacy 
itself capable of challenge in terms of the Constitution, but many of the Commission's 
proposals fall foul of the provisions contained in the Bill of Rights and as such need to 
be reconsidered. 
Adherents to the view that surrogacy is an unwelcome practice will find support in the 
principle of equality contained within the Bill of Rights. Women in South Africa have 
suffered, and continue to suffer discrimination on account of their sex. If one looks at 
the historical context of the right to reproductive choice, it is primarily aimed at 
providing South African women with access to the means to control their own fertility, 
thereby allowing women control over their lives. It is submitted that equality must be 
the precursor of reproductive freedom. Thus, without substantive equality, reproductive 











Proponents of surrogacy are able to rely on the rights of reproductive choice and the 
right to privacy in order to support the use of surrogacy. In their favour is the fact that 
surrogacy is not a widespread practice (for one the cost is just too prohibitive), and that, 
as the nature of the harms envisaged to women and children are so speculative, its 
benefits may well justify its continued existence. It is also possible to argue that with 
proper regulation, surrogacy will not be so harmful as to justify its prohibition. In other 
words it is possible to argue that with, proper control, the practice of surrogacy is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom. 
As mentioned previously, the Constitution does impact on the recommendations of the 
South African Law Commission and, consequently, many of its proposals need to be 
reconsidered. The Commission's proposals are premised on a traditional view of the 
family. Only heterosexual married couples are entitled to access to surrogacy 
arrangements. This clearly amounts to discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation or marital status. The surrogate mother must be a married, divorced or 
widowed woman. This too may amount to discrimination on the ground of marital 
status. 195 The Commission proposes that the commissioning parents be regarded as the 
legal parents of the child and, where the surrogate mother is unwilling to part with the 
child provides that she can be compelled to do so. It is uncertain whether this will 
always be in the best interests of the child, and accordingly, it is possible to argue that 











The Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee's has made its recommendations since the 
Constitution's enactment. The Committee proposes that commissioning parents must be 
suitable persons, but that neither sexual orientation nor marital status are to play any 
role in determining suitability. 
By way of conclusion, it is submitted that in a perfect world there would be no need for 
surrogacy. The practice of surrogacy is fraught with pitfalls, and its potential for harm 
should not be underestimated. The discomfort displayed by academics, judicial and 
medical commissions of enquiry, courts and legislators alike with respect to this topic 
is testimony to its potential to harm. However, the needs of those who are infertile 
should not be forgotten, and it may be that they should be accommodated as far as it is 
possible. The Constitution provides the framework against which these competing 
interests can be evaluated in order to ensure that a fair and equitable outcome is 
achieved. 
I 9S Of note is the amendment to the regulations to the Human Tissue Act 65 of 1983, which al low single 
woman to undergo artificial reproductive techniques. Regulation 8(1) deleted by Government Notice 












ACCESSING SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS: THE CONTRACT 
AND ITS SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES 
4.1. The Legal Recognition of Surrogacy Contracts 
Surrogacy is a collaborative process whereby a person or a couple engage a woman 
{very often a stranger) to have a child for that person or that couple. The parties {the 
commissioning parent or parents and the surrogate mother) generally draw up a 
contract, which contract would include a full statement of the parties undertakings, and, 
in particular, would provide for the surrender of the child to the commissioning parent 
or parents. 
In addition to the aforementioned terms, a surrogacy contract is likely to make 
provision for the death or divorce of the commissioning couple, the conduct of the 
surrogate mother during pregnancy, the circumstances in which the foetus may be 
aborted, the commissioning parents' responsibilities should the child be born mentally 
or physically handicapped, the parties' right to publicise the event, access rights {if 
any) of the surrogate mother to the child, and compensation payable to the surrogate 
mother. 
Although the parties may enter into a surrogacy agreement, the validity of the contract 











recourse against the defaulting party. In practice this may result in a situation where the 
commissioning parents are unable to compel the surrogate mother to surrender the 
child, or a surrogate mother is burdened with an unwanted child. 
Surrogacy arrangements are sometimes argued to be contra bonos mores and, thus, 
void. The reasons for their apparent illegality has been debated at length, but, in short, 
relate to the beliefs that surrogacy is inconsistent with human dignity, and that it 
encourages commercialism and exploitation, particularly of women and children. 
The argument that surrogacy is inconsistent with human dignity (because surrogacy 
commodities women's reproductive capacities and encourages the perception that 
babies are assets to be bought and sold) has been suggested as a reason for resistance to 
the recognition of these contracts.1 96 Surrogacy has also been criticised for encouraging 
a view of women that is undesirable. Recognition of surrogacy agreements may 
encourage the perception that women are objects for use by others.1 97 While a 
particular surrogacy arrangement may benefit the surrogate mother, it can be argued 
that commodifying reproductive capacities may have negative implications for women 
as a class,198 and may contribute to gender inequality as it reinforces the view of 
women as second class citizens.199 
196 See D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. In Christina Murray ( ed) Gender and the New South 
African Legal Order ( 1994) 
197 Cass R Sunstein 'Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special reference to Pornography, Abortion 
and Surrogacy)' (Jan 1992) 92( 1) Columbia Law Review 1 at 46 
198 Cass R Sunstein 'Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special reference to Pornography, Abortion 
and Surrogacy)' (Jan 1992) 92( 1) Columbia Law Review 1 at 46 
199 Cass R Sunstein 'Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special reference to Pornography, Abortion 











Raymond expresses the concern that surrogacy will lead to a view of women's 
reproductive capacities as an appropriate subject for commodification. 'When a state 
makes a surrogacy contract enforceable, even with the best of caveats and regulations 
to limit abuse and gross inequalities, it still does not address the nature of surrogacy 
itself which casts women in the role of "alternative reproductive vehicles", "rented 
wombs", "human incubators" and mere receptacles for spenn. An ultimate tragedy of 
surrogacy is that women come to view themselves as mere reproductive containers. 
Further what kind of society wants its female children to be born into a world where 
there is a breeder class of women? ... Are these the kind of aspirations we want girl 
children to have?•200 
It has been suggested that surrogacy contracts are inherently hannful to children, as 
they turn babies into commodities - objects to bought on the open market to satisfy the 
desire to have children. However, Trebilcock argues that if one considers that what is 
really being bought is the opportunity to become a parent, then the fear of 
commodification recedes. He comments that 'although carrying a child to tenn may 
mark the beginning of becoming a parent, the real task of child rearing begins with the 
birth of the child. The care, love, and nurturing demanded by children involves 
substantial resources, many years of a parents' life, endless degrees of energy, patience, 
and understanding, and ongoing financial commitments. That money is required in the 
raising of children, whether it be to pay for day-care, education, health care, or other 
amenities of life, does not seem to have destroyed the love most parents feel for their 
200 Janice G Raymond 'The International Traffic in Women: Women Used in Systems of Surrogacy and 











children, and it is difficult to believe that allowing commercial surrogacy contracts is 
antithetical to this love•.201 
It has been argued that surrogacy arrangements are unnatural, and 'threaten the nature 
of the family unit by introducing a third party into the process of procreation which 
should be confined to a loving relationship between two people'.202 These statements 
ignore the fact that infertility places additional strain on a relationship. Society expects 
women (especially married women) to have children and the failure to do so can cause 
tremendous heartache. 
Pretorius comments that it is extremely difficult in a heterogeneous society such as 
ours, to ascertain whether surrogacy arrangements offend the legal convictions of the 
community.203 Of interest is the fact that in some African tribes, practices similar to 
surrogacy arrangements are acceptable in certain circumstances in order to ensure that 
the kraal head has male offspring.204 
It is clear that there is no uniformity of opinion as to whether surrogacy offends public 
policy. However, as surrogacy arrangements address a legitimate need, it is submitted 
that the practice should be permitted in the case of genuine infertility, unless there are 
compelling reasons for denying the parties access to this process.205 
20l M J Trebilcock The Limits of Freedom of Contract (1993) 52 
202 ML Lupton 'Surrogate Parenting: The Advantages and Disadvantages' (1986) TRW 148 at 152 
203 Diederika Pretorius Su"ogate Motherhood: A Worldwide View of the Issues (1994) 82 
204 Diederika Pretorius Surrogate Motherhood: A Worldwide View of the Issues (1994) 84 











4.1.1. A Comparative Perspective 
Many legal dispensations have refused to recognise surrogacy contracts, and impose 
criminal sanctions should the parties choose to go ahead with the arrangement. In 
Australia, for example, the state of Queensland has refused to recognise surrogacy 
arrangements. An investigation of surrogate parenting produced the Surrogate 
Parenthood Act,206 which prohibits parties from entering into a surrogacy contract 
(whether formal or informal, for gain or not), and imposes stiff penalties on those who 
transgress.207 Moreover, the Queensland Status of Children Amendment Act provides 
that a child,208 conceived by means of artificial fertilisation, and born to a married 
woman will be regarded as the child of that couple (provided that her husband has 
consented to the procedure). A child born to an unmarried woman or to a woman 
whose husband has not consented to the procedure, and conceived by means of 
artificial reproduction will be regarded as the birth mother's child, a situation that is not 
provided for in terms of the Act. 
The effect hereof is that should the parties choose to proceed with a surrogacy 
arrangement, in addition to the possibility of criminal charges, the parties are faced 
with the problem that their contract is not enforceable. As the law does not recognise 
206 Surrogate Parenthood Act (65of1988) 
207 The Act was based on the Demack Report which was published in March 1984. This report found 
surrogacy arrangements to be contrary to public policy and to be in violation of existing adoption 
legislation. Consequently, the report recommended that a surrogate mother should not be bound by the 
agreement. 











the validity of the agreement, the commissioning couple have no claim to the child as it 
is the legal child of the surrogate mother. Conversely, as the surrogate mother is unable 
to hold the commissioning couple to the contract, she takes the risk that the 
commissioning couple will change their minds, leaving her to take care of the child. 
Another Australian state that prohibits surrogacy is South Australia. The Family 
Relationship Amendment Act prohibits all surrogacy and procuration contracts 
(contracts where a third party undertakes to arrange a surrogacy contract or introduce 
the prospective parties), 2o9 which contracts are illegal and, therefore, void.21o 
In Canada, a number of reports have addressed the topic of surrogacy, but their 
recommendations have yet to gain acceptance from the respective provincial 
legislatures. It appears that existing Canadian law would hold surrogacy contracts void 
for reasons of public policy.211 Furthermore, surrogacy contracts are likely to be 
contrary to the principles of Canadian family law, which regards any undertaking to 
hand over a child at birth as illega1.212 Parental responsibilities and rights are 
inalienable and incapable of transfer by way of contract,213 As in South Africa, 
209 Family Relationship Amendment Act (2 of 1988) 
210 Sections 10 g{l) &(2), Family Relationship Amendment Act (2of1988) 
211 Law Reform Commission of Canada Medically Assisted Reproduction (Working Paper 65: 1992) 65-
66 
212 Law Reform Commission of Canada Medically Assisted Reproduction (Working Paper 65: 1992) 66 











parentage and custody issues are detennined according to the best interests of the 
child.214 
The Law Refonn Commission of Canada recommends that surrogacy contracts be 
regarded as null and void.215 216 It submits that surrogacy arrangements fall within the 
sphere of family law. Thus, a Court asked to adjudicate the issue should do so within 
the framework of existing family law principles, without applying the law of 
contract. 217 
The Ontario Law Commission published its recommendations in 1985.218 In contrast to 
other jurisdictions the Commission's proposals were extremely facilitative of 
surrogacy. The Commission recommends that surrogacy arrangements are enforceable, 
and that the practice be regulated by means of legislation. The surrogacy contract must 
comply with legislative provisions and must be submitted for approval by the relevant 
Court. In addition, the parties' suitability to participate in a surrogacy arrangement must 
be established before the Court can approve the contract.219 The Commission states that 
214 Law Reform Commission of Canada Medically Assisted Reproduction (Working Paper 65: 1992) 66 
215 The Commission began its investigation into medically assisted procreation in 1988 and finally 
submitted its recommendations in 1992. Law Reform Commission of Canada Medically Assisted 
Reproduction (Working Paper 65: 1992) 
216 Law Reform Commission of Canada Medically Assisted Reproduction (Working Paper 65: 1992) 65-
66 
217 Law Reform Commission of Canada Medically Assisted Reproduction (Working Paper 65: 1992) 65-
66 
218 Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Human Artificial Reproduction and Related Matters 
(1985) 
219 See Bernard Dickens 'Canada: The Ontario Law Reform Commission Project on Human Artificial 











their 'sole purpose in allowing individuals to pursue surrogate motherhood 
arrangements under strict control is to respond to infertility, not to afford individuals 
the opportunity to satisfy their lifestyle preferences•.220 
In the United Kingdom, the relevant legislation does not explicitly address the status of 
surrogacy contracts, but it would appear that such contracts are unenforceable.221 The 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act settles the question of parentage in favour of 
the birth mother.222 Thus, the surrogate mother will be deemed to be the child's legal 
mother, whether pregnancy resulted from sexual intercourse, artificial insemination 
without licensed assistance or licensed assisted conception.223 If the surrogate mother is 
married and her husband has consented to the procedure, he will be presumed to be the 
legal father of the child concemed.224 
However, section 30 of the aforementioned Act permits a Court on application to make 
a parental order transferring parentage to the commissioning couple.225 If the 
application is successful, the parental responsibilities of the surrogate mother and, 
where applicable, her husband, are terminated. The Court must be satisfied that the 
22o The South African Law Commission discusses the recommendations of the Ontario Law Reform 
Commission. South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65: 1993) 51 
221 Su"ogacy Arrangements Act ( 1985) and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act ( 1990) 
222 Section 27(1), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990) provides that 'the woman who is 
carrying or has carried a child as a result of the placing in her of an embryo or of sperm and eggs, and no 
other woman, is to be treated as the mother of the child' 
223 Jo Bridgeman and Susan Millns Feminist Perspectives on Law. Law's Engagement with the Female 
Body(1998) 156 
224 Section 28, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990) 











surrogate and, if she is married, her husband 'have freely and with full understanding of 
what is involved, agreed unconditionally to the making of the order•.226 However, the 
consent of the surrogate mother is ineffective if given within six weeks of the child's 
birth.227 Should the surrogate be unwilling to surrender the child, the commissioning 
parents will not succeed with their application. Much weight is attached to the role that 
the surrogate mother plays in carrying and giving birth to the child, and, consequently, 
she will not be forced to honour a prior undertaking to surrender the child. This may 
have harsh consequences, especially in the case of full surrogacy, where the 
commissioning parents are genetically related to the child. 
A section 30 application is restricted to married couples making use of assisted 
reproduction technologies, and at least one of the intended parents must be genetically 
related to the child. The order must be sought within six months of the child's birth and 
the child must reside with the commissioning parents. Furthermore, the Court must be 
satisfied that no payments were made to the surrogate, except for reasonable expenses 
or payments authorised by the Court.228 The order is subject to provisions of the 
Adoption Act which makes the child's welfare the Court's paramount consideration.229 
226 Section 30(5), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990) 
227 Section 30(6), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990) 
228 Section 30(7), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990) 
229 Section 6 of the Adoption Act (1976), provides that '[i]n reaching any decision relating to an 
application for a parental order a court shall have regard to all the circumstances, first consideration 
being given to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child throughout his childhood; and 
shall so far as practicable ascertain the wishes and feelings of the child regarding the decision and give 











Where the commissioning parents are unable to bring an application in terms of section 
30, they can apply to adopt the child, or have it made a ward of Court.23o The Court 
would then resolve the matter by ascertaining the best interests of the child.231 
However, application of the best interests test differs from case to case. The Courts 
tend to take certain factors into account including, maternity, the material 
circumstances of the respective parties, and whether the surrogate mother wants to keep 
the child. In both Re P (Minors) (Wardship: Su"ogacy),232 and Av c,233 the surrogate 
mother was unwilling to relinquish the child. In determining the best interests of the 
child, the Court emphasised the existing maternal bond between the surrogate mother 
and the child. 
4.1.2. The South African Law Commission's Recommendations 
As discussed, surrogacy is not expressly prohibited by South African law. The Human 
Tissue Act allows for the use of donor gametes for the purpose of artificial 
insemination.234 This Act, while not intended to cover surrogacy arrangements, does 
not explicitly exclude them from its ambit. Nevertheless, in the absence of legislation 
230 Jo Bridgeman and Susan Millns Feminist Perspectives on Law. Law's Engagement with the Female 
Body(l998) 158 
231 In Re C [1985] FL R 846, Latey J discusses the criteria that the court will take into account to 
establish the best interests of the child. It is first of all important to establish that the commissioning 
couple still wanted the child and that the surrogate mother did not. Following that, the court should 
consider the commissioner's ages, their marital status and the state of their relationship, and their 
employment and residential circumstances. These factors would enable the court to assess their ability to 
provide for the child's material and emotional well-being compared with any other source. Derek Morgan 
'Who to Be or Not to Be: The Surrogacy Story' (May 1986) 49 Modern Law Review 358 at 365 
232 Re P (Minors) (Surrogacy: Wardship) [1987] 2 F.L.R. 421 
233 Av C [1985] F.L.R. 453 











to the contrary, it is questionable whether a surrogacy contract is valid and, hence, 
enforceable. If the surrogate mother refuses to hand over the child at birth, it is unlikely 
that the Courts would compel her to do so. In terms of existing law, she is the legal 
mother of the child and any agreement to terminate her parental responsibilities prior to 
birth would be contra bonos mores. The common law presumptions that establish 
parenthood favour the surrogate mother and her spouse. Furthermore, where a child is 
conceived by artificial means, the Children's Status Act provides that the child is the 
legitimate child of the couple to whom it is born, provided both spouses have 
consented to the procedure.235 The effect of this section is to determine parenthood in 
favour of the birth mother (the surrogate mother). The commissioning parents have no 
legally enforceable right to the child, even where they are the genetic parents. 
The South African Law Commission proposes legislation that would require 
compliance with certain standard practices, the enforcement of which are placed in the 
hands of the judiciary. In terms of the proposed legislation, the Court may only approve 
those pre-conception agreements that comply with certain criteria, and only these 
arrangements are to have legal effect.236 Confirmation by the Court of the surrogacy 
235 The Children's Status Act provides that 'no right, duty, obligation shall arise as a result of the 
artificial insemination of a woman and any person whose gamete or gametes have been used for such 
insemination and the blood relations of that person except where· (a) that person is the woman who gave 
birth to that child; or (b) that person is the husband of such a woman at the time of such artificial 
insemination'. Section 5(2), ChUdren's Status Act 82 of 1987 
236 The Commission proposes that no surrogate motherhood agreement shall be valid unless 'the 
agreement is confirmed in writing by a court within whose area of jurisdiction the surrogate mother is 
domiciled or habitually residing'. Clause 2(d), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report 
on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65: 1993) 
The Commission proposes further that 'any sUJTogate motherhood agreement that does not comply with 
the provisions of this Act shall be invalid and any child born as a result of any action taken in execution 
of such an arrangement shall, subject to the provisions of section 5 of the Status of Children Act, 1987 











agreement ensures that at birth the commissioning parents become the child's legal 
parents, and where necessary, the surrogate mother can be compelled to surrender the 
child. Once the agreement has been approved by the Court, the draft bill provides for 
full contractual enforcement. 
The Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee shares the South African Law 
Commission's view that it should be compulsory for the parties to enter into a written 
surrogacy arrangement.237 This agreement will have legal effect only once the Court 
has approved the contract. Thus, '[ o ]nee the Court has confirmed the agreement, it 
should be a valid and enforceable document. In this way the parties are legally bound 
by the agreement and the interests of the child [are] protected'.238 
Therefore, as long as the agreement has been confirmed by the Court, it is valid and 
enforceable. Where the arrangement does not comply with the prescribed criteria and 
the Court does not approve the contract, the surrogate mother (and where applicable) 
her husband are regarded as the child's legal parents. If the surrogate mother and her 
husband are willing to continue with the arrangement, the commissioning parents may 
apply to adopt the child. However, should either of the parties breach the agreement, 
the innocent party has no remedy as the agreement is void and unenforceable. 
Clause 8(2), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65: 1993) 
237 para 6.7. l, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 40 
238 para 6.7.2, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 











4.2. The Surrogate Motherhood Agreement 
4.2.l. Confirmation of the Agreement by Court 
As mentioned, the South African Law Commission proposes that certain criteria are 
met before a surrogacy contract will be ratified by the Court. The Commission requires 
that: 
1) The agreement be in writing and signed by all the parties;239 
2) the agreement is entered into in South Africa;240 
3) the parties are domiciled in South Africa at the time of entering into the 
agreement;241 
4) the parties must apply to Court for confirmation of the written agreement before 
impregnation can talce place;242 
5) the commissioning mother must be permanently and irreversibly infertile;243 and 
6) the parties must be competent and suitable persons, and fully appreciate the nature 
and legal consequences of their actions.244 
239 Clause 2(a), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65: 1993) 
240 Clause 2(b), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65: 1993) 
241 Clause 2(c), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65: 1993) 
242Ctause 2( d), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65: 1993) 
243 Clause 6(1 )(b)(i) & (ii), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate 











The High Court in whose jurisdiction the surrogate mother is domiciled or habitually 
resides, is charged with examining and confirming the surrogacy agreement.245 The 
parties are required to place conclusive evidence of the following before the Court: 
1) The commissioning wife's inability to give birth to a living child, which incapacity is 
permanent and irreversible;246 
2) the physical and psychological suitability of the surrogate mother to act as such;247 
3) the psychological suitability of the commissioning parents to be parents;248 
4) the family circumstances of the commissioning parents;249 and 
5) the interests of the commissioning parents' descendants or adopted child or 
children.25o 
It is arguable whether the judiciary is the only appropriate forum to evaluate these 
agreements. For example, in Israel, a surrogacy contract is assessed by a committee 
244 Clause 6(1)(b)(iii), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate 
Motherhood (Project 65: 1993) 
245 Clause 2(d), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65: 1993) 
246 Clause 6 (2)(a), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65: 1993) 
247 Clause 6 (2)(b ), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65: 1993) 
248 Clause 6 (2)(c), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65: 1993) 
249 Clause 6 (2)(d), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65: 1993) 
25° Clause 6 (2)(e), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 











comprising seven members - two gynaecologists, a doctor expert in internal medicine, 
a clinical psychologist, a social worker, a lawyer and a minister of the religion of the 
parties. There must be at least three members of each gender.251 The advantage of such 
a system is that the arrangement is assessed by a number of persons, and in making its 
decision is able to draw upon the combined expertise of its members. 
In the United Kingdom, provision is made for the appointment of a guardian ad /item to 
assist the Court where an application is brought for a parental order in terms of section 
30.252 253 The guardian ad /item is appointed on submission of the application, which 
is brought after the child's birth. The guardian ad /item is required to submit a report to 
the relevant Court after conducting enquiries as to whether or not the requirements of 
section 30 have been satisfied. The guardian ad /item is also required to ascertain 
whether the approval of a parental order is in the child's best interest. Section 6 of the 
Adoption Act provides that 'in reaching any decision relating to the application for a 
Parental Order, a Court shall have regard to all the circumstances, first consideration 
being given to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child throughout 
251 Rhona Schuz 'The Right to Parenthood: Surrogacy and Frozen Embryos' (1996) International Survey 
of Family Law 241 
252 Family Proceedings Courts (Children Act 1989) (Amendment) Rules 1994 S. I. 1994 No. 2166 
253 Rule 4A.5, The Family Proceedings (Amendment)(No 2) Rules 1994 S. I. 2165 provide that (1) As 
soon as practicable after the application has been filed the court shall consider the appointment of a 
guardian ad /item in accordance with section 41 ( 1) of the Children Act 1989. (2) In the High Court the 
Official Solicitor shall, ifhe consents, be appointed as the guardian ad /item of the child. (3) In a county 
court and in the High Court where the Official Solicitor does not consent to act as guardian ad /item, the 
guardian ad /item shall be appointed from a panel established under the Guardian Ad /item and Reporting 
Officers (Panels) Regulations 1991. (4) In addition to such matters set out in rule 4.11 as are appropriate 
to the proceedings, the guardian ad /item shall - (i) investigate the matters set out in section 30(1) to (7) 
of the 1990 Act; (ii) so far as he considers necessary investigate any matter contained in the application 
form or other matter which appears relevant to the making of a parental order; (ii) advise the court on 
whether there is any reason under section 6 of the Adoption Act 1976 (a), as applied with modifications 












his childhood'.254 Thus, the role of the guardian ad /item is an active one, requiring him 
to interview the applicants and to investigate the accuracy of the information with 
which he is provided. 
The Ontario Law Commission recommends that Children's Aid Societies (quasi-public 
agencies mandated to protect the interests of children) assist the Court in assessing the 
surrogacy arrangement.255 Where application is made for the confirmation of a 
surrogacy agreement, the relevant Children's Aid Society is notified and has locus 
standi to intervene should its records show that any of the parties are unsuitable to 
participate in the arrangement.256 
The South African Law Commission does not provide for expert assistance to the 
Court but it is implicit in its requirements that expert evidence or reports will have to 
be furnished. It is submitted that in this regard the Office of the Family Advocate could 
be of assistance to the Court, as (in theory) it has the resources to implement an 
enquiry. However, the Office of the Family Advocate is already hard pressed to cope 
with the demands placed on it, and it is possible that it may not be equipped to provide 
the Court with information of sufficient particularity for a decision to be made whether 
or not to confirm the agreement . Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court would be 
greatly assisted if an independent person or body were appointed to investigate the 
accuracy of the information placed before it. 
254 Section 6, Adoption Act 1976, as applied with modifications by the Parental Orders (Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology) Regulations 1994 
255 Bernard Dickens 'Canada: The Ontario Law Reform Commission Project on Human Artificial 
Reproduction'. In Sheila Mclean (ed) Law Reform and Human Reproduction (1992) 48 











It should be noted that it is extremely expensive to bring an application in the High 
Court. This will prevent poorer persons from making use of surrogacy. In the United 
Kingdom, legislation has been drafted which will bring parental orders within the 
ambit of those proceedings for which Legal Aid is available.257 In South Africa, 
applicants for Legal Aid must first pass a means test, and, thereafter, the merits of the 
matter are assessed. Thus Legal Aid may provide a solution for financially 
disadvantaged applicants. 
The Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee concurs with the South African Law 
Commission that it should be compulsory for the parties to conclude a written 
surrogacy agreement.258 The Committee argues that it is 'important to establish the 
intention of the parties as to parental rights and their willingness to proceed with this 
intention'.259 The contract should be confirmed by a Court before the parties can go 
ahead with the arrangement. Before confirming the agreement, the Court must be 
satisfied that the commissioning parents and surrogate mother have complied with the 
substantive requirements provided for in the proposed legislation. These requirements 
are in many instances similar to those of the South African Law Commission. 
The Committee recommends that: 
257 Legal Aid (Scope) Regulation 1994 
258 para 6. 7 .1, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 40 
259 para 6.7.1, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 











1) The parties to the surrogacy contract are South African citizens, and domiciled in 
South Africa at the time of conclusion of the contract;260 
2) the parties are suitable persons;261 and 
3) are parties are competent to enter into a surrogacy agreement.262 
However, the Committee differs from the Commission in that it recommends that a 
woman be permitted to act as a surrogate mother, regardless of her marital status or 
sexual orientation,263 provided she is suitable,264 competent,265 financially secure,266 
and has a child or children of her own. 267 (The Commission proposes that the 
surrogate mother be either a married, widowed or divorced woman, who has already 
given birth to at least one child).268 
260 para 6.4. l .5 & 6.4.2.6, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African 
Law Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 35 and at 37 
261 para 6.4. l. l & 6.4.2.3, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African 
Law Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 35 and at 36 
262 para 6.4. l .2. & 6.4.2.3, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African 
Law Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 35 and at 36 
263 para 6.4. l.3, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 35 
264 para 6.4. l. l, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 35 
265 para 6.4. l .2, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 35 
266 para 6.4. l .6, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 35 
267 para 6.4. l .4, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 35 
268 The Commission proposes that '[n]o surrogate motherhood agreement shall be valid unless the 
woman who is to become the surrogate mother has already given birth to in a natural way to at least one 











The Committee recommends that 'surrogacy should be available to any competent 
person or persons irrespective of their marital status or sexual orientation',269 whereas 
the Commission requires that the commissioning parents are a legally married 
couple.270 
The Committee does not stipulate which Court has jurisdiction to hear the matter. In 
contrast to the Commission, it would appear that the Committee envisages the lower 
Courts having jurisdiction to hear these applications. 
The Committee also proposes that the surrogacy contract is standardised. The parties 
are not prevented from including optional clauses, but these should not conflict with 
public policy.271 The Committee lists the required contents of the contract as follows: 
1) the agreement should clearly identify whether the arrangement involves full or 
partial surrogacy;212 
2) there should be an averment that the parties understand and agree to the terms of the 
3, Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65: 
1993) 
269 para 6.4.2.4, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 36 
270 'No person except a husband and wife who are lawfully married to each other and who act jointly as a 
couple shall be competent to conclude a valid surrogate motherhood agreement'. Clause 4, Schedule A to 
the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65: 1993) 
271 Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law Commission on 
Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 41 
272 para 6.7.4.1, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 











contract and the legal position pertaining to their particular surrogacy agreement;273 
3) the financial responsibilities of the parties should be established;274 
4) the commissioning parents must state that they accept responsibility for the child 
even where it is born physically or mentally handicapped;21s 
5) the health and insurance policies that are to be maintained throughout the 
agreement;276 
6) the parties should make provision for those circumstances in which abortion may 
occur. 
In particular, should the surrogate mother decide to have a non-therapeutic abortion, 
she may be held responsible for the necessary expenses of the commissioning parents 
in respect of her pregnancy;277 
7) the agreement should make provision for any rights ( for example, rights of access) 
that the surrogate mother might have with regard to the child;278 
8) the agreement should make provision for the custody of the child in the event of the 
death or divorce of one or both commissioning parents;279 
273 para 6.7.4.2, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 41 
274 para 6.7.4.4, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 41 
275 para 6. 7.4.5, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 41 
276 para 6. 7.4.6, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 41 
277 para 6.7.4.7, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 41 
278 para 6.7.4.8, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 41 
279 para 6. 7.4.8, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 











9) the parties must agree as to whether the arrangement can be publicised;280 
l 0) the agreement should provide for testing for social diseases.281 
In contrast, the Commission does not provide for a standardised contract. It simply 
requires that the agreement make provision for the 'custody, care, upbringing and 
general welfare of the child that is to be born in the event of the death of the 
commissioning parents or one of them, or their divorce before the birth of the child',282 
and its recommendations focus largely on the evidence to be placed before the Court in 
order to enable the Court to decide whether or not to confirm the agreement. 
The aforementioned requirements are only relevant once the parties are deemed 
competent and suitable persons. These notions are ill defined but nonetheless, both the 
Commission and the Committee seek to disqualify persons on these grounds. 
4.2.2. Access to Surrogacy Arrangements 
The Commission has adopted a somewhat conservative stance with regard to those 
persons who are permitted recourse to surrogacy arrangements. Eligibility requirements 
play a 'gate keeping' role in excluding certain persons from surrogacy arrangements.283 
280 para 6.7.4.9, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 41 
281 para 6.7.4.10, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 41 
282 Clause 6(l)(t), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65: 1993) 
283 Belinda Bennett 'Gamete Donation, Reproductive Technology and the Law'. In K Peterson (ed) 











While this may have the desirable effect of screening out unsuitable candidates, 
defining suitability is problematic and may be discriminatory. 
4.2.2.1. The Commissioning Couple 
As mentioned above, the Commission proposes that surrogacy arrangements are only 
available to married couples, acting jointly as such,284 where the commissioning wife is 
incapable of giving birth to a living child. This condition must be permanent and 
irreversible.285 The Commission recommends that in order to enable the Court to give 
proper consideration to the application, conclusive proof of infertility must be 
provided.286 It is submitted that these provisions are unsatisfactory as they deny access 
to surrogacy to unmarried persons, and to couples where the commissioning father is 
also infertile. 
Presently, only civil marriages are recognised as legally valid marriages in terms of 
South African law. However, this is likely to change in the near future.287 
Consequently, marriages concluded according to Customary law, Muslim or Hindu 
rites are not recognised as legally valid marriages. The failure to recognise these 
marriages is subject to constitutional challenge because this amounts to unfair 
284 Clause 4, Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65: 1993) 
285 Clause 6(1)(a), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65: 1993) 
286 Clause 6(2)(a), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65: 1993) 
287 See South African Law Commission Discussion Paper on Customary Marriages (Discussion Paper 











discrimination on grounds of religion or culture.288 Furthermore, in the context of 
same-sex marriages, there has been some suggestion that lack of legal recognition 
amounts to unfair discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.289 
A recent amendment to the regulations to the Human Tissue Act now defines 'married' 
as including 'a marriage by way of contract which, in terms of any Act or by customary 
law, constitutes a marriage',290 and allows unmarried persons access to artificial 
fertilisation. 291 Thus, persons other than legally married couples are now have access to 
artificial fertilisation. In this respect the Commission's proposals now contradict 
existing legislation. 
A reason for denying unmarried persons access to reproductive technologies is that it is 
in the child's best interest to be born to a stable two parent family.292 Certainly, the fear 
that children, who are born to unmarried persons, will be psychologically scarred and 
socially stigmatised is legitimate. However in this age of single-parent families and the 
288 Section 8, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996 
289 Section 8, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996 
290 Regulation 1 of the Regulations in tenns of section 37 of the Human Tissue Act, as amended by 
Government Notice R 1354 in Government Gazette 18362 of 17 October 1997 
291 Regulation 8(1) deleted by Government Notice R1354 in Government Gazette 18362of17 October 
1997 
292 Bridgeman and Millns quote from the Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Cmnd 9314 (1984) at para 2.5, which states that 'to judge from the evidence many 
believe the interests of the child dictate that it should be born into a home where there is a loving, stable, 
heterosexual relationship and that, therefore, the deliberate creation of a child for a woman who is not a 
partner in such a relationship is morally wrong ... We believe that as a general rule it is better for 
children to be born into a two-parent family, with both father and mother, although we recognise that it is 
impossible to predict with any certainty how lasting such a relationship will be'. Jo Bridgeman and Susan 











social reality of illegitimacy, 293 unless there is proof that being raised in a single parent 
family is likely to be detrimental to the welfare of the child, it would seem unfair to 
deny access to surrogacy arrangements to unmarried persons for this reason alone.294 
In the United States, the Supreme Court has yet to consider whether the right to 
procreate encompasses a right to utilise reproductive technologies.295 Its decisions have 
been confined to the issues of involuntary state ordered sterilisation,296 
contraception,297 and abortion.298 However, these cases establish that, regardless of 
marital status, the right to privacy protects the individual from any unwarranted 
interference by the state with his or her procreative rights. 
In Skinner v Oklahoma the Court commented on the importance of procreative liberty 
in marriage. This right 'involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and 
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race ... [The 
293 In South Africa, the failure to recognise those unions which are recognised by customary law or 
religious laws but do not comply with the Marriage Act 25of1961, has resulted in a situation where a 
large segment ofour population is in fact illegitimate. 
294 Anon 'Reproductive Technology and the Reproductive Rights of the Unmarried' (1986) 98 Harvard 
Law Review 669 at 681 
295 Robertson argues that full procreative freedom includes both the freedom not to reproduce as well as 
the freedom to reproduce when, with whom, and by what means one chooses. John Robertson 
'Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth' ( 1983) 69(3) Virginia 
Law Review 405 at 406 
296 In the earlier half of this century the United States Supreme Court considered two cases on the 
legality of state ordered sterilisation. Although, in Buck v Bell (274 US. 22(1927)), the Court found that 
sterilisation of mentally retarded persons without their consent violated neither the due process nor equal 
protection clause of the American Bill of Rights, this decision is now largely regarded as being incorrect. 
In Skinner v Oklahoma (316 US. 535 (1942)), the Court found that a criminal statute that ordered the 
sterilisation of criminals who had repeated felony convictions but which exempted 'white collar' 
criminals fell foul of the equal process provision contained in the Bill of Rights 
297 Eisenstadt v Baird405 U.S. 438 (1972) 











person sterilised by the State] is forever deprived of a basic liberty'.299 In Griswold v 
Connecticut. the link between procreative liberty and marriage was made once more 
when the Supreme Court found that a ban on the use of contraceptives by the state of 
Connecticut violated marital privacy.Joo However, Eisenstadt v Baird extended this 
reasoning to unmarried persons.JOI The Court stated that 'if the right of privacy means 
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child'.J02 In Roe v Wade, the Court found that the right to 
terminate a pregnancy is available to all persons regardless of marital status.JOJ J04 
The above cases refer to procreative freedom in the context of state interference with 
the prevention of conception. However, it is arguable whether procreative liberty 
includes the right of unmarried persons to use surrogacy to become parents. Robertson 
argues that while married persons do have a right to use reproductive technologies to 
effect conception, it does not follow that single persons have the same right. This is 
because the right accorded to married persons is an extension of the rights of familial 
autonomy and natural conception - rights that are already recognised by the Court. 
However in the case of unmarried persons, the Courts have yet to decide whether 
299 Skinner v Oklahoma 316 U.S. 535 (1942) at 541 
JOO Griswoldv Connecticut 381U.S.479 (1965) 
JOI Eisenstadt v Baird 405 U.S. 438 (1972) 
J02 Eisenstadt v Baird 405 U.S. 438 (1972) at 453 
JOJ Roe v Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
J04 I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness for the information contained in the above paragraph to 
Anon 'Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried' (1986) 98 Harvard Law 











unmarried persons have the right to conceive through natural intercourse let alone via 
artificial reproductive technologies.305 
In South Africa, the Constitution legislates against unfair discrimination, providing for 
the equal treatment of all persons.306 This right is only subject to limitation if it can be 
shown that the limitation is both reasonable and justifiable.307 Therefore, if married 
persons are permitted recourse to reproductive technologies, then unmarried persons 
should have the same rights unless it can be shown that the limitation of that right is 
reasonable and justifiable. 
Although it is often assumed that children are better off in heterosexual two parent 
families, studies of the social and emotional development of children raised in 
fatherless families indicate that the difficulties experienced by these children appear to 
be caused by the poverty and isolation these families often experience, rather than the 
absence of a father figure per se.308 It is submitted that as surrogacy involves a planned 
pregnancy, and is usually initiated by people of adequate means, a single 
commissioning parent should be given access to surrogacy. Commenting on unmarried 
women seeking access to infertility treatment in the United Kingdom,309 Golombok and 
305 John Robertson 'Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth' 
(1983) 69(3) Virginia Law Review 405 at 433 
306 Section 9, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act I 08 of 1996 
307 Section 36, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act I 08 of 1996 
308 Jo Bridgeman and Susan Millns Feminist Perspectives on Law. Law's Engagement with the Female 
Body (1998) 138 
309 In the United Kingdom, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 provides that the need 
for a father is a factor in assessing whether a woman should receive fertility treatment. The Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority Code of Practice (1995) at para 3.19 provides that 'where the 











Rust conclude that 'single women who have AID or IVF might generally be expected to 
be more motivated towards motherhood than those who have not needed or wanted to 
go to such extremes in order to give birth. Certainly, from this sign of commitment, ... 
we would not foresee special problems for children brought up in such families. The 
Warnock Report says nothing about the many children who are born into non-loving 
and unstable heterosexual relationships ... Given the extent to which children are 
abused within the traditional system, surely the double standards which have so far 
permeated the debate about eligibility for AID and IVF should be recognised'.310 
The Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee recommends that any competent and 
suitable person or persons should have access to surrogacy arrangements, regardless of 
their marital status or sexual orientation.311 Thus, unmarried men and women, 
homosexual or lesbian couples as well as married heterosexual couples are permitted to 
make use of surrogacy, provided that they comply with the Committee's other 
requirements. 
Both the South African Law Commission and the Ad Hoc Parliamentary Select 
Committee require that at least one of the commissioning parents is genetically related 
to the child. This means that surrogacy is unavailable to a couple where both parties are 
meet the child's needs throughout his or her childhood. Where appropriate, centres should consider 
particularly whether there is anyone else within the prospective mother's family or social circle willing 
and able to share the responsibility for meeting those needs, and for bringing up, maintaining, and caring 
for the child' 
310 Jo Bridgeman and Susan Millns Feminist Perspectives on Law. Law's Engagement with the Female 
Body(1998) 139 
311 para 6.4.2.4, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 











unable to provide gametes, and the commissioning wife is unable to carry a child to 
term. Certainly, it is unusual for a situation such as this to arise, but it is by no means 
impossible. The reason for allowing infertile persons access to surrogacy, is that 
surrogacy is probably their last resort. Consequently, by denying access to a couple 
where both parties are infertile one excludes the very persons who appear to be in 
greatest need of assistance from reproductive technologies. 
4.2.2.2. The Surrogate Mother 
Clearly, a potential surrogate mother must be able to cope with the considerable 
physical and psychological demands of surrogacy. Determining a potential surrogate 
mother's suitability is no easy task. Charo discusses the profile of surrogate mothers in 
the United States, and concludes that generally surrogate mothers are less educated and 
less financially secure than those persons who hire them.312 This means that surrogate 
mothers are likely to be more needy and have access to fewer resources than the 
commissioning parents, which makes them potential victims of exploitative practices. 
As discussed elsewhere, this inequality of bargaining power is a reason for the general 
reluctance to allow commercial surrogacy. On the other hand, by allowing any 
competent woman to act as a surrogate mother, women are afforded an opportunity to 
earn money while working at home. 'Childless couples, ... have a real human need, and 
they are willing to put up their own money to pay for it. On the other side are 
3!2 R Alto Charo 'United States: Surrogacy'. In Sheila AM Mclean law Reform and Human 











consenting surrogate mothers who would like the income, and who feel that the money 
amply compensates them for their labour'.313 
The South African Law Commission proposes that only those women, who have 
previously given birth in a 'natural way' to at least one child, and who at the time of the 
agreement are either married, widowed or divorced, should be regarded as suitable 
candidates for surrogate motherhood.31 4 (The proposed Bill does not define the word 
'natural' and exactly what is meant by this requirement is unclear. A possible 
interpretation is that 'natural' refers to a normal pregnancy as opposed to a pregnancy 
arising from surrogacy, or that the surrogate mother has experienced natural childbirth 
and has not given birth by way of caesarean section!) 
It is debatable whether this provision, which prevents unmarried women from acting as 
surrogates, is constitutional.315 The Commission limits the opportunity to be a 
surrogate mother to women who have already experienced motherhood and marriage. 
The rationale being that only these women will appreciate the risks associated with 
pregnancy and the implications of surrendering the child. This position ignores the 
growing acceptance of motherhood outside the bounds of marriage. Another argument 
in favour of restricting the practice to married women is that they are more likely to 
have strong familial support systems.316 However. surrogacy may well place additional 
313 R Alto Charo 'United States: Surrogacy' In Sheila A M Mclean Law Reform and Human 
Reproduction (1992) 223 at 233 
314 Clause 3, Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65: 1993) 
315 Section 9, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996 











stress on the surrogate mother's familial relationships, for example, the surrogate 
mother's husband may resent her physical and emotional commitment to the pregnancy 
and her children may experience psychological trauma. 
These proposals should be read together with the requirements relating to the genetic 
origin of the child.317 The Commission prohibits use of the surrogate mother's gametes 
or those of her husband.3 18 The child must be genetically related to at least one and 
preferably both of the commissioning parents. In this way, the Commission hopes to 
minimise the risk of the surrogate mother refusing to relinquish the child, believing that 
the absence of a genetic link will discourage the surrogate mother from becoming 
emotionally tied to the child.319 It is submitted that this view ignores the bond that will 
form between surrogate mother and child simply by her carrying the child to term. 
Furthermore, partial surrogacy is the more affordable and medically less invasive 
option. Meyerson comments that placing too many obstacles in the path of potential 
commissioning parents is likely to result in them resorting to clandestine 
arrangements. 320 
The Ad Hoc Parliamentary Select Committee also requires that the surrogate mother is 
competent and suitable. She must have given birth to children of her own, be 
311 Clause 5(1), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65: 1993) 
3l8 Clause 5(2) Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65: 1993) 
319 South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65: 1993) 152-153 
320 D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. ln Christina Murray (ed) Gender and the New South African 











financially secure, 321 be motivated by reasons of altruism,322 and have obtained her 
husband or partner's written consent.323 In addition, her husband or partner should be a 
party to the agreement.324 Thus, in contrast to the Commission, the Committee does not 
exclude unmarried women from acting as a surrogate mothers. 
4.2.3.3. Screening the Parties 
The commissioning parents and surrogate mother should be emotionally and physically 
fit to undertake their respective responsibilities. Hirsch suggests that the physician 
should conduct a physical examination and ascertain the surrogate mother's history. 
She should be tested for cervical gonorrhoea, syphilis, HIV, hepatitis, Rh (blood) 
typing, rubella titer and the physician should establish a month of basal body 
temperatures demonstrating a biphasic pattem.325 It is equally important to establish 
that the surrogate mother is psychologically prepared for the task of carrying a child to 
term and then relinquishing it. The surrogate mother's physical and psychological 
strength is critical to the success of the endeavour and great care should be taken in 
establishing this. 
321 para 6.4. l .4, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 35 
322 para 6.4. l .6, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 35 
323 para 6.4.l .8, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 35 
324 para 6.4. l .8, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 35 












It is just as important to subject the commissioning parents to screening. Where the 
commissioning father intends donating his gametes he should also be physically 
healthy and should submit to genetic testing, as well as tests to establish that his sperm 
is free from diseases such as syphilis, gonorrhoea , HN and hepatitis.326 Likewise, 
where the commissioning mother intends donating her ovum, she should submit to 
genetic testing as well as any other appropriate medical tests. 
The commissioning parents are required to submit evidence of their suitability to be 
parents, while the surrogate mother must present evidence of both her psychological 
and physical suitability to act as a surrogate.327 The Commission's memorandum directs 
the Court to consider evidence as to the 'physical health, psychological disposition and 
financial means' of the commissioning parents.328 The Court should also consider 
evidence of the physical and psychological suitability of the surrogate mother.329 
It is submitted that these directions are inadequate. The parties are informed as to the 
categories of evidence needed (that is, they should prove that they are physically, 
psychologically and, in the case of the prospective parents, financially suitable 
persons), but are left in the dark as to how exactly they should go about establishing 
326 H Hirsch 'Surrogate Motherhood - The Legal Climate for the Physician' (1986) 5 Medicine and Law 
151 at 154 
327 Clauses 6(2)(b) and (c), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate 
Motherhood (Project 65: 1993) 
328 Clause 6( 1 )(b )(ii) Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate 
Motherhood(Project 65: 1993) 
329 Clause 6(2)(b ), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 











their suitability. Presumably, they are required to place expert evidence before the 
court, but it is unclear how far they are required to go to satisfy the evidentiary burden. 
Both the Commission and the Committee recognise the importance of screening.330 331 
The Committee observes that 'it is evident that the majority of the problems emanating 
from surrogacy agreements were brought about by the insufficient screening of the 
parties'.332 In this respect, the Committee's proposals are of greater assistance to the 
parties because they are more detailed. The Committee requires that the parties submit 
to rigorous screening six months prior to entering into an agreement, as screening is 
vital to establish whether 'the parties social and psychological backgrounds are 
compatible and to determine their suitability for surrogacy arrangement'. 333 The parties 
are assessed by a screening panel, who submit their report to Court. The screening 
panel's report must address the following issues: 
1) The parties' physical and psychological suitability; 
2) the surrogate mother's financial status, and whether or not she is entering into the 
agreement for financial reasons; 
3) the parties' familial c rcumstances; 
4) the interests of any descendant or adopted child of the parties; and 
330 para 6.6, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 38 
331 South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65: 1993) 149 
332 para 6.6, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 38 
333 para 6.6.1, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 











5) the commissioning parents inability to produce a child and whether or not that 
incapacity is permanent and irreversible. 334 335 
Who should conduct the screening? Although the Commission gives no directions in 
this respect, the Committee requires that the parties are screened by a state body or 
private bodies approved by legislation.336 In addition, it proposes that members of the 
screening panel should include a social worker, psychologist, psychiatrist, a lawyer and 
a minister of religion.337 
It is submitted that there is place for both private screening and screening by state 
bodies. The advantage of being screened by a panel is that the parties are assessed by a 
number of experts. Furthermore, the associated costs are likely to be significantly 
cheaper than if the parties have to establish their suitability by recourse to independent 
practitioners. However, there can be no hann in allowing the parties to consult with 
professionals of their choice, provided that they are able to furnish the Court with the 
required evidence. 
What of the possible role of surrogacy agencies or even private medical and legal 
practitioners in facilitating surrogacy arrangements? Many dispensations have banned 
334 para 6.6.5.1- 6, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 39 
335 para 6.6.6.1- 5, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 39 
336 para 6.6.3, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 38 
337 para 6.6.3, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 











the use of professional brokers or agencies in their haste to discourage surrogacy 
arrangements or out of fear that commercial agencies may contribute to the exploitation 
of women and children. While these persons or agencies are interested in making a 
profit, this does not mean that the services they can provide are not valuable. It is 
submitted that strict regulation of their activities may be the more appropriate 
legislative response. While the Commission does allow for compensation for the bona 
fide services of medical or legal professionals, 338 the operation of commercial agencies 
is prevented by making it an offence to let it be known (in any way or with a view to 
compensation) that a person may be interested in entering into a surrogate motherhood 
arrangement. 339 
The commissioning parents may not have the resources to find a suitable surrogate, and 
may have to rely on 'fortuitous and improbable connections' with uncertain results.340 
Commercial agencies, in particular, have the resources to assess the psychological and 
physical suitability of the respective parties, weeding out those who are unfit. In 
addition, these agencies have an interest in ensuring that the arrangement is successful. 
'Traditional standards of negligence for professional actors would create incentives for 
responsible selection and preparation of the surrogate mother ... Such incentives would 
338Clause 10(3), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65: 1993) 
339Clause 12(2) & (3), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate 
Motherhood (Project 65: 1993) 
340 Andrea E Stumpf 'Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies' (1986) 











not be misplaced because responsible service is especially critical to the lives of the 
surrogate mother and the child.341 
4.2.2.4. The Interests of the Parties' Children 
The South African Law Commission requires that the Court should take potential 
prejudice to the non-material interests of any living descendant or adopted child of the 
parties into account, before confirming the pre-conception agreement.342 The 
Commission also proposes that conclusive evidence should be submitted regarding the 
family circumstances of the parents.343 However, how the Court is to go about 
determining the existence of prejudice, or for that matter the lack thereof, is unclear. 
Since few studies have been conducted n surrogacy arrangements, it is difficult to do 
anything other than speculate as to whether or not the arrangement is prejudicial to the 
surrogate mother's child(ren). The child loses rather than gains a sibling. While the 
financial aspects of the arrangement may be indirectly beneficial to a living child of the 
surrogate, it is hard to see how the experience can be anything other than emotionally 
damaging. Although some authors argue that if the matter is sensitively addressed, 
341 Andrea E Stumpf 'Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies' ( 1986) 
96 Yale Law Journal 187 at 190 n 57 
342 Clause 6(l)(e), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65: 1993) 
343 Clause 6(l)(d), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 











living children of the surrogate need not be traumatised,344 other writers fear the 
opposite to be true. While giving testimony before Congress, Elizabeth Kane, a 
surrogate mother, revealed the hann that had been done to her family. 'Today I am 
faced with a broken family. The only thing that I have taught my children is that money 
can buy anything ... One thing that my family will never be able to buy back are the 
memories that we have lost of my son .. .I have robbed my children and my parents of a 
relationship with their relative, and I am not proud ofthat'.345 
A surrogate mother faces the risk of physical hann as she undertakes to carry a child to 
tenn and give birth to it, a process that may endanger her health, if not her life. This 
most certainly is prejudicial to the living child's right to parental care. While it is 
impossible to compensate the children of the surrogate mother for their loss should 
anything untoward happen to the surrogate mother as a result of the pregnancy, the 
precaution of making financial provision for just such a situation is recommended. 
The living child(ren) of the commissioning parents may also suffer prejudice. While 
the circumstances are unusual, the child gains a sibling. In any family the birth of a new 
child brings with it the potential for sibling rivalry. This kind of jealousy is by no 
means unusual and generally passes once the older child has been reassured as to his or 
her position in the family and it is doubtful that the Court's would regard the mere fact 
that the family is being added to as prejudicial to the interests of the living child(ren) of 
344 Margaret Friedlander Brinig 'A Materialistic Approach to Surrogacy: Comment on Richard Epstein's 
Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement' (1995) 81 Virginia Law Review 2377 at 2384 n 
27 
345 Margaret Friedlander Brinig 'A Materialistic Approach to Surrogacy: Comment on Richard Epstein's 












the commissioning parents. However, the existing children of the commissioning 
parents may also find the manner in which the new sibling is acquired psychologically 
disturbing. 
4.3. Conclusion 
It is impossible to protect the parties from all the consequences of their actions. 
However, the involvement of an innocent and particularly vulnerable third party, 
namely the child, justifies fairly stringent regulation of the agreement, 'in order to 
distribute fairly the risks of their transaction to the parties directly involved in it'.346 
Meyerson comments that should the parties enter an agreement that fails to comply 
with any of the provisions designed to ensure fairness to them, the contract should be 
upheld in so far as the Court is able to s . It is altogether a different matter where their 
defiance contravenes rules designed to protect the child. In this event, the agreement 
should be unenforceable.347 
The South African Law Commission proposes that surrogacy contracts are valid, 
provided the parties comply with the provisions of the relevant legislation and have 
been confirmed by the High Court. Where there is non-compliance, the contract is void 
and, hence, unenforceable. In this event, the surrogate mother and her husband will be 
regarded as the child's legal parents, and the commissioning parents will have no claim 
to the child. Furthermore, the surrogate mother will be unable to compel the 
346 D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. In Christina Murray (ed) Gender and the New South African 











commissioning parents adopt the child. This is particularly worrying as the surrogate 
mother may be burdened with the responsibility of a child she had not planned for. 
In contrast to the Commission, the Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee permits 
both full and partial surrogacy. In the case of full surrogacy, the Committee provides 
that where there is non-compliance with any of the legal requirements, the surrogacy 
agreement is void. The Committee does not discuss non-compliance with respect to 
partial surrogacy, which would appear to be an oversight on its part. 
The contract between the parties contains the totality of rights and obligations between 
the parties. Thus, it is important that it is comprehensive and contains all the necessary 
provisions to ensure that the parties are aware of their rights and duties. Both the South 
African Law Commission and the Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee feel it 
prudent for a written agreement to be submitted to a Court for confirmation. Only once 
the Court has approved the agreement can impregnation take place. The advantage of a 
standard form contract is that the opportunity for including exploitative terms is 
diminished. 
It is submitted that compulsory screening is essential to minimise the risk of harm to 
the parties. Screening of the surrogate mother is of particular importance in order to 
establish whether or not she is likely to act responsibly toward the child and is capable 
347 D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. In Christina Murray (ed) Gender and the New South African 











of relinquishing the child at birth.348 Furthermore, the commissioning parents need to 
be assessed in order to establish the extent of their commitment to the undertaking, 
especially should the child be born mentally or physically handicapped. 
However, compulsory screening can only be effective as a preventative measure if 
carefully applied. It is submitted that in this regard the Commission's proposals are 
sadly lacking, as the Commission fails to properly direct the parties as to who may 
assess them, and as to the issues that person or persons need address. In contrast, the 
Committee provides for compulsory screening by a state established screening panel or 
by a licensed private body, and furnishes a list of topics that are to be the subject of a 
report regarding the parties suitability. Nonetheless, despite the inclusion of these 
preventative measures, disputes may still occur at a later stage. 













CONCEPTION AND GESTATION 
5.1. Introduction 
Once the parties have entered into the contract, the next step is to arrange for the 
impregnation of the surrogate mother, which may be brought about by artificial or 
natural means. If conception is achieved, the surrogate mother will carry the child to 
term with the intention of handing the infant to the commissioning parents at birth. 
These stages of the surrogacy arrangement raise several issues, in particular: 
1) Whether the parties should be permitted to choose either full or partial surrogacy; 
2) the legal position of medical professionals involved in rendering professional 
services to the parties; and 
3) the rights and duties that exist between the parties during the pregnancy. 
The South African Law Commission has chosen to address some of these issues and 











1) Surrogacy should be restricted to full (or gestational) surrogacy. In other words, the 
use of the gametes of either the surrogate mother or her husband is prohibited.349 





















Impregnation is achieved by using the gametes of at least one, if not both, of the 
commissioning parents;350 351 
2) conception is to occur within twelve months of the court's confirmation of the 
agreement;352 
3) the provisions of the Human Tissue Act are applicable to any artificial fertilisation 
procedure carried out;353 354 
4) where an abortion is necessary it must be carried out in terms of the provisions of the 
Abortion and Sterilisation Act;355 356 and 
5) medical professionals or other persons, who assist the parties to a surrogacy 
arrangement by carrying out the artificial fertilisation procedure where the requisite 
judicial approval has not been obtained, are subject to harsh penalties.357 
350 Clause 5, Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65, 1993) 
351 The Commission proposes that the gametes of at least one of the commissioning parents be used to 
effect impregnation prevents commissioned adoption. Jn other words, where neither of the 
commissioning parents is able to provide gametes, they are unable to utilise surrogacy as a solution to 
their infertility. 
352 Clause 7(1 )(b), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65, 1993) 
353 Section I of the Act defines artificial fertilisation as being the 'introduction by other than natural 
means of a male gamete or gametes into the internal reproductive organs of a female person for the 
purpose of human reproduction, including a) the bringing together outside the human body of a male and 
female gamete or gametes with a view to placing the product of a union of such gametes in a womb of a 
female person; orb) the placing of the product ofa union ofa male and female gamete or gametes which 
have been brought together outside the human body, in the womb of a female person for such purpose'. 
The Regulations in terms of section 37 of the Human Tissue Act, as amended by Government Notice 
RI 3 54 in Government Gazette 18362 of 17 October 1997, regulate inter alia the donation of gametes, 
and artificial fertilisation. Human Tissue Act 65 of 1983 
354 Clause 7(2), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65, 1993) 
355 Abortion and Sterilisation Act 2of1975. Since the South African Law Commission published its 
proposals there have been considerable changes to abortion laws, and the Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Act 92of1996 now legislates the matter of abortion. 
356 Clause 9, Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 











The Commission's proposals can be criticised for failing to consider a number of 
issues. In particular, the Commission's stance with respect to partial surrogacy is ill 
considered. In addition, the Commission fails altogether to address the issue of 
contractual limitations on the surrogate's conduct during the course of her pregnancy. 
5.2. Full or Partial Surrogacy 
As previously discussed, there are different forms of surrogacy. Partial (or traditional 
surrogacy), is the more commonly practised, and occurs where the surrogate mother's 
own ovum is fertilised by means of artificial insemination. Full (or gestational) 
surrogacy occurs where the gametes of one or both of the commissioning parents are 
used to effect the pregnancy, the surrogate mother providing no genetic material. 
(Where the commissioning parents are only able to provide either sperm or eggs, donor 
gametes are used). In this instance ova are fertilised in vitro and then implanted in the 
surrogate mother. 
As mentioned previously, surrogacy can occur without medical intervention and is 
sometimes referred to as natural surrogacy. This form of surrogacy is known to occur in 
South Africa, especially in black communities where women face abandonment should 
they fail to produce a child.358 
357 Clause 12(3), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 











The South African Law Commission requires that conception is effected by the use of 
the gametes of at least one of the commissioning parents.359 The use of donor gametes 
is permitted,360 but neither the surrogate mother nor her husband may provide their 
gametes.361 The Commission states that 'if it were to be permitted to use donor gametes 
in legal surrogate motherhood, the use of the gametes of the surrogate and/or her 
husband should never be permitted'.362 In other words, the Commission permits only 
full surrogacy, and not partial or natural surrogacy. It should be noted that a failure to 
adhere to this provision will result in the contract being void and, hence, 
unenforceable.363 
The Commission's proscription of any form of surrogacy, other than full surrogacy, 
deserves careful consideration, and would appear to be motivated by the desire to avoid 
the possibility of a dispute between the parties with respect to parentage. The 
Commission reasons that where the surrogate mother has used her own gametes, there 
can be almost no justification for a decision to compel her to hand over her child.364 
Furthermore, the Commission is of the opinion that the existence of a genetic 
358 'The Miracle of Birth for Barren Women. Surrogate Mums in Demand' Weekend Argus 5-6 July 
1997 
359 Clause 5, Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65, 1993) 
360 Clause 5, Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65, 1993) 
361 Clause 5(2), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65, 1993) 
362 South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65, 1993) 152 
363 Clause 5(1), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65, 1993) 











relationship between the child and at least one of its intended parents, will facilitate 
bonding between them.365 
While well intentioned, the Commission's reasoning can be criticised for placing too 
great an emphasis on the genetic aspect of parenthood. This approach denies the 
significance of the relationship that develops between the surrogate mother and the 
child during gestation. Much has been written regarding maternal bonding in utero,366 
and it appears that the absence of a genetic relationship will not always make it easier 
for the surrogate mother to relinquish the child. A study conducted by the American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists noted that maternal attachment in the case 
of gestational surrogacy is as great as it would have been had there been a genetic 
relationship.367 Studies on the effects of relinquishment in the case of adoption describe 
the feelings of new mothers who are separated from their children. 'New mothers 
experience a kind of separation anxiety when they are separated from their children 
even for relatively short periods of time. When the separation is permanent, the 
experience may take on extreme, even pathological proportions, including a deep sense 
of loss which pervades daily activities. Depression, anxiety, and a host of other 
emotional consequences may result'.368 
365 [T]he Commission remains convinced that in order to promote the bond between the child and its 
commissioning parents it is desirable, in the best interest of such a child, that the gametes of at least one 
of the commissioning parents should be used'. South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate 
Motherhood (Project 65, 1993) 151 
366 See David MacPhee and Kathy Forest 'Surrogacy: Programme Comparisons and Policy Implications' 
(1990) 4 lnternational Journal of Law and the Family 308-317 











Thus, the absence of a genetic relationship may not prevent the custodial disputes that 
the Commission is clearly hoping to avoid. Brinig states that 'women are not 
programmed to have children and then part with them. A contract made beforehand, 
even though it may make the rational part of the placement easier, cannot effect these 
biological drives'.369 
The case of Johnson v Calvert,310 illustrates the difficulties involved in attempting to 
determine parenthood in the case of gestational surrogacy by relying solely on 
biological or genetic factors. Anna Johnson, the surrogate mother, argued that nature 
inevitably caused her to form a bond with her child during gestation, a bond of such 
strength that expert testimony described it as being a 'bond of love'.371 In addition, the 
surrogate mother asserted that like the commissioning parents she too could prove her 
blood relationship to the baby. The baby was born with her hormones and antibodies 
which would clearly identify her as being the biological mother.m The commissioning 
parents were also able to demonstrate parenthood based on their genetic relationship to 
the child, by means of blood tests. Dolgin concludes that the effect of the parties 
368 John Lawrence Hill 'What Does It Mean to Be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for 
Parental Rights' (May 1991) 66 New York University Law Review 353 at 405 
369 Margaret Friedlander Brinig 'A Matemalistic Approach to Surrogacy: Comment of Richard Epstein's 
Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement' (1995) 81 Virginia Law Review 2377 at 2384 
370 Johnson v Calvert 851 P 2d 776 (1993) 
371 The case is extensively discussed by Dolgin, who quotes the testimony of the surrogate mother's 
psychiatrist to the California Court of Appeal : 'In my interview with Ms Johnson, she talked tearfully 
about the experience of nursing the baby ... of her belief that he recognises her odour, and when she has 
him he roots to nurse since she has continued to nurse even during the visitations. She believes that he 
feels safe and falls asleep easily in her arms' Janet L Dolgin 'The Law Debates the Family: Reproductive 
Transfonnations' (1995) 7(1) Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 31at51-52. 
372 Janet L Dolgin 'The Law Debates the Family: Reproductive Transfonnations' (1995) 7(1) Yale 











arguments is to 'almost neutralise each other, so that the identification of a single real 
mother on the basis of biological facts and arguments presented becomes largely a 
matter of social choice'.373 In this instance, the Court decided the case in favour of the 
commissioning parents basing its decision on their intention to create the child. 
McDonald v McDonald is another case in point.374 Although this case did not involve a 
surrogacy arrangement, it demonstrates the inadequacy of relying solely on genes to 
explain and assign parenthood. The birth mother, Mrs McDonald, was unable to 
provide ova, and was not genetically related to her daughters but was married to their 
genetic father. On their divorce, Mr McDonald claimed sole custody of the children on 
the basis that he was their sole genetic parent. The Court rejected his argument and 
found Mrs MacDonald, the birth mother, to be a parent of the children. Mrs 
MacDonald argued that her biological maternity was evidence of her motherliness,375 
describing gestation as but 'one stage in the "nourishment and care" that a good mother 
gives her children•.376 
The cases discussed above clearly demonstrate that the advent of reproductive 
technologies challenge our understanding of parenthood, as both the surrogate mother 
and commissioning parents are able to present credible arguments in support of their 
parentage. It follows that if both the commissioning parents and the surrogate mother 
373 Janet L Dolgin 'The Law Debates the Family: Reproductive Transfonnations' (1995) 7(1) Yale 
Journal of Law and Feminism 3 7 at 55 
374 McDonald v McDonald 608 N.Y.S. 2d 477 (App. Div. 1994) 
375 Janet L Dolgin 'The Law Debates the Family: Reproductive Transfonnations' (1995) 7(1) Yale 











are able to establish a blood relationship to the child, despite the absence of a genetic 
relationship on the part of the surrogate mother, other factors will have to be taken into 
account in determining parentage. 
As gestational surrogacy is far more costly than partial surrogacy, the South African 
Law Commission's insistence on gestational surrogacy is discriminatory towards 
potential commissioning parents as only those commissioning parents who can afford 
the expense of infertility treatment will have access to surrogacy. In addition, 
gestational surrogacy involves complicated medical procedures, with no guarantee of 
success. Meyerson comments that if the c.ommissioning mother is unable to donate 
eggs, a donor will have to be found. '[E]gg donation is not like sperm donation. It 
requires risky hormone treatment and surgical extraction of the egg. Even supposing 
that the couple are lucky enough to find an egg donor, or that the commissioning 
mother is able to conceive or merely needs the surrogate to carry her baby, this is not 
the end of the story. The egg will need to be fertilised outside the surrogate mother's 
body and then implanted in her after artificially manipulating her cycle'.377 It is 
submitted that by insisting on this form of surrogacy, the Commission's proposals may 
be largely self defeating, as desperate people are likely to resort to clandestine partial 
surrogacy arrangements as the only practical way of having a child.378 
376 Janet L Dolgin 'The Law Debates the Family: Reproductive Transfonnations' (1995) 7(1) Yale 
Journal of Law and Feminism 37 at 64 
377 D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. In Christina Murray (ed) Gender and the New South African 
Legal0rder(l994) 138 
378 D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. In Christina Murray (ed) Gender and the New South African 











In addition, by insisting on gestational surrogacy the Commission's proposals may fall 
foul of the Constitution.379 The Constitution guarantees the right to bodily and 
psychological integrity, which includes the right to make decisions concerning 
reproduction.380 While this right is subject to the limitation clause,381 it is possible to 
argue that the right is broad enough to enable the parties to effect conception by any 
means and not just by way of gestational surrogacy. Certainly, it is hard to justify the 
prohibition of other forms of surrogacy in the absence of proof that this restriction of 
surrogacy is reasonable and justifiable. 
An additional concern is that the consequence of failure to comply with the provisions 
of the proposed bill will result in the contract's invalidity. Should a contract be invalid, 
the child will be deemed to be the child of the birth mother,382 contrary to the intention 
of the parties. This fails to protect the interests of any of the parties to the contract, and 
the surrogate mother is placed in a particularly difficult position as she may find herself 
responsible for a child she had not planned for.383 
The Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee proposes that both full and partial 
surrogacy be permitted. However, the Committee is of the belief that partial surrogacy 
should only be used where 'it is not possible, for biological or medical reasons, to use 
3 79 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 
380 Sections 12 (2)(a), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 
381 Section 36, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 
382 Clause 8, Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65, 1993) 
383 D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. ln Christina Murray (ed) Gender and the New South African 















































the female gamete of the commissioning parent for the purpose of artificial 
fertilisation'.384 The Committee discusses the issue of cost and mentions that most 
commentators are of the belief that as surrogacy is an expensive procedure, state-
funded fertility clinics should provide assistance to those who otherwise would be 
unable to afford the procedure.385 In the light of the scarcity of resources in South 
Africa, and the difficulties experienced by the state in delivering even primary health 
care, it is hard to see how it will find the funds to provide fertility clinics. 
5.3. The Role of Medical and Other Health Professionals 
Medical professionals play an important role in the execution of surrogacy 
arrangements. Neither the South African Law Commission nor the Parliamentary Ad 
Hoc Select Committee provide much guidance regarding the legal position of medical 
professionals who assist the parties to a surrogacy agreement. The Commission merely 
proposes that artificial fertilisation of the surrogate mother shall not take place before 
the surrogacy agreement is confirmed by the relevant court,386 or after the lapse of 
twelve months from the date of confirmation of the agreement by the court.387 The 
provisions of the Human Tissue Act are applicable to any artificial fertilisation 
384 para 6.3.2, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 34 
385 para 5.9.9.4, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 33 
386 Clause 7(l)(a), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate 
Motherhood (Project 65, 1993) 
387 Clause 7(l)(b), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate 











procedure carried out in execution of a surrogacy agreement.388 A person who 
artificially fertilises or who assists in artificially fertilising a woman in execution of a 
surrogacy agreement where a court has not confirmed the agreement or where the 
requisite authorisation has lapsed, may be guilty of a criminal offence.389 
The regulations to the Human Tissue Act control, inter alia, the donation of gametes 
and artificial fertilisation, and would be applicable in surrogacy situations.390 
Regulation 4 describes the duties of a medical practitioner intending to remove gametes 
from the body of a living person for the purpose of artificial insemination of another 
person. Regulation 8(2) provides that no gametes which are removed outside the 
provisions of these regulations shall be used for the purpose of the artificial 
insemination of a person. 
Regulation 9 provides that the medical practitioner must open a file for the recipient of 
artificial fertilisation. Of interest is regulation 9(e) which provides that the medical 
practitioner shall make sure that' (i) before any artificial insemination is effected on the 
recipient, the recipient and her husband in the case of a married person must receive 
advice and information from appropriate experts concerning - (aa) the possibilities, if 
any, of the recipient's being able to conceive in a natural manner; (bb) all the 
388 Clause 7(2), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65, 1993) 
389 'Any person who contravenes this section ... shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to 
a fine not exceeding R 20 000 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or to both such 
fine and such imprisonment'. Clauses 12(1) & (3), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission 
Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65, 1993) 
390 The regulations to the Human Tissue Act 65of1983 were published under Government Notice 
Rl 182 in Government Gazette 10283 of2 June 1986, and amended by Government Notice Rl354 in 











implications of artificial insemination ... , [and] (ii) the recipient is biologically, 
physically, socially and mentally suited for artificial insemination'. 
The regulations also provide that it should be determined whether or not the recipient 
or donor are carriers of a genetic defect. Regulation 9(v)(bb) provides that where it is 
established that the donor is a carrier or a probable carrier of the defect concerned, then 
the gametes of said donor shall not be used for artificial insemination. Medical 
practitioners have a duty to establish the suitability of the recipient to undergo artificial 
fertilisation. In addition, it must be established whether there is the possibility that 
either the donor or recipient is the carrier of genetic defects. Thus, this legislation 
provides for certain screening mechanisms which would be applicable to surrogacy. 
However, these provisions may be insufficient for the purposes of surrogacy and 
require supplementation. 
5.4. The Surrogate Mother's Conduct During Pregnancy 
It is of great concern that the South African Law Commission fails to address the effect 
of contractual terms which would restrict the conduct of the surrogate mother during 
the pregnancy. Presumably these provisions would be scrutinised by the court when it 
considers the pre-conception agreement. However, the proposed bill gives no 
guidelines as to how a court should view such conditions. The Parliamentary Ad Hoc 











All parties to the contract have an interest in establishing the limits of legitimate 
interference with the surrogate mother's pre-natal conduct. Certainly, it is to the 
commissioning parents' advantage to include tenns that would prevent the surrogate 
from engaging in activities which may be potentially hannful to both herself and the 
foetus. Yet these terms may well conflict with the surrogate mother's personal freedom. 
The question arises to what extent the surrogate mother should be pennitted to control 
the course of her pregnancy, possibly acting against the wishes of the commissioning 
parents. 
Stumpf argues that the law should provide the surrogate mother with a guarantee that 
she will enjoy the same rights during her pregnancy as any other pregnant woman. 39! 
She states that 'once the embryo is implanted in the womb of the surrogate, the process 
enters the realm of privacy which entails substantial personal freedom for the gestating 
mother'.392 
This assertion raises two important points. Firstly, exactly what rights do pregnant 
women enjoy, and secondly, should surrogate pregnancies be treated differently to 
'nonnal ' pregnancies? The fact that the surrogate mother has contracted to bear a child 
on behalf of the commissioning parents means that they have an interest in ensuring 
that her conduct in no way endangers the child's well being. Kilroe argues that the 
391 Andrea A Stumpf 'Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies' (1986) 
96 Yale Law Journal 187 at 204 
392 Andrea A Stumpf 'Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies' (1986) 











'extent of the surrogate's autonomy during pregnancy is weighted against the extent of 
the commissioning parents right of control over her'. 393 
Any legal recognition of restrictions on the surrogate's conduct during gestation is 
fraught with problems. Contractual freedom is never absolute, and while a surrogate 
may agree to abide by the restrictions contained in a contract, certain restrictions may 
be judged to be too burdensome or may even set a dangerous precedent for 
womankind. This forms part of a larger concern relating to the sphere of legitimate 
intrusion into an individual's right to bodily autonomy. Even if the parties were to 
include contractual terms that regulated the conduct of the surrogate mother, to what 
extent should these terms be enforceable by an aggrieved party? 
Kilroe discusses the legal remedies available to commissioning parents who fear that 
the surrogate mother's conduct may be harmful to the foetus. The couple could apply to 
Court for an order preventing the surrogate mother from continuing with the prohibited 
activity. Alternatively, the couple can claim damages. Kilroe submits that while it is 
theoretically possible for the court to grant an interdict, it will be impossible for the 
order to be enforced unless, for example, the Court is prepared to confine the surrogate 
to prevent her from engaging in the prohibited activity. She concludes that this would 
be contra bonos mores, and as such it is unlikely that the Court would ever grant such 
an order. 394 
393 BA Kilroe Surrogate Motherhood: A Regulated Approach (no date) 11 











There are several cases in the United States that document legally sanctioned violations 
of pregnant women's physical integrity.395 These violations are justified by reference to 
the best interests of the unborn child, and emphasise a disturbing trend which views the 
interests of mother and child as separate and even antagonistic. 'The earlier model for 
the woman-foetus relationship was interdependence ... Now, doctors regard the foetus 
as a separate patient, and the law recognises the foetus as a being with independent 
interests'.396 Consequently, in certain circumstances, the foetus is seen as requiring 
legal protection from its mother's conduct. 
As mentioned above, a number of decisions have approved interference with a pregnan_t 
woman's rights to physical autonomy where the foetus is regarded as being at risk. 
These decisions authorised medical professionals to perform various invasive medical 
procedures, including caesarean sections, despite the refusal of the woman concerned 
to undergo the procedure. In re A. C. the patient, Angela Carder, had been diagnosed as 
having leukaemia at the age of thirteen but had been in remission three years prior to 
falling pregnant. At the relevant t me she was twenty-seven years of age. She was 
hospitalised in the twenty-sixth week of her pregnancy and it appeared that her 
condition was deteriorating rapidly. Despite believing that the foetus would have a 
better chance of survival if delivered at twenty-eight weeks, the doctors felt that a 
caesarean section should be performed. Angela Carder refused to consent, but a court 
395 See In Re A.C. 533 A 2d.61 l (1987). See also In Re Stevens S. 178 Cal.Rptr.525 (Ct.App.1981) 
396 Lisa C Ikemoto 'The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the Ideology of Motherhood, 
the Practice of Defaulting to Science and the Interventionist Mindset of the Law' (1993) 53(5) Ohio State 











order was obtained and the caesarean section was performed. Both mother and foetus 
died soon after the surgery.397 
Other decisions have aimed at preventing mothers from engaging in behaviour 
regarded as dangerous to the foetus' well-being (even where this would involve some 
kind of physical restraint or imprisonment).398 These decisions have been criticised as 
having 'less to do with the status of the foetus than with the moral and legal status of 
women. They reinforce deep societal stereotypes of women, particularly of pregnant 
women, as somehow incompetent to make moral decisions'.399400 
397 In Re A. C. 533 A 2d.61 l ( 1987). The Court subsequently granted a petition for rehearing, In the 
Matter of A.C. 539 A 2d.203 (1988). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals subsequently reversed 
its decision in the case of In re A.C. 573 A 2d. 1235, 1990. Leanna Darvell Medicine, Law and Social 
Change: The Impact of Bioethics, Feminism and Rights Movements on Medical Decision Making 
(1993) 10-11 
See also Lisa C Ikemoto 'The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the Ideology of 
Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science and the Interventionist Mindset of the Law' (1993) 
53(5) Ohio State Law Journal 1205 at 1241-1242 
398 In Re Stevens S. 178 Cal.Rptr.525 (Ct.App.1981), the Court detained the 'foetus, and accordingly 
[Kay S.] detained'. The terms of the order were that Kay S. be detained until the birth of her chi Id. In 
United States v Vaughn 117 DAILY. W ASH.L.REP. 441 ( l 989)(D.C.Super.Ct), the mother's cocaine 
habit was the judge's reason for ordering her incarceration for 180 days, despite the prosecutor's 
recommendation that she be given probation. Lisa C Ikemoto 'The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the 
Intersection of the Ideology of Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science and the Interventionist 
Mindset of the Law' (1993) 53(5) Ohio State Law Journal 1205 at 1250 
3 99 Leanna Darvall Medicine, Law and Social Change: The Impact of Bioethics, Feminism and Rights 
Movements on Medical Decision Making (1993) 11 
400 Ikemoto discusses instances where there has been direct judicial interference with the choices of 
pregnant women. She cites cases where women have been forced to undergo caesarean sections, to have 
a hospital delivery, to have life support and have been forced to undergo prenatal treatment. In each case 
the state has stepped in to enforce medical opinion that intervention is necessary. The prevailing view 
seems to be that consent is the choice of the good mother, whereas refusal is unnatural. It would seem 
that women are expected to sacrifice their own interests for that of the child they are carrying. Lisa C 











The Constitution does guarantee a right to psychological and physical integrity, as well 
as a right to privacy, which can be interpreted to prevent unwarranted interference with 
the physical autonomy of the surrogate mother during the pregnancy.401 In addition, the 
Constitution protects against unfair discrimination, including unfair discrimination on 
the ground of pregnancy.402 However, the legal recognition and subsequent 
enforcement of any restrictive contractual conditions may amount to a violation of 
these rights. Nevertheless, section 28(2) of the Constitution ensures that the best 
interests of the child are always paramount in matters concerning children.403 Since 
legal personality begins at birth, a foetus lacks the rights of a child, and section 28(2) 
is therefore not applicable. 
A woman's right to control the course of her pregnancy, is further endangered by 
potential delictual liability for pre-birth injuries. In the United States, it has been held 
that the doctrine of parental immunity is no longer wholly operative, and that it is 
possible for children to sue their parents for harm inflicted on the child by the parent 
during pregnancy,404 as illustrated by the case of Grodin v Grodin.405 Ms Grodin was 
sued by her son because she had taken an antibiotic during her pregnancy that had 
resulted in the discoloration of her son's teeth. He alleged that she had failed to 'seek 
of Defaulting to Science and the Interventionist Mindset of the Law' (1993) 53(5) Ohio State Law 
Journal 1205 
401 Section 12, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996 
402 Section 9, Constitution ofthe Republic of South Africa Act 108 ofl996 
403 Section 28(2), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 
404 Lisa C Ikemoto 'The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the Ideology of Motherhood, 
the Practice of Defaulting to Science and the Interventionist Mindset of the Law' ( 1993) 53(5) Ohio State 











proper prenatal care'. The trial court found for Ms Grodin but on appeal it was held that 
while 'a woman's decision to continue taking drugs during pregnancy is an exercise of 
her discretion, the focal question is whether the decision reached by a woman in a 
particular case was a 'reasonable exercise of parental discretion', and the matter was 
remanded for expert evidence to be presented regarding the reasonableness of the 
defendants decision to take the medication in question.406 
In South Africa, the position appears to be less extreme than in the United States. 
Nevertheless, there are indications that legal precedent may support a claim seeking to 
hold a parent accountable for pre-birth injuries. Legal personality begins at birth, and 
while there are instances where the court will recognise the interests of an unborn child, 
these are always subject to the proviso that the child is subsequently born alive. The 
case of Pinchin v Santam Insurance Company Limited,407 established that a child may 
have a delictual action against a third party for harm caused while in utero (provided 
that the child is subsequently born alive). The court intimated that the child might even 
have an action against its own mother for harm caused in utero.408 The commissioning 
parents would have to establish a causal connection between the surrogate mother's 
405 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich.Ct.App.1980) 
406 Lisa C Ikemoto 'The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the Ideology of Motherhood, 
the Practice of Defaulting to Science and the Interventionist Mindset of the Law' (1993) 53(5) Ohio State 
Law Journal 1205 at 1262 
See also John Robertson 'Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth' 
(1983) 69(3) Virginia Law Review 405 at 441-42 
407 Pinchin v Santam Insurance Company Limited 1963 (2) SA 254 (W) 
408 Per Hiemstra J 'When a rule, previously limited, is extended to a new field, one is apt to ask where it 
is to stop. What, for instance, ofa case where the mother injures her infant in an attempted abortion? 
Would he after birth have an action against his own mother? Difficulties of proof would probably 
confine such a case to the academic sphere, but I do not see why even in such a case the child should not 











conduct and the ill health or defect experienced by the child. In Pinchin, the plaintiff 
was unable to establish causation, and the Court's comments on the existence of such a 
claim are obiter dicta. However, this decision has stood for many years, is in line with 
other jurisdictions, and it is submitted that it can be regarded as persuasive authority. 
Kilroe discusses the issue of how damages would be measured and in particular 
whether it is possible to make an assessment where a child is born with a defect. She 
likens it to the problem posed by wrongful life claims, where it is impossible to place 
the person in the position he or she was in prior to the wrongful and blameworthy 
conduct of the wrongdoer as he or she was born defective. Kilroe advocates that the 
approach of the Court in Cur/ender v Bio-Science Laboratories,409 where the Court 
artificially constructed the award of damages 'for the pain and suffering to be endured 
during the life-span available to such child, and any special pecuniary loss resulting 
from the "impaired condition" should be followed.410 
The bill places the surrogate mother in a very difficult position. Although she is the 
birth mother, she is legally in the position of a third party (the commissioning parents 
are the child's legal parents),411 and is possibly liable for pre-birth injuries. The (many) 
drawbacks to this approach are obvious, and Ikemoto argues that recognition of such an 
409 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App. 1980) 
410 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App. 1980) at 489, quoted in BA Kilroe Surrogate Motherhood: Regulated 
Motherhood (no date) 14 
411 'Any child born as a result of the artificial fertilisation of the surrogate mother in accordance with the 
agreement shall for all purposes be the child of the commissioning parents as if the commissioning wife 
had given birth to the child within her marriage to the commissioning husband'. Clause 8(1)(a), Schedule 











action would result in 'mother and child [being] legal adversaries from the moment of 
conception'.412 
5.5. Abortion 
Abortion in the context of a surrogate motherhood arrangement has yet to be 
documented in practice.413 However, it is a potential source of conflict, and at the very 
least, the following issues need to be addressed: 
1) The circumstances in which a termination may be carried out; 
2) with whom the decision to carry out an abortion will lie; and 
3) the effect of the termination on the surrogate arrangement and liability for 
contractual damages in the event of termination. 
The South African Law Commission proposals were published prior to enactment of 
the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act,4' 4 and provide that an abortion carried 
out in terms of the Abortion and Sterilisation Act will terminate a surrogate 
motherhood agreement.4ts 416 The proposals state that the decision to terminate the 
412 Lisa C Ikemoto 'The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the Ideology of Motherhood, 
the Practice of Defaulting to Science and the Interventionist Mindset of the Law' (1993) 53(5) Ohio State 
Law Journal 1205 at 1263 
413 Debates of the National Assembly (Hansard) Wednesday 18 June 1997 col 4070-4071 
414 Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 
415 Abortion and Sterilisation Act 2of1975 
416 Clause 9(1), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 











pregnancy shall lie with the surrogate mother,417 but that the commissioning parents 
shall be informed of the circumstances and shall be allowed to consult with the 
surrogate mother before the abortion is performed.418 
However, the law pertaining to abortion has changed since the Commission published 
its recommendations and the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act now regulates 
access to abortion.419 Whereas previously South African women were only allowed 
access to abortion in very limited circumstances,420 the new Act provides for abortion 
on request up to twelve weeks into the pregnancy.421 Thereafter, as the pregnancy 
progresses, the Act places increasing restrictions on access to abortion.422 The act 
417 Clause 9(2), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Su"ogate Motherhood 
(Project 65, 1993) 
418 Clause 9(3), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65, 1993) 
419 Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 
420 The circumstances in which an abortion could be perfonned in tenns of the Abortion and 
Sterilisation Act 2of1975 were, 'namely where the continued pregnancy would endanger the life of the 
woman concerned or would constitute a serious threat to her physical or mental health, or where there 
exists a serious risk that the child to be born would suffer from a physical or mental defect of such a 
nature that he would be irreparably seriously handicapped, or where the foetus is alleged to have been 
conceived as a result of unlawful intercourse, that is rape, incest, or intercourse with a woman who is 
feeble-minded or an idiot'. Barnard, Cronje and Olivier The South African Law of Persons and Family 
Law(l986) 19 
421 Section 2(I)(a), Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92of1996 
422 Section 2 of Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92of1996 provides in which circumstances 
an abortion may be carried out. Section 2(l)(a) provides that a pregnancy may be tenninated upon 
request ofa woman during the first twelve weeks of the gestation period of her pregnancy. Section 
2(I)(b) provides that a tennination may be perfonned between the thirteenth and twentieth week ifa 
medical practitioner after consultation with the pregnant woman is of the opinion that (i) the continued 
pregnancy would pose a risk of injury to the woman's physical or mental health; or (ii) there exists a 
substantial risk that the foetus would suffer from severe physical or mental abnonnality; or (iii) the 
pregnancy resulted from rape or incest; or (iv) the continued pregnancy would significantly affect the 
social or economic circumstances of the woman. Section 2(I)(c) provides that after the twentieth week of 
the gestation period a tennination may be perfonned ifa medical practitioner after consultation with 











specifically states that only the consent of the pregnant woman is required for the 
termination of pregnancy,423 even where the woman is a minor.424 Furthermore, the 
identity of a woman undergoing an abortion is protected.425 
These changes suggest that this aspect of the Commission's proposals should be 
redrafted. Whereas previously, an abortion might be carried out in limited 
circumstances the new act has significantly relaxed access to abortion, even permitting 
termination on demand up to 12 weeks into the pregnancy. Thus, the Commission's 
proposal that the commissioning parents be consulted before the abortion is performed 
will be difficult to enforce. 
The Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee deals with abortion by requiring the 
parties to make provision in their agreement for 'all eventualities which could lead to 
the surrogate mother or the commissioning parents requesting an abortion. The 
agreement may state that the surrogate mother will, where she decides to terminate the 
pregnancy for non-therapeutic reasons, be responsible for repaying and reimbursing all 
the necessary expenses incurred by the commissioning parents in respect of her 
pregnancy'. 426 
(i) endanger the woman's life; (ii) would result in severe malfonnation of the foetus; or (iii) would pose a 
risk ofinjury to the foetus 
423 Section 5(2), Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 
424 Section 5(3), Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92of1996 
425 Section 7(5), Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92of1996 
426 para 6.7.4.7, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 











The Committee's suggestions are most unsatisfactory as they leave the parties to decide 
the matter for themselves, and are in contradiction of the provisions of the Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Act.427 This could lead to several undesirable consequences. 
For example, it is quite possible that the contract may permit the commissioning 
parents to insist that the surrogate mother undergo an abortion. It is submitted that the 
ultimate decision to undergo an abortion should be made by the surrogate mother, as 
she is the person who bears the risk of pregnancy, and is also the person who will 
undergo the physical procedure. The commissioning parents should not be able to insist 
that she has an abortion. Similarly, if the surrogate mother decides for any reason that 
she wishes to terminate the pregnancy, she should have the same rights as any other 
pregnant woman, in terms of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act.428 
However, what will happen if the surrogate mother decides to terminate the pregnancy 
for non-therapeutic reasons? Although the commissioning parents may be able to claim 
either contractual or delictual damages, allowing these remedies will to some extent 
negate the surrogate mothers freedom of choice. Thus despite the commissioning 
parents' interest in the pregnancy, failure to respect the surrogate mother's wishes 
regarding the continuation or otherwise thereof, may constitute an unconscionable 
invasion of her personal freedom. 
427 Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 












It is submitted that the parties should be permitted recourse to either fu II or partial 
surrogacy. The advantages of full surrogacy are not sufficient to justify a complete ban 
on the use of partial surrogacy. Partial surrogacy is the cheaper, and less risky 
procedure, and will afford far more people access to surrogacy, an important 
consideration in a countries like South Africa, where resources are scarce. 
The position of medical practitioners who assist in the surrogacy arrangement should 
be clarified. A situation such as that which exists in the United Kingdom, where 
medical and legal practitioners are afraid to render professional services with respect to 
a surrogacy arrangement, for fear that the receipt of a professional fee might result in 
criminal prosecution under the relevant Act, should be avoided at all costs.429 The 
parties should be encouraged to seek the assistance of bona fide professionals and those 
professionals should be able to render services without fear of criminal sanction. 
Any regulation of this stage of the arrangement should be careful not to dismiss the 
relationship between the surrogate mother and the foetus. 'A baby is not, after all, a 
matter of genes only. A great deal of its development in the foetal stage depends upon 
the maternal environment; upon the diet of the host-mother, the efficiency of her 
placenta, the biochemical details of her cells and bloodstream'.430 A surrogate mother is 
more than just an incubator, and it is of great importance that her physical and 
429 Section 2, Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 
430 George J Annas and Shennan Elias 'In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Medicolegal 











psychological integrity is protected. Although the commissioning parents have a strong 
interest in the birth of a healthy child, it is the writer's submission that they should be 
required to respect the surrogate mother's autonomy in matters relating to conduct 
during the pregnancy and abortion, as to permit interference would be an invasion of 














Until recently identifying a child's mother was as straightforward as identifying the 
birth mother. With the advent of new reproductive technologies, and in particular 
surrogate motherhood, this task has become more difficult. In the context of surrogacy, 
Corea isolates three possible mothers:-
l) The genetic mother who donates or sells her eggs; 
2) the surrogate or natal mother who carries the baby; and 
3) the social mother who raises the child.431 
Clearly, existing definitions of motherhood, and indeed of parenthood, may no longer 
be satisfactory. The parental relationship is commonly based on the existence of a 
'blood' tie between parent and child. Traditionally, a child's mother is the woman who 
gave birth to that child, irrespective of whether the child is illegitimate or not.432 
Giesen comments that the in most legal systems this was a given, and therefore no legal 
431 Jo Bridgeman & Susan Millns Feminist Perspectives on Law. Law's Engagement with the Female 
Body (1998) 125 
432 The legal maxim, mater certa semper est, means simply that law identifies the mother of a child as 
the woman who gives birth to that child. The maxim is a statement of that which in the past has been 












definition of motherhood existed in family law.433 Paternity has never been as certain 
and, consequently, the law has developed various methods of assigning fatherhood, 
drawing a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children. In the case of a child 
born in marriage, there is a rebuttable presumption that the birth mother's husband is 
the father. Where a child is illegitimate, paternity must be established. The woman 
need only prove that she had sexual intercourse with the reputed father for the creation 
of a rebuttable presumption of paternity.434 
Montgomery submits that in surrogacy arrangements, '[t]our different types of parental 
tie can be identified. The link between the gamete donors and the child is a genetic one 
... The surrogate mother herself is bound to the child by the fact that she has carried and 
given birth to the child ... The surrogate mother's husband will be presumed to be the 
father under the presumption of legitimacy by reason of the marriage. The 
commissioning couple will be tied to the child by a social relationship, which 
corresponds to the outward appearance of a 'normal' family. They will be caring for the 
child' .435 Thus, separation of the genetic, gestational and social components of 
parenthood entitles the gamete donors, the birth (or surrogate mother) and her husband 
and the commissioning parent or parents all to claim parenthood of the child. 
433 Dieter Giesen 'Artificial Reproduction Revisited: Status Problems and Welfare of the Child - A 
Comparative View'. In Caroline Bridge (ed), Family law Towards the New Millenium: Essays/or PM 
Bromley (I 997) 23 7 
434 P Q R Boberg The law of Persons and the Family (I 977) 326 
435 Jonathan Montgomery 'Constructing the Family - After a Surrogate Birth' (I 986) 4,9(5) Modern law 











As use of reproductive technologies becomes more frequent, the inadequacy of 
maintaining a traditional view of the family unit becomes increasingly apparent. 'The 
changes made possible by reproductive technology ... challenge the fundamental 
assumption that human reproduction is the result of natural processes which inevitably 
define social relationships'.436 
Deech comments that the traditional notion of family is disintegrating. 'First sex was 
separated from marriage more readily than before by revolutions in contraception and 
social attitudes in the 1960s. Support and marriage parted as women became more 
capable and willing as breadwinners. The rise in open cohabitation divided 
companionship and partnership from marriage in the 1970s and 1980s. In the same 
post-war decades childrearing was separated from marriage by the rise of acceptable 
illegitimacy and single parenting. Now childbearing has come apart from marriage and 
cohabitation by the processes of IVF. Most recently, fertilisation has become capable of 
being asexual by the newest cloning techniques'.437 An alternative view recognises that 
families are 'collections of autonomous individuals who, like actors in the marketplace, 
choose to join together at various times and for various purposes' .438 Despite the 
changes mentioned above, the law has been slow to adapt. Giesen comments that in the 
area of reproductive technologies, the law is' ... lagging behind badly and sadly'.439 
436 Janet L Dolgin 'The Law Debates the Family: Reproductive Transformations' ( 1995) 7( l) Yale 
Journal of law and Feminism 37 at 42 
437 Ruth Deech 'Families and Fertility'. Unpublished paper delivered at the Ninth World Conference of 
the International Society of Family Law, Durban, South Africa, 28-31 July 1997 at l 
438 Janet L Dolgin 'The Law Debates the Family: Reproductive Transformations' (1995) 7(1) Yale 
Journal of law and Feminism 37 at 40 
439 Dieter Giesen 'Artificial Reproduction Revisited: Status Problems and Welfare of the Child - A 
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The South African courts have not yet been called upon to adjudicate parentage 
disputes in the context of surrogacy, but other jurisdictions have not been as fortunate. 
On occasion a surrogate mother has refused to surrender the child to the 
commissioning parents, despite her initial agreement to do so, and it is this possibility 
that has given rise to much debate - legal and otherwise - as to the nature of the parties' 
rights. Several theories have been advanced to provide solutions to the problem of 
determining parentage in the context of surrogacy arrangements. Some writers argue 
that the law of contract provides a solution to the problem of determining parentage, 
while others suggest that recourse should be had to existing principles off amity law. 
Proponents of a contractual approach argue that application of the law of contract to 
surrogacy arrangements has a number of advantages, in that it promotes certainty and 
recognises freedom of choice.440 Epstein comments that lack of certainty with respect 
to parentage may result in drawn out litigation which should be avoided if at all 
possible.441 It is not only the surrogate mother and the commissioning parents who will 
suffer in the event of a dispute as to parentage, but also the child who may spend the 
first few years of its life being passed back and forth between the parties. Thus, it is in 
the best interests of all concerned that those contractual provisions relating to parentage 
are enforceable. 
440 Richard Epstein 'Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement' (1995) 81 Virginia Law 
Review 2305 at 2339-2341 
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Lack of certainty may have other less obvious consequences for the parties. For 
example, if the surrogate mother is allowed to entertain some hope of retaining the 
child, she is encouraged to develop maternal feelings.442 In the case of the 
commissioning parents, fear of disappointment may discourage them from preparing 
themselves for the arrival of the child, which may make the transition to parenthood 
more difficult. 
Another argument that favours the application of contract law to surrogate parenting is 
that it recognises the principle of individual autonomy or freedom of choice. The ways 
in which familial ties are formed have changed, and can no longer merely be presumed 
to follow a biological or genetic relationship. Applying contract law to the sphere of 
surrogacy acknowledges this. 'Contract reflects individual choice and recognises that 
'families and familial relationships are not natural or inevitable but constructed and 
contingent'.443 In other words, individuals should be permitted to enter agreements 
without fear of undue interference from the State. 
It is by no means certain that contract law provides a solution to the problems of 
surrogate parenting. An agreement is only effective if the parties are able to enforce its 
terms. The validity or otherwise of the contract effects the availability of contractual 
remedies in the event of breach. Clearly, if the contract is found to be void or 
unenforceable, no contractual remedies are available. 
442 Richard Epstein 'Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement' (1995) 81 Virginia Law 











Even where the contract is valid, application of contractual remedies may prove 
troublesome. The principal contractual remedies are specific performance and 
damages, and in the event of a breach of contract, an aggrieved party can claim either 
specific performance, damages or both. 
The Court has a discretion to grant an order for specific performance of a contract.444 
Meyerson submits that in the context of a surrogacy arrangement, the Court should 
exercise its discretion in favour of the surrogate mother, and refuse an order to enforce 
the contract should the surrogate mother refuse to relinquish the child because of the 
bond that develops between them during pregnancy. She argues that it would be wrong 
to force the surrogate mother to give up her child as the physiological impact of 
pregnancy and childbirth cause changes to the woman's body. 'These changes are no 
respecter either of the genetic parentage of the child or of the woman's motivation. 
Surrogacy, especially full surrogacy, is a trick played on the body, and the body 
responds to the pregnancy in the normal way'.445 Meyerson comments that the surrogate 
mother's body 'nourishes the child and makes possible every aspect of its 
development'.446 Furthermore, the surrogate mother takes upon herself the physical risk 
443 Janet L Dolgin 'The Law Debates the Family: Reproductive Transformations' ( 1995) 7 Yale Journal 
of Law and Feminism 31at41 
444 D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. In Christina Murray (ed), Gender and the New South African 
Legal Order ( 1994) 13 9 
445 D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. In Christina Murray (ed), Gender and the New South African 
Legal Order (1994) 140 
446 D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. In Christina Murray (ed), Gender and the New South African 











of pregnancy.447 Meyerson submits that these factors are sufficient to justify a refusal to 
order specific performance against the surrogate mother.448 
It is doubtful whether an award of damages will adequately compensate the parties for 
their disappointment. It stands to reason that an award of damages will only be helpful 
where the offending party has the resources to meet such an award. 
Many writers object to a contractual approach to surrogacy because it encourages an 
'inappropriate way of thinking about family relations'.449 They believe that the intrusion 
of the individualistic spirit of the marketplace into the realm of the family is 
undesirable as a currency should not be placed on certain things, 'such as one's politics, 
work, religion, family, love, sexuality, friendships, altruism, experiences, wisdom, 
moral commitments, character and personal attributes, all of which are integral to the 
self .450 
The established principles of family law may provide the appropriate tools in terms 
whereof the needs of all the parties, but especially those of the child, should be 
determined. Although, for the sake of certainty, it may appear to be a good idea for 
447 D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. In Christina Murray ( ed), Gender and the New South African 
Legal Order (1994) 140 
448 D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. In Christina Murray (ed), Gender and the New South African 
Legal Order (1994) 139-140 
449 Andrews explains that this objection is based on 'the sense that contract is an inappropriate way of 
thinking about family relations, a way which encourages people to behave badly toward each other'. Lori 
B Andrews 'Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Frame>M>rk for Surrogate Motherhood' (1995) 81 
Virginia Law Review 2343 at 2344 n 9 
450 Margaret Friedlander Brinig 'A Maternalistic Approach to Surrogacy: Comment on Richard Epstein's 
Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement' (1995) 81 Virginia Law Review 2377 at 2380 n 











parenthood to be decided in favour of the commissioning parents prior to birth, this 
may not always be in the child's best interests. Thus, the best interests of the child, and 
not the intention of the parties will detennineparentage. 
However, application of the principles of family law can, like contract, also be 
problematic. Western family law is based on the outmoded concept of the nuclear 
family, the male-led couple with children,451 and in certain situations women fare 
poorly as a result of judicial bias against non-traditional families. Judicial bias has been 
demonstrated in the context of custody decisions 'purportedly decided by application of 
the best interest standard. It has been demonstrated that biases operate against (a) a 
sexually active mother, (b) against a mother with less money than the father, (c) against 
a working mother, (d) against a lesbian mother, (e) against a mother involved in an 
interracial marriage, and ( f) in favour of a remarried father'. 452 
In Baby M,453 the surrogate mother experienced a fonn of prejudice when contesting 
the commissioning father's right to claim custody of their daughter. The trial court 
judge condemned her as a bad mother because she agreed to participate in the surrogate 
arrangement, and as an hysterical woman when she attempted to keep her daughter. 
Her life was minutely examined, and the fact that she dyed her hair red, had been an 
exotic dancer, had remained in an abusive relationship with her husband, whom she 
divorced during the proceedings in order to marry the father of her youngest child 
451 Lori B Andrews 'Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate Motherhood' 
(1995) 81 Virginia Law Review 2343 at 2345 
452 Lori B Andrews 'Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate Motherhood' 
(1995) 81 Virginia Law Review 2343 at 2344 n 5 











resulted in the media labelling her a 'baby seller'.454 The trial court tenninated her 
parental rights, and granted pennanent custody to the commissioning father, declaring 
that 'the child's best interest is the only aspect of man's law that must be applied in 
fashioning a remedy for this contract'.455 
To date, the courts faced with a custody dispute regarding surrogate parenting have 
generally refused to recognise the validity of these contracts, and have decided the 
issue of custody via recourse to the welfare principle.456 For the most part these 
disputes have concerned partial surrogacy, where the surrogate mother is both the 
genetic and gestational mother. However, recent cases have seen the introduction of the 
intent principle, which effectively introduces a contractual approach to the assignment 
of parenthood.457 
454 Ellen Faulkner 'The Case of Baby M' (1989) 3 Canadian Journal of Women and Law 239 at 240-242 
455 In the Matter of Baby M525 A.2d 1128, 217 NJ Super. 313 (Superior Ct. Chancery Division 1987) 
1166-67. Ellen Faulkner 'The Case of Baby M' (1989) 3 Canadian Journal of Women and Law 239 at 
241 
456 In the United States, see In the Matter of Baby M525 A.2d 1128, 217 NJ Super. 313 (Superior Ct. 
Chancery Division 1987); In the Matter of Baby M 531, A.2d 1227, 109 NJ 396 (NJ S. Ct. 1988). In the 
United Kingdom, see A v C [1985] F .L.R. 453; Re C [1985] F .L.R. 846; Re P (Minors) (Surrogacy: 
Wardship) [1987] 2 F.L.R. 421 











6.2. Comparative Perspective 
6.2.1. United Kingdom: 
For the purposes of the United Kingdom's Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 458 
a mother is defined as 'the woman who is carrying or has carried a child as a result of 
the placing in her of an embryo or of sperm and eggs, and no other woman is to be 
treated as the mother of the child'.459 Thus, the Act assigns motherhood to the 
gestational mother regardless of the child's genetic heritage. 
Section 28 of the same Act defines a father, as the husband of the woman who has 
conceived by way of artificial fertilisation, if 'at the time of the placing in her of the 
embryo or the sperm and eggs or her artificial insemination, the woman was party to a 
marriage, and the creation of the embryo carried by her was not brought about with the 
sperm of the other party to the marriage, then, ... the other party to the marriage shall 
be treated as the father of the child unless it is shown that he did not consent to the 
placing in her of the sperm and eggs or to her insemination (as the case may be)'.460 
Where the woman is unmarried but seeks treatment together with a man, and 'the 
creation of the embryo carried by her was not brought about with the sperm of that 
man, then ... that man shall be treated as the father of the child'.461 
458 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
459 Section 27( 1 ), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
460 Section 28(2), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 











These provisions imply that where a married surrogate mother seeks treatment, her 
husband will be regarded as the child's legal father, provided that he consented to the 
treatment. If an unmarried woman seeks treatment from a licensed centre accompanied 
by a man, then that man is regarded as the child's father, provided he is not the sperm 
donor. (A sperm donor will not be treated as a father, provided that his gametes are 
used in accordance with the Act).462 
Diesen comments that the Act creates a class of children who are potentially 
fatherless.463 For example, where a married woman is treated without the consent of 
her husband, the child is technically fatherless.464 Other instances of fatherless children 
occur where an unmarried woman seeks treatment from a licensed centre 
unaccompanied by a man465 or where she seeks treatment from a facility that is 
unlicensed. 466 
462 Section 28(6), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
463 Dieter Giesen 'Artificial Reproduction Revisited: Status Problems and Welfare of the Child. A 
Comparative View'. In Caroline Bridge (ed) Family Law Towards the New Mil/enium: Essays/or PM 
Bromley ( 1997) 248 
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465 Dieter Giesen 'Artificial Reproduction Revisited: Status Problems and Welfare of the Child. A 
Comparative View. In Caroline Bridge (ed) Family Law Towards the New Millenium: Essays/or PM 
Bromley ( 1997) 248 
466 Dieter Giesen 'Artificial Reproduction Revisited: Status Problems and Welfare of the Child • A 
Comparative View'. In Caroline Bridge (ed) Family Law Towards the New Millenium: Essays/or PM 











Section 30 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act was drafted in response to 
the case of Re W (Minors)(Surrogacy),467 which highlighted the plight of 
commissioning parents in the context of full surrogacy. A local authority, the Cumbria 
County Council, insisted that the commissioning couple adopt the children despite the 
fact that they were the children's genetic parents. In terms of the law at that time, the 
commissioning parents had no legal right to the children, and therefore they were 
compelled to adopt the children. 
The Act provides that in certain circumstances the commissioning parents may apply to 
court for an order declaring them to be the child's legal parents.468 Section 30 makes it 
clear that so called 'fast track' adoption is only available where the following conditions 
have been met:469 
1) The application can only be brought by married couples making use of assisted 
reproduction techniques,470 and at least one of the intended parents is genetically 
related to the child;47I 
2) the child must have its home with the commissioning parents;472 
467 Reported in The Times, 25 June 1990, and subsequently reported in Re W (Minors) (Surrogacy) 
[1991]1F.L.R.385 
468 Section 30, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
469 Section 30(9) provides for a parental order to be drawn up by simplifying the existing adoption 
provisions contained in the Adoption Act 1976 (as amended) for England and Wales, and in Northern 
Ireland, the Adoption (Northern Ireland) Order 1987. Department of Health Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990. The Parental Orders (Human Fertilisation and Embryology) Regulations 1994, 
Guidance Notes - England, Wales and Northern Ireland (August 1994 ) l 
470 Section 30(1 ), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
471 Section 30( l )(a), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 











3) the order must be made within six months of the child's birth;47J 
4) the court must be satisfied that the surrogate mother, and, if she is married, her 
husband 'have freely and with full understanding of what is involved, agreed 
unconditionally to the making of the order'.474 However, consent to the transfer of 
parentage given within 6 weeks of the child's birth is ineffective;475 and 
5) the surrogate may not receive any payment, except for reasonable expenses or such 
payments authorised by the court.476 
These orders are subject to the Adoption Act, which makes the child's welfare the 
paramount consideration of the court.477 Section 6 of the Adoption Act requires that 'in 
reaching any decision relating to an application for a parental order a court shall have 
regard to all the circumstances, first consideration being given to the need to safeguard 
and promote the welfare of the child throughout his childhood'.478 
The effect of a parental order is to extinguish the parental responsibility (guardianship) 
of the surrogate mother and her husband or partner. From the date of the court order, 
the commissioning parents are deemed to be the child's legal parents, and ' ... shall be 
473 Section 30(2), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
474 Section 30(5), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
475 Section 30(6), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
476 Section 30(7), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act l 990 
477 Adoption Act l 916 











treated in law as if he had been born as a child of the marriage of the husband and 
wife'.479 
Unfortunately, the Act is not all encompassing. It does not apply to those surrogacy 
arrangements, which do not comply with the requirements of the Act. For example, it is 
not applicable where the commissioning parents are unmarried, or are not genetically 
related to the child, and it does not provide a remedy to the surrogate mother, should 
the commissioning parents renege on their contractual duty to accept the child. The 
surrogate mother (and her husband or partner) are regarded as the child's legal parent, 
and the Act protects gamete donors from having parenthood thrust upon them, which 
may operate against the commissioning parents in the context of full surrogacy. It is 
therefore possible that the surrogate mother may have to assume responsibility for the 
child should the commissioning parents refuse to take the child. Conversely, if the 
surrogate mother refuses to relinquish the child, or if some other circumstance prevents 
compliance with the provisions of section 30, the commissioning parents are unable to 
apply for a parental order, and may apply to adopt the child, or have it declared a ward 
of court.480 
In the United Kingdom, courts faced with a parentage dispute in the context of 
surrogacy arrangements, have awarded custody based on the best interests of the child. 
Montgomery comments that 'parental rights exist in order to promote the function of 
bringing up a child. The blood tie does not guarantee that this function will be well 
479 Section 39(l)(a), Adoption Act 1976. See also para 2, Parental Orders (Human Fertilisation and 











perfonned. English family law has moved on from making this assumption'.48 1 Thus, in 
the Baby Cotton case,482 prior to the enactment of section 30, the court found that the 
commissioning parents were in an excellent position to raise the child, and awarded 
custody to the couple. In addition the court held that as the surrogate mother had no 
wish to raise the child, it was clearly not in the child's best interests to be 'foisted upon 
a woman who did not want it if other suitable adults did'.483 
However, in A v C,484 application of the same principle resulted in the surrogate mother 
retaining custody. In this case the court felt that the bond between mother and child was 
such that it would be wrong to separate the two.485 
In Re P (Minors)(Wardship: Surrogacy),486 the court found that the maternal bond 
between the surrogate mother and the children, as well as evidence that she was a 
satisfactory mother, outweighed the factors that the commissioning father was able to 
480 Jo Bridgeman & Susan Millns Feminist Perspectives on Law. Law's Engagement with the Female 
Body (1998) 158 
481 J Montgomery 'Constructing a Family -After a Surrogate Birth' (1986) 49(5) Modern Law Review 
635 at 638 
482 Re C [1985] F.L.R. 846 
483 J Montgomery 'Constructing a Family- After a Surrogate Birth' (1986) 49(5) Modern Law Review 
635 at 637 
484 Av C (1985] F.L.R. 445 
485 Ormond J reasons that '[t]here is always a close physical bond between mother and child which tends 
to get closer from the time of birth onwards for some considerable time and then, perhaps, to slacken off 
a little as the child gets older. The bond between father and child operates in the opposite direction. At 
first it is very slight indeed, but gradually, association between father and child increases and lengthens 
in time, the bond becomes more and more real ... In this case we have a situation where there is no bond 
between the father and the child except the mere biological one'. J Montgomery 'Constructing a Family -
After a Surrogate Birth' (1986) 49(5) Modern Law &view 635 at 637 











place before the court in support of his case. Accordingly, the Court awarded the care 
and custody of the children to the surrogate mother. 
These cases demonstrate the tendency of the English courts to award custody to the 
birth mother (particularly where the child lives with the birth mother), and not to the 
commissioning father, notwithstanding the quality of parenting he is able to offer. In Re 
P, the court accepted that the commissioning father was able to offer the child many 
advantages. 'It is said (and said quite correctly), that the shape of the B family is the 
better shape of a family in which these children might be brought up, because it 
contains a father as well as a mother and that is undoubtedly true. Next, it is said that 
the material circumstances of the B family are such that they exhibit a far larger degree 
of affluence that can be demonstrated by Mrs P. That, also, is undoubtedly true. Next it 
is said that the intellectual quality of the environment of the B's home and the stimulus 
which would be afforded to these babies, if they were to grow up in that home, would 
be greater than the corresponding features in the home of Mrs P. That is not a matter 
which has been extensively investigated, but I suspect that is probably true .... Then it is 
said that the religious comfort and support which the B's derive from their Church is 
greater than anything of that sort available to Mrs P. How far this is true, I simply do 
not know .... Then it said, and there is something in this, that the problems which might 
arise from the circumstances that these children who are, of course, congenitally 
derived from the semen of Mr B and bear traces of Mr B's Asiatic origin would be 
more readily understood and discussed and reconciled in the household of Mr and Mrs 
B, a household with an Asiatic ethnic background than they would be if they arose in 











English village and which has no non-English connections'.487 Nevertheless, the Court 
decided that it was in the best interests of the children to stay with the woman who had 
given birth to them and who had shown a satisfactory standard of maternal care, despite 
the obvious advantages of awarding custody to the father. 
These cases highlight the difficulty of applying the 'best interests' test. A tendency 
exists to equate the best interests of the child with maternal custody, and, consequently, 
the commissioning parents will almost always find it difficult to establish that it is in 
the child's best interests that they are awarded custody of a child. 
6.2.2. United States of America 
In the United States there is no uniform legislative approach to surrogacy arrangements, 
and there have been several disputes concerning parentage - the most notorious of these 
being the case of Baby M.488 
In Baby M, the surrogate mother entered into a contract whereby she agreed to be 
artificially inseminated with the sperm of the commissioning father, to carry the child 
to term and to terminate her parental rights upon its birth. In return, she was to receive 
$10 000. The arrangement proceeded smoothly until the baby was born, whereupon the 
487 1987] 2 F.L.R. 421at425-426. Jo Bridgeman & Susan Mil Ins Feminist Perspectives on Law. Law's 
Engagement with the Female Body (1998) 158 
488 In the Matter of Baby M 525 A.2d 1128, 217 NJ Super. 313 (Superior Ct. Chancery Division 1987); 











surrogate mother changed her mind, and she is quoted as saying, 'It overwhelmed me. I 
had no control. I had to keep her'.489 
At the trial court,490 the surrogacy contract was enforced against the surrogate mother. 
The Court held that the contract did not amount to the sale of a baby, as it was not 
possible for a father to buy something that already belonged to him. The court also 
found that it was in the child's best interests to be placed with her father. Consequently, 
the court upheld the contract, terminated the surrogate mother's parental rights, and 
allowed the commissioning mother to adopt the child. 
The case was brought on appeal before the New Jersey Supreme Court.491 Although, 
the court found that surrogate contracts were illegal and against public policy, it dealt 
with the contractual and custodial issues separately. The surrogate mother's parental 
rights were restored, but the commissioning father was given custody of the child on 
the grounds that it was in the child's best interests. 
The case prompted many states to consider legislative intervention.492 However, there 
is no uniformity, and state legislatures have adopted a variety of responses to the 
problem of determining parentage. For example, Arizona prohibits surrogacy contracts. 
489 Alta R Charo 'United States: Surrogacy'. In Sheila AM Mclean (ed) Law Reform and Human 
Reproduction (I 992) 234 
490 Jn the Matter of Baby M, 217 NJ Super. 313, 525 A.2d l 128 (Ch. Div l 987), affd in part, rev'd in 
part, In the Matter of Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (l 988) 
491 Jn the Matter of Baby M 531, A.2d 1227, 109 NJ 396 (NJ S. Ct. l 988) 












However, where there is such an arrangement, the surrogate mother is the child's legal 
mother and, if she is married, her husband is (rebuttably) presumed to be the father.493 
In Arkansas, the intended mother and the biological father are the legal parents, 
provided that the biological father is married to the intended mother. If the biological 
father is a sperm donor, then the commissioning mother is the legal parent.494 In 
Washington, there are no presumptions with respect to parentage and it is for the court 
to decide who is to have custody of a child born of a surrogate arrangement.495 In New 
Hampshire, the surrogate is deemed to be the mother and is allowed 72 hours after 
giving birth in which to decide whether she wishes to keep the child.496 
In 1988, model legislation in the form of the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted 
Conception Act proposed that state legislation either prohibit the practice altogether or 
permit it only under the supervision of a court order.497 Where a court has approved the 
arrangement prior to conception, the intended parents are regarded as the child's legal 
parents, but where a court has not given its approval the arrangement is void, and the 
493 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 25-218 (1991). Alice Hofheimer 'Gestational Surrogacy: Unsettling State 
Parentage Law and Surrogacy Policy' ( 1992) 19(3) New York University Review of Law and Social 
Change 571 at 613. See also Diederika Pretorius Surrogate Motherhood: A Worldwide View of the 
Issues (1994) 55 
494 Ark. Code Ann 9-10-201 (Michie 1991). Alice Hofheimer 'Gestational Surrogacy: Unsettling State 
Parentage Law and Surrogacy Policy' ( 1992) 19(3) New York University Review of Law and Social 
Change 571 at 613. See also Diederika Pretorius Surrogate Motherhood: A Worldwide View of the 
Issues (1994) 55 
495 Wash. Rev. Code Ann 26.26.210-260 (West 1992). Alice Hofheimer 'Gestational Surrogacy: 
Unsettling State Parentage Law and Surrogacy Policy' (1992) 19(3) New York University Review of 
Law and Social Change 571at616. See also Diederika Pretorius Surrogate Motherhood· A Worldwide 
View of the Issues (1994) 56 
496 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann 168-8:1-32 (1991). Alice Hofheimer 'Gestational Surrogacy: Unsettling State 
Parentage Law and Surrogacy Policy' ( 1992) 19(3) New York University Review of Law and Social 
Change 571 at 613. See also Diederika Pretorius Surrogate Motherhood: A Worldwide View of the 
Issues (1994) 56 











surrogate mother is regarded as the child's mother. However, as model legislation is 
only advisory, state legislatures are by no means compelled to adopt the proposals. 
In California, the case of Johnson v Calvert,498 has created a remarkable precedent. The 
issue of parentage was decided by reference to procreative intent. The Court reasoned 
that the child owed its existence to the commissioning parents who had mentally 
conceived it, and accordingly awarded them parentage. 
In terms of Californian law, both the surrogate and commissioning mother were able to 
provide evidence of their motherhood. Anna Johnson, the surrogate mother, had given 
birth to the child, whereas Crispina Calvert, the commissioning mother, was able to 
demonstrate her genetic relationship. The Court, however, recognised the procreative 
intent of the commissioning parents, and held that the intended mother was the child's 
legal mother. It reasoned that '[b ]ecause two women each have presented acceptable 
proof of maternity, we do not believe this case can be decided without enquiring into 
the parties intentions as manifested in the surrogacy agreement ... [the Calverts) 
affirmatively intended the birth of the child, and took the necessary steps to effect in 
vitro fertilisation. But for their acted-on intention, the child would not exist ... 
Although the gestative function Anna [Johnson] performed was necessary to bring 
about the child's birth, it is safe to say Anna would not have been given the opportunity 
to gestate or deliver the child had she, prior to implantation of the zygote manifested 











her own intent to be the child's mother'.499 The Court regarded the role of the surrogate 
mother as that of a substitute: 'A woman who enters into a gestational surrogacy 
arrangement is not exercising her own right to make procreative choices; she is 
agreeing to provide a necessary and profoundly important service without any 
expectation that she will raise the resulting child as her own'.500 
The decision is of great interest as it attempts to provide an answer to the question of 
who the natural mother is, without recourse to family law principles. The decision 
highlights the role of the commissioning parents in engineering the reproductive 
process. 'Although the Act recognises both genetic consanguinity and the act of giving 
birth as a means of establishing a mother and child relationship, when the two means 
do not coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate the child - that is, she 
who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own -
is the natural mother under California law'.501 Thus, it is intention and not family law 
that is used to decide the competing claims of the parties. 5o2 Evidence of this intention 
will nearly always be found in the contract. 
The court's reasoning in Johnson's case was used in McDonald v McDonald to decide 
the maternal status of a woman who, although not the genetic mother, had given birth 
499 Johnson v Calvert 85 I P 2d 766 (I 993) at 782. D '.\1organ 'A Surrogacy Issue: Who is the Other 
Mother' (1994) 8 /nternationa/ Journal of Law and the Family 392 at 392 
500 Johnson v Calvert 85 I P 2d 766 (1993) at 786. D Morgan 'A Surrogacy Issue: Who is the Other 
Mother' (1994) 8 lnternational Journal of Law and the Family 392 at 394 
5o1 Johnson v Calvert 85I P 2d 766 (I993) at 782. D Morgan 'A Surrogacy Issue: Who is the Other 
Mother' (I994) 8 lnternationa/ Journal of Law and the Family 392 at 392 
502 D Morgan 'A Surrogacy Issue: Who is the Other Mother' (I 994) 8 lnternational Journal of Law and 











to twin girls.503 In this case, the court relied on the notion of intent to find that the 
woman who mentally conceived the child was for all purposes its natural mother. The 
McDonalds were engaged in a custody dispute pending their divorce. Their children, 
had been conceived by means of artificial fertilisation of donated eggs. The embryos 
were successfully implanted and Mrs McDonald gave birth to twin girls. However, 
before the girls were born, Mr McDonald sought a divorce order in which he asked for 
the sole custody of the children. He based his claim on his genetic relationship arguing 
that he was the 'only genetic and natural parent available'.504 
The Court relied heavily on the concept of maternal intent and found in Mrs 
McDonald's favour. It argued that in cases of split biological maternity the woman who 
mentally conceived the child (or children) is to be regarded in law as the natural 
mother.505 It is, however, worth noting that the court's task was made easier by the fact 
that they were not asked to decide between the completing claims of two women.506 
Dolgin discusses the doctrine of maternal intent in detail, and criticises the majority's 
reasoning in Johnson's case.507 The word intent implies choice or will, whereas the 
traditional concept of family presupposes that the relationship is inevitable. Until 
503 McDonaldv McDonald608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1994) 
504Janet L Dolgin 'The Law Debates the Family: Reproductive Transformations' (1995) 7(1) Yale 
Journal of Law and Feminism, 7(1) 37 at 59 
505 Janet L Dolgin 'The Law Debates the Family: Reproductive Transformations' (1995) 7(1) Yale 
Journal of Law and Feminism, 7(1) 37 at 61 
506 Janet L Dolgin 'The Law Debates the Family: Reproductive Transformations' (1995) 7(1) Yale 
Journal of Law and Feminism, 1( 1) 3 7 at 62 











recently, posing the question - who is the child's mother - would be met with a reply 
that referred to the woman who gave birth to the child. Reproductive technologies 
allow the genetic and gestational components of motherhood to be split between two 
mothers. In effect both of these women can be called the real or natural mother. 
However, the majority refused to consider the possibility that a child could have more 
than one mother, and determined the identity of the 'natural' mother by referring to the 
pre-conception intention of the parties. 
The dissenting judgement of Kennard J in the same case raises further concerns. In 
order to establish the intention of the parties, recourse must be had to the terms of their 
contract. Thus, an intent-based approach implies that contractual principles will decide 
the fate of the child concerned. Kennard J objects to the failure of the majority to 
decide the matter of custody by referring to the 'best interests' principle. He argues that 
'we are not deciding a case involving the commission of a tort, the ownership of 
intellectual property, or the delivery of goods under a commercial contract; we are 
deciding the fate of a child'.sos He argues that an intent-based test does not 
automatically serve a child's best interests. For example, it requires 'little imagination to 
foresee cases in which the genetic mother is unstable, or a substance abuser, or in 
which her life circumstances change dramatically during the gestational mother's 
pregnancy•.so9 An intent-based approach effectively extinguishes any claim that the 
surrogate mother might have to the child, even where it is clearly in the best interests of 
SOB D Morgan 'A Surrogacy Issue: Who is the Other Mother' (1994) 8 lnternational Journal of law and 
the Family 386 at 395 
S09 D Morgan 'A Surrogacy Issue: Who is the Other Mother' (1994) 8 Jnternational Journal of law and 











the child to remain with her.s10 Morgan comments that the majority could have 
achieved the same result by applying the principles of family law as the child was at 
that stage already three years old, and had its home with the commissioning parents. 
Accordingly, it would clearly have been in the child's best interests to remain with the 
commissioning parents.s11 
Thus, while a contractual approach is advantageous in that it 'respects the value of 
personal intention and contractual commitments in forming relationships•,s12 it is not 
necessarily the most appropriate mechanism to determine parenthood. The best 
interests' test enables the court to decide which person or persons are best suited to the 
task ofrearing the child, thereby placing weight on the social aspect of parenting. 
6.2.3. Canada: 
In Canada, surrogacy contracts are likely to be void for reasons of public policy.m In 
addition, surrogacy contracts conflict with established principles of Canadian family 
law, as parentage and issues of custody are determined by reference to the best interests 
510 D Morgan 'A Surrogacy Issue: Who is the Other Mother' (1994) 8 International Journal of Law and 
the Family 386 at 395-396 
511 D Morgan 'A Surrogacy Issue: Who is the Other Mother' (1994) 8 International Journal of Law and 
the Family 386 at 395-396 
512 Lori B Andrews 'Beyond Doctrinal boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate Motherhood' 
( 1995) 81 Virginia Law Review 2343 at 2345 












of the child. s 14 Parental responsibilities are incapable of transfer as a matter of contract 
and it is illegal to agree to relinquish a child prior to its birth.SIS 
While it is possible to enter a surrogacy arrangement in some Canadian provinces by 
exploiting the loopholes in existing law,s16 the practice is not always encouraged. 
Although, the Saskatchewan Law Commission on artificial insemination did not 
directly address surrogate motherhood,m its proposals provide that where a woman is 
artificially inseminated with the consent of her husband, the resultant child should be 
regarded as their legitimate chi Id. A sperm donor is for all purposes deemed to have no 
legal ties with a child born as a result of artificial insemination. The implication is that 
in the case of surrogacy, the surrogate mother would be regarded as the legal mother, 
and her husband as the child's father. The genetic parent(s) in the case of full surrogacy, 
are deemed to have no ties to the child, and consequently are unable to rely on their 
genetic relationship to the child to assert their claim.sis 
In Alberta, legislators have proposed that the birth mother be regarded as the legal 
mother.s19 However, where the presumptions of parentage are not in accordance with 
reality, the proposed act allows a court to declare parentage, 'whether of the mother or 
S 14 Law Reform Commission of Canada Medically Assisted Procreation (Working Paper: 65: 1992) 66 
SIS Law Reform Commission of Canada Medically Assisted Procreation (Working Paper: 65: 1992) 66 
Sl 6 Law Reform Commission of Canada Medically Assisted Procreation (Working Paper: 65: 1992) 66 
St7 Saskatchewan Law Reform Commission Proposals/or a Human Artificial Insemination Act (March 
1987) 
SIS South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65, 1993) 59 











the father - of a child who is the product of assisted human reproduction•.520 The court 
must issue a declaration if it is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the applicant 
is in fact the parent. The best interests of the child are paramount and the applicant 
must be able and willing to assume the responsibilities of parenting. When the court 
makes the declaration, it will make an order with regard to guardianship and access. 
The province of Ontario undertook extensive research into surrogate arrangements, and 
its proposals created some controversy as they are facilitative of such arrangements.521 
522 The commission proposed that surrogate contracts are enforceable provided that the 
contract is in accordance with legislative provisions.m In order to ensure that surrogate 
contracts complied with the prescribed criteria, it proposed that the courts take an 
active role in this regard.524 
The Ontario Commission recommended that from the moment of birth the 
commissioning parents be considered for all purposes to be the legal parents of the 
child, with all the ensuing responsibilities and duties of parentage.525 In the event that 
the child is born handicapped, the commissioning parents are nevertheless accorded 
520 South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65, 1993) 59 
521 Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Human Artificial Reproduction and Related Matters 
(1985) 
522 The South African Law Commission discusses the recommendations of the Ontario Commission in 
some detail. South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65, 1993) 50-58 
523 Bernard Dickens 'Canada: The Ontario Law Reform Commission Project on Human Artificial 
Reproduction'. In Sheila AM Mclean (ed) Law Reform and Human Reproduction (1992) 47 at 71 
524 Bernard Dickens 'Canada: The Ontario Law Reform Commission Project on Human Artificial 
Reproduction'. In Sheila AM Mclean (ed) Law Reform and Human Reproduction (1992) 47 at 71 
525 Bernard Dickens 'Canada: The Ontario Law Reform Commission Project on Human Artificial 











full parental status and should they refuse to take on that responsibility they can be 
compelled to provide financial support.526 Furthermore, it recommended that 
legislation should provide for the immediate surrender of the child at birth, and should 
the mother refuse to hand over the child, a court order compelling her to do so could be 
obtained by the commissioning parents.m 
The Law Reform Commission of Canada recommended that surrogate contracts be 
regarded as void and, consequently, unenforceable.528 It reasoned that the law of 
contract is not an appropriate medium to decide matters relating to the family. The 
removal of surrogate agreements from the sphere of contract would enable a court to 
decide issues such as custody and legal parentage by reference to the best interests of 
the child.529 
The Law Reform Commission of Canada noted that the presumption that the woman 
who gives birth to a child is its mother, is a rule of evidence, and is capable of 
rebuttal.530 Where a number of persons are able to claim parentage, it is possible that a 
dispute will arise on this point. The Commission recommends that the surrogacy 
526 Bernard Dickens 'Canada: The Ontario Law Reform Commission Project on Human Artificial 
Reproduction'. In Sheila AM Mclean (ed) Law Reform and Human Reproduction (1992) 47 at 73 
521 Bernard Dickens 'Canada: The Ontario Law Reform Commission Project on Human Artificial 
Reproduction'. In Sheila A M Mclean ( ed) Law Reform and Human Reproduction ( 1992) 4 7 at 72 
528 Law Reform Commission of Canada Medically Assisted Procreation (Working Paper: 65: 1992) 138 
529 Law Reform Commission of Canada Medically Assisted Procreation (Working Paper: 65: 1992) 66 












contract be null and void, and custody of the child is to be determined according to the 
best in interests of the child'.531 












6.3. Determining Parenthood: South Africa 
In South Africa, traditional family law identifies the woman who bears a child as its 
mother.532 In the past this fact has been so obvious that there has been no need for any 
discussion of the notion of motherhood. In contrast, paternity is often the subject of 
dispute. In order to identity the father of a child, the law distinguishes between 
legitimate and illegitimate children. Where a child is born of a marriage, the birth 
mother's husband is rebuttably presumed to be its father. Where a child is illegitimate, 
the birth mother is its sole legal guardian, and paternity must be established. 
The Children's Status Act, inter alia, regulates the status of children conceived by 
means of artificial fertilisation.533 In terms of the Act, artificial fertilisation includes 
both the introduction of 'by other than natural means of a male gamete or gametes into 
the internal reproductive organs of that woman', and 'the placing of the product of a 
union of male and a female gamete or gametes which have been brought together 
outside the human body in the womb of that woman'.534 This definition would appear 
to be wide enough to include the artificial fertilisation techniques utilised to effect 
conception in a surrogacy arrangement. 
The Act provides that 'whenever the gamete or gametes of any person other than a 
married woman or her husband have been used with the consent of both that woman 
and her husband for the artificial insemination of that woman, any child born of that 
532 The common law presumption is expressed in the maxim mater semper certa est, which means 
literally that the identity of the mother is always certain. 
533 Children's Status Act 82 of 1987 











woman as a result of such artificial insemination shall for all purposes be deemed to be 
the legitimate child of that woman and her husband as ifthe gamete or gametes of that 
woman or her husband were used for such artificial insemination'.535 Furthermore, no 
right, duty or obligation shall arise between any child born as a result of the artificial 
insemination and the gamete donor or donors, unless the donor is the birth mother or 
her husband.536 
These provisions have a restrictive effect. The surrogate mother and her husband are 
deemed to be the child's legal parents. Thus, the commissioning couple would have to 
adopt the child in order to become its legal parents and this depends on the co-
operation of the surrogate mother and her husband.537 Likewise, should the 
commissioning parents decide that they no longer wish to take the child, the surrogate 
mother may be burdened with a child she never bargained for. 
Presently, the commissioning couple have few options available to them to ensure their 
recognition as the legal parents of a child born of a surrogate arrangement. In terms of 
the provisions of the Child Care Act,538they are able to adopt the child with the consent 
of the surrogate mother (and her husband if she is married).539 It is also (theoretically) 
possible for the couple to apply to the High Court for an order requesting that 
535 Section 5( 1 )(a), Children's Status Act 82 of 1987 
536 Section 5(2), Children's Status Act 82 of 1987 
537 In terms of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983, the surrogate mother (and, if she is married, her husband) 
must consent to the adoption of the child. Second Issue Paper on The Review of the Child Care Act: 
Project 110 at 3 
538 Child Care Act 74 of 1983 











guardianship of the minor child be awarded to them.54° In this instance, they would 
have to show that such an order would be in the best interests of the minor child. 
The South African Law Commission proposes that only gestational surrogacy is 
permitted.541 The Commission reasons that ifthe surrogate mother is genetically related 
to the child, almost no justification can be found to compel her to relinquish the 
child.542 Departing from the common law, the Commission proposes that the 
commissioning parents be regarded as the child's legal parents.543 The proposed bill 
provides that 'any child born as a result of the artificial fertilisation of the surrogate 
mother shall for all purposes be the child of the commissioning parents as if the 
commissioning wife had given birth to the child within her marriage to the 
commissioning husband'.544 The surrogate mother is obliged to surrender the child to 
the commissioning parents as soon as is reasonably possible after the birth.545 The 
surrogate mother and her husband will have no rights of parenthood or custody of or 
access to the child.546 
540 Second Issue Paper on The Review of the Child Care Act: Project 110 at 3 
541 South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65, 1993) 152 
542 South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65, 1993) 154 
543 Clause 8(1)(a), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project65, 1993) 
544 Clause 8(l)(a), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65, 1993) 
545 Clause 8( 1 )(b ), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65, 1993) 
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The corollary to this is that the surrogate mother will never be forced to assume 
responsibility for the child. Once conception has taken place, the commissioning 
parents are unable to renege on the arrangement even where they no longer wish to 
parent the child. The Commission explains that 'from a legal viewpoint the child is 
automatically deemed to be the legal child of the commissioning parents. This entails 
that it is registered as the legal child of the couple at birth. The parents are obliged to 
care for the child even where it is born handicapped'.547 
The Commission proposes further that the surrogate mother be obliged to hand over the 
child to the commissioning parents as soon as is reasonably possible after its birth,548 
and that neither the surrogate mother nor her husband shall have any rights of access to 
or custody of the child.549 The child has no claim of maintenance or succession against 
the surrogate, her husband or their relatives.550 
The Commission proposes a system of direct parentage, in other words, there is no 
need for the commissioning parents to apply for a transfer of parentage, as the child is 
automatically deemed to be the legal child of the commissioning parents, and is 
547 Clause 8 (l)(a), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate 
Motherhood (Project 65, 1993) 
548 Clause S(l)(b), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65, 1993) 
549 Clause S(l)(c), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65, 1993) 
550 Clause S(l)(e), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 











registered at birth as the legal child of the commissioning couple.551 Consequently, 
neither the surrogate mother, nor her husband, has any rights or duties to the child.552 
The Commission emphasises that once the child is conceived no attempt on the part of 
any of the parties to renege on the agreement (with the exception of the circumstances 
relating to abortion), will be countenanced.553 The Commission states that it is of 
cardinal importance that the best interests of the child are considered before 
conception. Situations where the court has to decide these issues ex post facto should 
be prevented at all costs.554 
Finally, the Commission proposes that where the parties fail to comply with the 
provisions of the proposed act, any agreement, which may exist between them, is 
invalid, and the surrogate mother is deemed to be the legal mother.555 The purpose of 
this clause is to encourage the parties to comply with the existing agreement.556 
While the Commission does not explicitly state its reasons for adopting a direct 
parentage model, it appears that it was persuaded by the following considerations: 
55 l South African Law Commission Report on Su"ogate Motherhood (Project 65, 1993) 173 
552 South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65, 1993) 174 
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1) That it is in the best interests of the child for parenthood to be decided prior to its 
birth;557 
2) the existence of a genetic relationship between the commissioning couple and their 
child facilitates bonding between the commissioning parents and the child;sss 
3) the lack of a genetic relationship between the surrogate and the child will make it 
easier for the surrogate to relinquish the child, as it is thought that bonding occurs after 
birth;559 and 
4) a direct parentage model gives effect to the parties' intentions as stated in the 
agreement. 
It is arguable whether it is in the child's best interests to assign parenthood prior to 
birth. Despite the Commission's view that a surrogate is less likely to want to renege on 
an agreement where she is not genetically related to the child, there is evidence that the 
maternal attachment experienced by these mothers is as great as if they were 
genetically related to the child.560 The surrogate carries, nurtures and ultimately gives 
birth to the child, and it appears arbitrary to discount her biological contribution in 
favour of the genetic contribution of the commissioning parents. 
The Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood has alternative proposals to those of the 
557 South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65, 1993) 156 
558 South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65, 1993) 151 
559 South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65, 1993) 152 











Commission with respect to the assignment of parenthood.561 It distinguishes between 
full and partial surrogacy, and introduces the concepts of direct parentage and fast track 
adoption. Where full surrogacy is utilised, the child is considered the legitimate child 
of the commissioning parents at birth, and the birth is registered 
accordingly.562Although the parties can enter into an agreement as to any rights of 
access the surrogate mother is to enjoy, neither she nor any of her relatives have any 
rights of parenthood or custody of the child.563 Nor does the child have any rights of 
maintenance or of succession against the birth mother or any of her relatives.564 The 
surrogate is obliged to hand the child to the commissioning parents immediately after 
birth.565 
In the case of partial surrogacy, the Committee recommends fast track adoption,566 
which it defines as, 'a procedure whereby the commissioning parent or parents in a 
surrogate motherhood agreement petition the court for a parental order whereby they 
will be treated in law as the parent or parents of the child or children, without having to 
adopt the said child or children. Until the making of the order by the court the surrogate 
561para6.9.l.l, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 42 
562 para 3.11, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 7 
563 para 6.9.1.3, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 43 
564 para 6.9. l .4, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Olmmittee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 43 
565 para 6.9.1.5, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 43 
566 para 6.9.2.4, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Olmmittee on the Report of the South African Law 











mother remains the legal mother of the child or the children'.567 In other words, the 
child is registered in the name of the surrogate mother and is regarded as her child (and 
that of her husband, if applicable). The commissioning parents may apply to the court 
for an order directing a transfer of parentage within six months of the child's birth but 
the application may not be brought before a six-week period has elapsed from the date 
of birth. The surrogate mother's consent must be unconditional, and can not be given 
within the six-week period after the child's birth. Of note is the Committee's 
recommendation that the surrogate mother is obliged to hand over the child to the 
commissioning parents at birth.568 
Clearly, the Committee has drawn heavily on the provisions contained in section 30 of 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act,569 which enables a court to make an 
order providing for a child to be treated in law as the child of the commissioning 
parents, provided certain criteria are complied with. As already mentioned, a section 30 
order is restricted to married couples making use of assisted reproduction techniques 
where at least one of the intended parents is genetically related to the child.570 571 The 
order must be brought within six months of the child's birth,572 and the child must have 
567 para 3. I I, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October I 998 at 7 
568 para 6.9.2.3, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October I998 at 7 
569 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act I990 
570 Section 30( I), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act I 990 
571 Section 30(1 )(a) & (b ), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act I 990 











its home with the commissioning parents.573 In addition, the court must be satisfied that 
the surrogate and, if she is married, her husband 'have freely and with full 
understanding of what is involved, agreed unconditionally to the making of the order', 
and the surrogate mother can not give her consent before a period of six weeks 
elapses.574 
The 'best interests' principle is the court's paramount consideration in deciding to grant 
a section 30 order. A guardian ad /item is appointed to assist the court in establishing 
whether or not the requirements set out in section 30 have been satisfied,575 and 
whether reasons exist to refuse a parental order. In English law parenthood is separated 
from pennission to raise a child, and parental responsibility is not automatically 
accorded to the legal parents.576 Giesen comments that English law considers 'nurture' 
more important than 'nature', and concludes that this is advantageous as emphasis is 
placed on the socially defined family, and not the biological family.577 In other words, 
the best interests of the child trump biological and genetic parenthood. 
The Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee proposes that the surrogate mother is 
legally incapable of consenting to the transfer of parentage to the commissioning 
parents within six weeks of giving birth, despite the fact that in tenns of the 
573 Section 30(3)(a), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
574 Section 30(5), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
575 Section 41, Children Act 1989 
576 Dieter Giesen 'Artificial Reproduction Revisited: Status Problems and Welfare of the Child - A 
Comparative View'. In Caroline Bridge (ed), Family Law Towards the New Millenium: Essays/or PM 
Bromley ( 1997) 259 
577 Dieter Giesen 'Artificial Reproduction Revisited: Status Problems and Welfare of the Child -A 
Comparative View'. In Caroline Bridge (ed), Family Law Towards the New Millenium: Essays/or PM 











Committees own recommendations, the child will already be living with them. The 
commissioning parents have six months in which to bring an application for the 
transfer of parental rights, but this application will not succeed unless the surrogate 
mother has consented to the transfer. The Committee makes no mention of the need for 
the consent of the surrogate mother's husband, although in terms of the Children's 
Status Act he is the child's legal father.578 Just as in English law, the Committee also 
provides for the appointment of a guardian ad /item for the child.579 However, in 
English law, this guardian is appointed in terms of the Adoption Act, and has specific 
powers and responsibilities in terms of that Act.580 The closest South African law 
comes to the English concept of a guardian ad /item is the Family Advocate. However, 
it is debatable whether the Family Advocate has the resources to perform yet another 
function in family law arena, and in any event the Committee does not suggest who or 
which body will fulfil this role. 
The effect of an order to transfer parentage is that the surrogate mother's parental rights 
are extinguished, although the parties can come to an agreement to afford the surrogate 
mother access rights.581 Furthermore, the child has no claim for maintenance or 
succession against the surrogate mother or any of her relatives.582 The Committee 
makes no mention of the surrogate mother's husband. As he is the child's legal father, 
578 Section 5, Children's Status Act 82of1987 
579 para 6.9.2.2, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 43 
580 Adoption Act, 1976 
581 para 6.9.2.6, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 44 
582 para 6.9.2.7, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 











provision should be made to provide for the extinction of his parental rights. Once the 
parental order has been granted, the child will be issued with a new birth certificate, 
naming the commissioning parents as the child's parents.583 
The Committee recommends that the child is handed to the commissioning parents at 
birth in the case of both full and partial surrogacy.584 585 The surrender of the child 
raises a number of issues, for example, what remedies are available to the 
commissioning parents, should the surrogate mother refuse to hand over the child? The 
Committee states that the surrogate mother is obliged to hand the child to 
commissioning parents at birth, but does not state how far the commissioning parents 
can go to compel the surrogate mother to surrender the child. In the case of full 
surrogacy, the commissioning parents are in strong position as they are deemed to be 
the child's legal parents, and it does not appear that the surrogate has any claim to the 
child. In the case of partial surrogacy, the commissioning parents have no remedy 
should the surrogate mother decide not to relinquish the child. 
In addition, the Committee omits to discuss the situation where the commissioning 
parents breach the agreement, for example, by refusing to accept the child because it is 
born handicapped. As previously discussed, the position of the South African Law 
Commission is that after conception the parties are not permitted to renege, and the 
commissioning parents are deemed to be the child's parents. In effect the parties are not 
583 para 6.9.2.4, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 43 
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allowed to change their minds, regardless of any defects the child may suffer from. In 
this regard, the Committee's recommendations are the same. 
However, the Committee also permits partial surrogacy, and as discussed above the 
surrogate mother is regarded as the child's legal mother. Although the surrogate mother 
is given an opportunity to decide whether to consent to the transfer of parentage, no 
provision is made for the situation where the commissioning parents no longer wish to 
take the child. The question arises whether the surrogate mother should be able to 
compel the commissioning parents to assume responsibility for the child? 
The issue of breach of contract on the part of the commissioning parents is likely to 
arise when the child is born with a physical or mental defect. The case of Ma/ahojf v 
Stiver,586 illustrates the difficulties encountered when a child born of a surrogacy 
agreement is handicapped. The baby in this case was born with microcephaly. Neither 
the surrogate mother, her husband or the commissioning parents wanted the child. It 
was eventually established through blood tests, that the surrogate's husband was the 
child's father, thereby releasing the commissioning father from his obligations. Giesen 
comments that in these situations, 'the step to demand flawless delivery is easily taken. 
The obligation necessarily connected with 'natural' reproduction to accepting the 
resulting child, whatever its physical and mental state may be, ceases to be the central 
norm of the parent-child relationship'.587 
586 Malahoff v Stiver No. 83-4 734 
587 Dieter Giesen 'Artificial Reproduction Revisited: Status Problems and Welfare of the Child - A 
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Although it is possible to argue that it is not in a child's best interest to be placed with 
parents who do not want it, it is submitted that the surrogate mother should be able to 
compel the commissioning parents to take responsibility for the child. However, it can 
be argued that it is unfair to hold the commissioning parents to the contract, while 
permitting the surrogate to refuse to hand over the child. Meyerson submits that it 
should be possible to compel the commissioning parents to perform because a 
handicapped child is a risk of any pregnancy. The commissioning parents would bear 
the risk in the case of a normal pregnancy, and consequently it is reasonable to expect 
them to bear the risk now.588 
Meyerson argues that it should not be possible to compel the surrogate mother to 
surrender the child. 'Carrying and giving birth to a child almost invariably has a deep 
emotional impact on a woman, whether she is genetically related to it or not, and 
whatever her motives for conceiving it'.589 For this reason it is submitted that the 
distinction made between full and partial surrogacy is illogical. Afterall, why should 
the experience of conceiving a child, and carrying it to term, have less impact on a 
surrogate mother in a full surrogacy arrangement than in a partial surrogacy 
arrangement. 
6.4. Conclusion: 
Different jurisdictions have adopted disparate solutions to the problem of assigning 
parenthood in the context of surrogacy arrangements. In Johnson v Calvert, a 
588 D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. In Christina Murray (ed), Gender and the New South African 
Legal Order (1994) 142 
589 D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. In Christina Murray (ed), Gender and the New South African 











Californian court identified the mother by recourse to the intention of the parties.590 
This can be criticised for importing contractual principles into an area of the law in 
which the interests of the child should be paramount. Moreover, such an approach 
creates a class of women whose role is that of a human incubator. In this role, 'women 
... [are] planted with the male seeds and harvested; women [are] used for the fruit that 
they bear, like trees; women who run the gamut from prized cows to mangy dogs; from 
highbred horses to sad beasts ofburden•.591 
In other jurisdictions, the law clings to the more traditional definitions of motherhood, 
which poses the question of how to decide between the genetic and gestational mother. 
An award of parenthood on the basis of genetic relationship ignores the role that the 
surrogate mother plays in carrying the child to term and giving birth. On the other hand, 
emphasis on the gestational element of motherhood, ignores the genetic relationship the 
commissioning parents have with the child, and their willingness to undertake the 
responsibilities of parenthood. 
The South African Law Commission's proposal that the commissioning parents will be 
deemed to be the child's legal parents, has the advantage of certainty. In addition, the 
lengths to which the commissioning parents are prepared to go to have a child of their 
own is seen as indicative of their commitment,592 thereby assuming that the best 
interests of the child will always be served by awarding parentage to them. However, it 
is submitted that this assumption is too easily made, as numerous other factors could, 
590 Johnson v Calvert 851P2d 766 (1993) 
591 Jo Bridgeman & Susan Millns Feminist Perspectives on Law. Law's Engagement with the Female 
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and should, be taken into account in determining the best interests. The Commission 
appears to place too great an emphasis on intention, and the genetic relationship 
between commissioning parents and child, at the expense of the contribution of the 
surrogate mother in carrying the child to term. 
It is submitted that the Commission has erred in prohibiting partial surrogacy. As 
previously discussed, the restriction placed on partial surrogacy is unnecessary, and 
consequently both full and partial surrogacy should be permitted. Likewise, the 
Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee's proposal that there be two different models 
to assign parenthood, distinguishing between full and partial surrogacy, is unnecessary. 
It is submitted that the surrogate mother (and where applicable, her husband) should be 
deemed to be the child's legal parent (or parents), regardless of the child's genetic 
heritage. The intention of the parties should be recognised by making provision for a 
speedy procedural mechanism to transfer parentage to the commissioning parents. The 
commissioning parents should not be able to force the surrogate mother to relinquish 
the child. Although this may at first seem unfair, the surrogate mother has carried the 
child to term, and has had the opportunity to bond with the child. 
However, to some extent the interests of the commissioning parents can be protected 
by requiring the surrogate mother to elect whether or not to keep the child within a 
limited time. In contrast, the Committee permits the surrogate mother a relatively long 
period to do so. During this time the child lives with the commissioning parents. 
Presumably, if the surrogate mother decides to keep the child, the child will then be 
returned to her. It is submitted that this is most unsatisfactory, as the child will then 
have had an opportunity to bond with the commissioning couple, and it may not be in 











afforded a suitably short period of time in which to make her decision, and once that 
decision is made, her consent to the transfer of parentage should be irrevocable. 
The surrogate mother should be able to compel the commissioning parents to assume 
responsibility for the child as it will be unfair to burden her with the responsibility of a 
child she had not planned to keep. The commissioning parents instigated the 
arrangement, and consequently must assume a greater share of the responsibility. 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the best interests of the child should guide the court 
in determining parentage. The approaches of the Commission, the Committee and other 
jurisdictions, although not always couched in the terms of 'best interests', are premised 
on the belief that their process for assigning parentage reflect this principle, 
demonstrating the subjective nature of this concept. Consequently, legislation should 
aim at avoiding an overly rigid approach as epitomised in Johnson v Calvert,593 and to 
a certain extent displayed in the Commission's recommendations, both of which over-
emphasise the intention of the parties. Clearly, the parties' intention at the outset 
should not necessarily determine the fate of the child at the end of the process. 














'[l]t is trite to state that certain things - such as genuine feelings of love - cannot be 
bought. It is no less obvious that there exist things which are not traded - even though 
in principle they could be - because for one reason or another, they are considered 
inappropriate for commodification'.594 The exchange of money between the parties to a 
surrogacy arrangement is contentious. It would appear that the reasons for the 
controversy include both the fear that the parties face harm as they are exposed to the 
possibility of exploitation, as well as concern that commodification will lead to the 
degradation of human life. Although closely related, these concerns are distinct and 
merit careful examination. 
Opponents of commercial surrogacy argue that buying a woman's reproductive services 
is degrading. A woman's reproductive capacities are integral to her person, and for this 
reason should not be the object of a market transaction. Harding discusses the obvious 
comparisons between surrogacy and prostitution. 'Both appear to be an arrangement in 
which a woman 'sells her body' in a way deemed more intimate and somehow more 
morally problematic than, say, the selling of muscle power as labour in return for a 
wage. Questions centre partly on what the sexual and reproductive organs are thought 
to be for, and whether exchanging their use for money is compatible with their assumed 
purpose .... From a feminist perspective, an objection might be that both prostitution 











and surrogacy depend on women trading specifically female aspects of their biology, 
and the danger is that women's sexual and reproductive abilities will be emphasised to 
the detriment of their other abilities and potentialities .... [T]he use of prostitution and 
surrogacy as means of earning money may well serve to reinforce women's 
disadvantage in other economic activities, and to reinforce the view of women as 
having primarily a sexual and reproductive function in relation to society as a whole'.595 
Thus, it is feared that commercial surrogacy is not only degrading, but may encourage 
the perpetuation of gender stereotypes. 
It is also argued that surrogacy arrangements degrade children by treating them as 
commodities - objects to be bought and sold. Veile suggests that surrogacy is little 
more than a thinly disguised trade in children. The 'surrogate mother provides her 
ovum, and enters into [an] arrangement with the clear understanding that she is to 
avoid the responsibility for the life she creates. Accordingly, her motives for bearing 
children change from a desire to have them for their own sake, to a desire to have them 
because they can provide some benefit. In fact, she bears the child not because she 
desires it, but because she desires something from it. In essence babies are turned into 
commodities'596 
595 L M Harding 'The Debate on Surrogate Motherhood: The Current Situation, Some Arguments and 
Issues; Questions Facing Law and Policy' (1984) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 31at59-
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The argument that commercial surrogacy degrades women and children can be 
criticised for being overly moralistic. Generally, the characteristics of any moral 
argument are that the feared harms are highly speculative in nature, and no attempt is 
made to measure the benefits against the potential harms. Meyerson submits that moral 
arguments are not sufficient reason to justify prohibition of a practice unless there is a 
real possibility that the parties concerned will actually suffer harm.597 
Duxbury concedes that the argument that commercial surrogacy commodities children 
and degrades women is emotive, but submits that it is not convincing for the following 
reasons. Firstly, the argument relies on depicting the most extreme scenario, thereby 
presenting a distorted image of the parties involved. 'For those who fear the degrading 
effects of commodification, the surrogate mother tends to be portrayed as a victim of 
market forces who, owing to material hardship, is prepared to conceive a child for no 
other reason than material advantage. Prospective parents, in tum, tend to be depicted 
as classic rational economic agents who not only treat the commercial surrogacy 
agreement as a contract for the supply of goods, but who are prepared to refuse to take 
possession of. or assume responsibility for, those goods if they tum out to be other than 
expected. Such depictions rarely capture the reality of surrogacy arrangements'. 598 
Secondly, it is normal for people to sell talents and abilities which might be regarded as 
integral to self - for example teachers, musicians and athletes - without this resulting in 
597 D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. In Christina Murray (ed) Gender and the New South African 
Order(l994) 125 











a perception of degradation.s99 Moreover, prohibiting women from earning wages for 
their reproductive labour may well reinforce traditional gender stereotypes. Trebilcock 
questions whether 'reproductive labour [should] continue to be market exempt to 
protect against the exploitation of uneducated and financially disadvantaged women, or 
is it possible that by denying women the opportunity to profit from 
reproductive/gestational labour, this form oflabour will continue to be under-valued by 
society'. 600 
In its favour, surrogacy attempts to address the problem of infertility which many 
couples face. There is tremendous pressure on couples to have children. 'Girls who are 
brought up to expect to be mothers can feel that the have failed if they do not fulfil 
these expectations•.601 The adoption of a child is not always viable, and the 
liberalisation of attitudes towards illegitimacy and abortion has meant that there are 
fewer children to adopt. Furthermore, 'most people think that rearing their genetic 
offspring is better than rearing children who are not genetically theirs ... Other reasons 
for desiring genetically-linked offspring include property inheritance, carrying on the 
family name, and immortality'.602 Thus, if surrogacy is regarded as an inherently 
valuable service, why then should payment make it less so? Surely it is unreasonable to 
expect a surrogate mother to endure the risks of pregnancy without some reward, even 
if only for loss of earnings, and expenses incurred. 
599 Neil Duxbury 'Do Markets Degrade?' (1996) 59(3) Modern Law Review 331 at 342 
600 M J Trebilcock The Limits o/Contractua/ Freedom (1993) 51 
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Duxbury concludes that the argument that commercial surrogacy is degrading is 
essentially a moral evaluation and as such is not a good reason for restricting the 
practice. 'Where people are offended by what they perceive to be the degrading effects 
of commodification, their feelings ought not to count as a reason for curbing 
markets'.603 There may well be reasons to justify the restriction of the market - for 
example, the market may create opportunities for widespread exploitation. 
A more immediate concern is that the possibility of earning desperately needed money 
may tempt a woman to agree to be a surrogate mother without proper thought as to the 
consequences. Meyerson identifies three separate arguments with respect to 
commercial surrogacy and exploitation.604 The first is the fear that the prospect of 
earning a fee is so tempting to the potential surrogate mother that it is coercive in itself. 
605 The second argument is that a woman cannot give her free and unconditional 
consent prior to the child's birth.606 The last argument concerns the possibility of the 
commissioning parents taking advantage of a surrogate mother's position to drive an 
'unconscionable bargain'. 607 
603 Neil Duxbury 'Do Markets Degrade?' (1996) Modern Law Review 341at348 
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Meyerson argues that women should be given the opportunity to improve their 
financial circumstances, adding that a prohibition of commercial surrogacy 
arrangements will effect poorer women the most, as they will be denied the opportunity 
to earn desperately needed money. 608 'If we think that respect for persons warrants 
prohibiting a mother from selling something personal to obtain food for her starving 
children, we do not respect her personhood more by forcing her to let them starve 
instead' .609 
Moreover, a prohibition of the exchange of money does not automatically ensure that 
the arrangement is free from any form of exploitation. An ostensibly altruistic 
arrangement between family members or friends may mask a situation where the 
surrogate faces an inordinate amount of pressure. Many of the objections to 
commercial surogacy are pertinent to altruistic surrogacy. Raymond notes that the 'so 
called altruism of non commercial surogacy still reinforces the fact that women are 
breeders or mere maternal containers for someone else, whether done for money or 
love. The potential for exploitation is not necessarily less, merely because no money is 
involved, and the arrangements may take place in the family setting. The family has 
hardly been a safe place for women•.610 
608 D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. In Christina Murray (ed) Gender and the New South African 
Order (1994) 13 l 
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An additional concern is that the child is unable to consent to its own participation in 
the arrangement. Meyerson notes that parties who agree to exchange goods are usually 
allowed to do so. However, where children are involved, the state is obliged to ensure 
that the child's interests are protected. She argues that this is a reason for regulation and 
not prohibition.611 
What precisely is being bought in the context of commercial surrogacy? The surrogate 
bears and gives birth to the child. In doing so she expends 'considerable labour and 
time, [suffers] a dramatic change in lifestyle, and [undertakes] additional 
responsibilities towards a potential human being'.612 Thus, if payment is for her 
services, there can be no question of the child being a commodity. However, if the 
receipt of payment is conditional on the surrogate consenting to the termination of her 
parental rights, then the arrangement closely resembles the sale of a child. Thus, the 
pivotal question is whether 'the payment is designed to induce a parent to part with her 
child'?613 
Even so, it is possible to argue that what is really being bought is the opportunity to be 
a parent. 'Although carrying a child to term may mark the beginning of becoming a 
parent, the real task of child rearing begins with the birth of the child. The care, love, 
and nurturing demanded by children involves substantial resources, many years of a 
parent's life, endless degrees of energy, patience, and understanding, and ongoing 
611 D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. In Christina Murray (ed) Gender and the New South African 
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financial commitments. That money is required in the raising of children, whether it be 
to pay for day-care, education, health care, or other amenities of life, does not seem to 
have destroyed the love most parents feel for their children, and it is difficult to believe 
that allowing commercial surrogacy contracts is antithetical to this love'.614 
A closer look at the commercial aspect of surrogate parenting reveals that the payment 
component can be divided into several categories. The first involves compensation of 
the surrogate mother for her medical and other reasonable expenses. The second is the 
payment of the surrogate for her services (in carrying the child to term and, 
subsequently, relinquishing her rights to the child). The third is the payment of third 
parties, such as commercial agencies, for their role in facilitating the arrangement. 
As previously discussed, surrogate arrangements challenge traditional notions of 
motherhood. This is even more pronounced in those cases where the underlying reason 
for the agreement is money, and not love. Our society expects women to love their 
children in a way that is 'uniquely selfless'.615 Where there is no exchange of money 
between the parties, it remains possible to view the surrogate's contribution as an act of 
selflessness on her part, and not as part of a transaction. However, research reveals that 
financial need does indeed prompt a large percentage of those women who act 
surrogates.616 This suggests that fewer women would act as surrogate mothers in the 
614 M J Trebilcock The Limits of Contractual Freedom (1993) 52 
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absence of a financial incentive to do so. It is submitted that if one permits surrogacy, it 
is counter-productive to frustrate access to it by making it difficult to find women 
willing to act as surrogate mothers. 
Medical and legal professionals should be able to recover their fees for legitimate 
services rendered, but commercial agencies are widely regarded as undesirable. 
Commercial agencies or 'baby-brokers', whose business it is to facilitate surrogacy 
arrangements, are viewed almost universally with suspicion by legislators. In the 
pursuit of profit, unscrupulous organisations or individuals might be tempted to take 
advantage of the misfortune of others. The possibility of exploitation is high, and some 
horrifying accounts of exploitation have been documented. One such account 
documents an American baby-broker's plan to set up shop in a South American country 
because the women there are poor and, consequently more willing to act as surrogate 
mothers for a lesser fee than their North American counterparts.61 7 
On the other hand, these brokers do offer a valuable service in bringing the parties 
together. An agency will typically introduce the commissioning parents to a surrogate 
mother. The agency should ensure that both the surrogate mother, and the 
commissioning couple are carefully screened in order to assess their suitability to 
participate in a surrogate arrangement. This is an extremely valuable service as proper 
screening can prevent the occurrence of problems associated with surrogacy 
arrangements. By banning these organisations, access to surrogacy is made much 
harder, forcing people to make their own arrangements. 'Surrogates found through 
617 Gena Corea 'Junk Liberty' In H Patricia Hynes (ed) Reconstructing Babylon: Women and Technology 











infonnal means are unlikely to receive counselling or to be well screened; they may 
indeed be young, poor, or emotionally disturbed and, thus, ripe for exploitation'.618 
It appears that regulation is preferable to prohibition. A professional agency is in an 
excellent position to ensure that the parties receive the best possible assistance. This 
service would ideally involve screening of all prospective parties (and not just the 
surrogate mother) The screening should be thorough, and encompass both physical and 
psychological testing of the parties. The agency should also provide psychiatric or 
psychological counselling for the parties, and in the case of the surrogate mother should 
include counselling prior to and during the pregnancy, and also after she has given 
birth. In addition, the parties should be infonned of their legal rights. 
It is submitted that it is possible to ensure unifonnity by requiring that agencies register 
with a licensing body. A licensed agency would have to comply with the requisite 
regulations, and dissatisfied persons would be able to direct their complaints to the 
licensing body. In South Africa, allowing licensed agencies to operate may lessen the 
burden on state resources. 
The South African Law Commission proposes that 'no person shall in connection with 
a surrogate motherhood arrangement give or promise to give to any person, or shall 
receive from any person, a reward or compensation in money or in kind'.619 The 
618 Martha Garrison 'Surrogate Parenting: What Should Legislation Do?' (Summer 1988) 22(2) Family 
Law Quarterly 149 at 154 
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Commission proposes that payment in the context of surrogate parenting be prohibited 
with the exception of compensation for those expenses that relate directly to the 
'artificial fertilisation and pregnancy of the surrogate mother, the birth of the child and 
the confinnation of the surrogate motherhood agreement•.620 
Provision is made for the compensation of bona fide services rendered by medical and 
legal professionals.621 However, advertising is prohibited and it is an offence for a 
person 'in any way or with a view to compensation [to make it] known that any person 
is or might possibly be willing to enter into a surrogate motherhood agreement•.622 
The Parliamentary Ad hoc Select Committee agrees that commercial surrogacy should 
be prohibited. Accordingly, it is of the view that legislation should provide that 'no 
person shall in connection with a surrogate motherhood agreement give or promise to 
give any person, or shall receive from any person, a reward or compensation in cash or 
in kind'.623 The Committee states further that this prohibition will also apply to agents 
and brokers,624 but excludes all 'medical, legal and other necessary expenses related to 
620 Clause 10(2), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65: 1993) 
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surrogacy ... including all necessary expenses incurred for post-natal care'.625 
Reimbursement of the surrogate mother for her loss of earnings is permitted.626 Lastly, 
the Committee recommends that insurance be permitted to cover the surrogate mother 
in the event of her death or disability as a result of the pregnancy.627 
7.2. Comparative Perspective 
7.2.1. United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, the Warnock Committee recommended that commercial 
surrogacy agencies should be outlawed.628 The Warnock Committee was of the opinion 
that 'the danger of exploitation of one human being by another ... far [outweighed] the 
potential benefit'.629 
In response to public outrage surrounding the case of Baby Cotton,63° the Surrogacy 
Arrangements Act was passed.631 632 In this case, the commissioning parents, an 
625 para 6.5. l. l, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 37 
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Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 37 
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American couple, had entered into a surrogate contract with a British woman. It was 
agreed that the surrogate mother would receive $10 000 for her services. The baby was 
born in January 1985, but before the couple could take the child to the United States 
the relevant local authority, intervened to obtain an order that authorised it to remove 
the child to a place of safety pending an inquiry.633 The outcome of the inquiry found 
that the child's best interests were served by placing it with the commissioning parents, 
as the surrogate mother had expressed her unwillingness to retain the child. 
As mentioned above, the outcry surrounding the Baby Cotton case prompted the 
Legislature to act swiftly in enacting the Surrogacy A"angements Act.634 However, the 
foundation for the Act had been laid with the recommendations of the Warnock 
Committee. As a result of these recommendations, the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 
prohibits commercial surrogacy and imposes criminal sanctions on those who might be 
considered to be baby brokers. The Act makes it an offence for persons to engage in 
activities related to the making or negotiating or facilitation of the making of any 
surrogacy agreement in exchange for a fee.635 In addition, it is an offence to advertise in 
relation to a surrogate arrangement.636 
632 Douglas notes that the enormous publicity surrounding the Baby Cotton case led to the Surrogacy 
Arrangements Act 1985. Gillian Douglas Law Fertility and Reproduction (1991) at 152 
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However, altruistic surrogacy arrangements are not prohibited. In addition, in order to 
avoid children being born to mothers subject to the taint of criminality,637 the exchange 
of money between the immediate parties to a surrogate agreement is not subject to 
criminal sanction.638 Morgan comments that the purpose of these restraints is aimed at 
keeping surrogacy a family affair.639 
It is argued that under the provisions of the Act, the position of legal and medical 
practitioners offering professional services to the parties for a fee is extremely 
precarious.640 Sloman submits that the wording of section 2 is wide enough to cover the 
bona fide services of medical and legal professionals assisting the parties to a surrogacy 
arrangement for a fee. She argues that if surrogacy is to be permitted at all then 'the law 
should ensure that the parties directly involved are not exploited and that legal, medical 
and other necessary facilities are available to them'.641 
637 Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology Cmnd. 9314 (1984) at 
para 8.19 
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becoming a surrogate mother herself, to do any act mentioned in that subsection or to cause such an act 
to be done, or (b) for any person, with a view to a surrogate mother carrying a child for him, to do such 
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Despite the enactment of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act,642 commercial 
surrogacy is still subject to criminal sanction. The provisions of section 30 to that Act 
allow commissioning parents to apply to Court for a parental order which would 
declare them to be the legal parents of a child born of a surrogacy agreement. However, 
the court will not grant this order unless it is satisfied that no payments were made to 
the surrogate mother with the exception of her reasonable expenses or those expenses 
authorised by the Court.643 
7.2.2. United States 
A similar situation prevails in the United States with regard to attitudes to commercial 
surrogacy. As a result, much of the litigation in the United States has involved 
establishing whether commercial surrogacy contracts fall foul of state adoption statutes 
which prohibit parents from relinquishing their parental rights for money. 
In Surrogate Parenting Association, Inc v Commonwealth of Kentucky,644 the Kentucky 
Supreme Court distinguished between surrogacy arrangements and contracts for the 
purchase of a child. It held that surrogacy arrangements do not violate 'baby selling' 
laws, as the birth mother is not financially pressured into surrendering the child. The 
Court reasoned that the payment is not aimed at coercing the surrogate mother to 
surrender the child, as the surrogate agrees to carry the child prior to conception. She 
642 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
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enters the agreement of her own free will, and hence cannot be said to have been 
coerced to part with her child. 
In the case of Doe v Kelley,645 the Michigan Appeal Court held that surrogacy 
arrangements are a legitimate way of having children, but found that commercial 
surrogacy arrangements contravene adoption laws. In this case, the commissioning 
couple contracted with the surrogate mother. It was agreed that she would be paid the 
sum of $5 000. The contract made express provision for the surrogate mother to 
terminate her parental rights. The Court was asked to rule on the issue of prohibition of 
payment in the case of surrogacy. The Court held that although the relevant statute did 
not directly prohibit surrogacy, the payment of consideration in the context of 
surrogacy arrangements constitutes a violation of adoption statutes. 
In the case of Baby M,646 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that surrogacy contracts 
are invalid, and held that surrogacy 'amounts to the sale of a child, or at the very least, 
the sale of a mother's right to her child, the only mitigating factor being that one of the 
purchasers is the father. Almost every evil that prompted the prohibition on the 
payment of money in connection with adoptions exist here'.647 
Many state legislatures, including the states of Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Michigan, and Nebraska, 648 have passed legislation aimed at the prohibition of 
645 Court of Appeals of Michigan, 1981. 106 Mich.App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 
646 Jn the Matter of Baby M 109 NJ 396 410-411537A2d 1227, 1234 (1988) 
647 Jn the Matter of Baby M 109 NJ 396 410-411537A2d 1227, 1234 (1988) at 1250 











commercial surrogacy. In Washington and Utah it is a misdemeanour to conclude a 
surrogacy contract for gain, and all such agreements are void.649 The state of New 
Hampshire allows for the implementation of certain judicially approved surrogacy 
contracts.650 Although an exception is made for certain expenses relating to pregnancy, 
life insurance, legal costs and counselling, commercial surrogacy is not tolerated and 
solicitation is proscribed. Similarly, in Virginia,651 surrogate brokering of any kind is 
prohibited, although provision is made for compensation relating to the surrogate 
mother's reasonable expenses. However, Alabama, and West Virginia expressly 
exclude surrogate arrangements from the ambit of state baby selling statutes,652 thereby 
allowing surrogate agencies to operate. 
7.2.3. Canada 
At present, Canadian law does not make provision for surrogacy arrangements. 
However, it is likely that commercial surrogacy falls foul of legislative provisions 
aimed at prohibiting the trade in children. As in the United States, these legislative 
provisions are to be found in adoption and child protection statutes, which attempt to 
restrict those who may arrange adoptions, and restrict payment of consideration in the 
context of adoption arrangements. 
649 Diederika Pretorius Surrogate Motherhood: A Worldwide View of the Issues ( 1994) 55 
650 A Hofheimer 'Gestational Surrogacy: Unsettling State Parentage Law and Surrogacy Policy' (1992) 
19(3) New York University Review of Law and Social Change 571at614 
651 Diederika Pretorius Surrogate Motherhood: A Worldwide View of the Issues (1994) 55 
652 A Hofheimer 'Gestational Surrogacy: Unsettling State Parentage Law and Surrogacy Policy' (1992) 











The province of Ontario undertook extensive research into surrogacy arrangements, 
and in contrast to most other jurisdictions its proposals are extremely facilitative of 
surrogacy. The Ontario Law Reform Commission proposed that the issue of payment 
be left to the discretion of the Court which would have to approve the payment of any 
monies.653 
In 1992 the Law Reform Commission of Canada published the results of its 
investigation into medically assisted reproduction. The Commission stated that the 
activities of paid intermediaries should be met with criminal sanction.654 The 
Commission submitted that payment of a surrogate mother amounts to the sale of a 
child, and is not payment for services, as is sometimes argued. 'In surrogacy, unlike 
adoption, the child is conceived specifically to be surrendered in return for a sum of 
money ... Even if the transaction were not the sale of a child, the result would be too 
much like a sale to be treated differently. Any attempts to commercialise (payments to 
surrogates and intermediaries) should be expressly prohibited. A recommendation to 
this effect would follow the logic of the prohibitions that currently apply to adoption 
and child protection'.655 However, the Law Reform Commission decided that the 
immediate parties to a surrogacy contract (as opposed to intermediaries) should not be 
subject to criminal sanction because it was of the opinion that this might result in the 
653 The South African Law Commission discusses the recommendations of the Ontario Law Reform 
Commission Report on Human Artificial Reproduction and Related Matters ( 1985). South African Law 
Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood(Project 65: 1993) 56 
654 Law Reform Commission of Canada Medically Assisted Reproduction (Working Paper 65: 1992) 
137-138 












practice of surrogacy being driven underground.656 Furthermore, it held that it is not in 
the best interests of a child to be born to parents who face prosecution.657 
7 .3. Recommendations of the South African Law Commission 
Payment in the context of a surrogacy arrangement poses a problem. As previously 
discussed, the surrogate is regarded as the child's legal mother, and she would have to 
consent to its adoption by the commissioning parents. Section 24 of the Child Care Act 
makes the receipt of remuneration in the context of adoption a criminal offence.658 
However, the regulations to the Act do make provision for compensation for the natural 
mother's expenses. 659 
The South African Law Commission acknowledges the difficulties involved in 
enforcing a complete ban on commercial surrogacy. If the parties agree to a fee in 
private it will be extremely difficult to establish whether there has been an exchange of 
money.660 Nevertheless, the Commission hopes that the prospect of not receiving 
656 Law Reform Commission of Canada Medically Assisted Reproduction (Working Paper 65: 1992) 
137-138 
657 Law Reform Commission of Canada Medically Assisted Reproduction (Working Paper 65: 1992) 
138 
658 Section 24 states that '(l) no person shall, save as prescribed under the Social Work Act, 1978 (Act 
No. 110of1978) give, or undertake to give, receive or undertake to receive any consideration, in cash or 
kind, in respect of the adoption of a child. (2) Any person who contravenes any provision of subsection 
( 1) shall be guilty of an offence and on conviction liable to a fine not exceeding R8000 or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years or to both such fine and such imprisonment'. Child 
Care Act 74 of 1983 
659 Regulation 2l(l)(b)(iii) in terms of the section 60 of the Child Care Act 74of1983 under GN R 
2612 of 12 December 1986 











compensation will discourage the 'profit minded' potential surrogate mother.661 The 
Commission views commercialism in the context of surrogacy as being wholly 
undesirable and accordingly proposes that payment in the context of surrogate 
parenting be prohibited with the exception of compensation for those expenses that 
relate directly to the 'artificial fertilisation and pregnancy of the surrogate mother, the 
birth of the child and the confirmation of the surrogate motherhood agreement'.662 
The Commission goes on to propose that the surrender of the child should not be 
connected to the payment of compensation. Consequently, the commissioning parents, 
as the child's legal parents, have the right of custody of the child despite the existence 
of a dispute with respect to payment of compensation. In the event of a dispute, the 
Commission recommends that it is dealt with only once the child has been handed to 
the commissioning parents.663 664 
Provision is made for the compensation of bona fide medical and legal professionals, 
even where the agreement is not subsequently confirmed by a court for whatever 
reason.665 However, it is an offence for a person 'in any way or with a view to 
compensation [to make it] known that any person is or might possibly be willing to 
661 South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65: 1993) 160 
662 Clause 10(2) Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project65: 1993) 
663 South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65: 1993) 150 
664 The Commission is of the opinion that if custody of the child is eliminated as a ground of litigation 
the law of contract and delict make sufficient provision in the event of the parties wishing to litigate 
against each other'. South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65: 1993) 
at 159 
665 Clause 10(3), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 











enter into a surrogate motherhood agreemenf.666 The Commission is also of the belief 
that the prohibition of advertising may also restrict commercialism.667 However, the 
Commission does not prohibit the dissemination of information by individuals or 
organisations, where their activities are not linked to a profit motive. Although the 
Commission expressed its reluctance to criminalise any aspect of surrogacy 
arrangements, it was of the opinion that such a measure would serve as a deterrent to 
those parties tempted to assist in the establishment of an illegal surrogacy 
arrangement. 668 
It is submitted that a ban on commercial agencies is unnecessary, and that properly 
regulated agencies could be invaluable in facilitating access to surrogacy, and in 
alleviating the burden on state resources. Present government health policies promote 
primary health care, and it is unlikely that the needs of infertile couples will be a 
priority. However, the demand for surrogacy arrangements is likely to increase with the 
relaxation of abortion laws, and the consequent decline in the number of babies 
available for adoption. 
666 Clause 12(2), Schedule A to the South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood 
(Project 65: 1993) 
667 South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65: 1993) 158 











7.3.1. Recommendations of the Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the 
Report of the South African Law Commission 
The Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee agrees with the South African Law 
Commission's proposal that commercial surrogacy should be prohibited.669 
Accordingly, it is of the view that legislation should provide that 'no person shall in 
connection with a surrogate motherhood agreement give or promise to give any person, 
or shall receive from any person, a reward or compensation in cash or kind'.670 
However, it proposes that exception should be made for 'medical, legal and other 
necessary expenses related to the surrogacy arrangement 'including all necessary 
expenses incurred for post-natal care,671 as well as any loss of earnings the surrogate 
mother might suffer.672 It also recommends that the parties arrange insurance to cover 
the surrogate mother in the event of her death or disability as a result of the 
pregnancy. 673 
The Committee permits compensation for the surrogate mother's necessary expenses 
and loss of earnings. This, however, implies that the surrogate mother must have had a 
form of employment prior to the pregnancy. It is submitted that if 'loss of earnings' is to 
669 para 6.5 .1, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 37 
670 para 6.5.1. & 6.10.2, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African 
Law Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 3 7 
671 para 6.5.1.1, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 37 
672 para 6.5.1.2, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood Draft Final Report dated October 1998 at 37 
673 para 6.5.1.3, Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Report of the South African Law 











include 'loss of earning capacity', this may in practice amount to an indirect way of 
compensating the surrogate mother for her services. 
The Committee does not make express provision for payment of a fee to the surrogate 
mother for services rendered. However, if one follows the Committee's reasoning there 
should be no objection to payment of the surrogate in the case of full surrogacy, as the 
Committee regards the birth mother as a surrogate in the true sense of the word, and 
consequently she does not sell her parental rights. Payment in these circumstances 
would not contravene the relevant provision of the Child Care Act.674 In the case of 
partial surrogacy, the birth mother transfers her parental rights to the commissioning 
parents, and accordingly it is possible to interpret the exchange of monies (other than 
for expenses) as payment for the child itself. 
The Committee provides that advertising that any person is willing to enter into a 
surrogacy contract, whether for gain or otherwise, is an offence. This provision will 
make it difficult for commissioning parents to find a surrogate mother. As is noted 
above, the more difficult access to surrogacy is made, the greater the likelihood that 
potential commissioning parents will resort to informal or clandestine arrangements. 












Many commentators view the prospect of commercial surrogacy with alarm. 
Opponents to commercial surrogacy are concerned that commercial surrogacy will 
contribute to the degradation of women and children, and fear that vulnerable persons 
will be exploited. 
These arguments are criticised as being both moralistic and paternalistic. Meyerson 
states that there can be no justification for interfering with a person's freedom on either 
of these grounds. 'We should not interfere with a person's freedom [on paternalistic 
grounds] for the same reason that we should not interfere on moralistic grounds, 
namely that judgements as to what is in a person's best interests, like judgements about 
what is morally admirable and what repugnant, differ, and they differ reasonably'.675 In 
other words, unless there is a good reason for interfering with a person's freedom, he or 
she should be permitted to determine his or her own course of action. The fear that 
permitting people the freedom to choose will expose them to the possibility of 
exploitation is better addressed by regulating the practice of surrogacy itself. 
Commercialism in the context of surrogacy includes a wide spectrum of activities. It is 
submitted that it is desirable to permit the payment of compensation for the legitimate 
services of legal and medical professionals. The parties should not be expected to 
participate in a surrogacy arrangement without recourse to these professional services. 












In addition, it is submitted that a surrogate mother should be permitted to claim her 
reasonable expenses, including loss of earnings. 
Both the South African Law Commission and Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee 
prohibit surrogacy for financial gain. However, they permit certain categories of 
payments, in particular those pertaining to the surrogate mothers reasonable expenses. 
However, both the Commission and Committee prohibit the payment of a fee to the 
surrogate mother. It is submitted that if the parties are required to make full disclosure 
of their financial arrangements to the Court, there is no reason to object to payment of a 
fee to the surrogate mother. When confirming the arrangement, the Court will have an 
opportunity to assess the quantum of the fee which is to be paid, and make any order it 
may deem necessary with respect to payment of the surrogate mother. 
It is submitted that the surrogate mother should be able to earn a reasonable fee with 
respect to the services she renders. It has been shown that surrogate mothers are 
motivated by the prospect of earning a fee and by prohibiting payment many potential 
surrogate mothers will be discouraged. This may create a situation where surrogacy is 
permitted, but it is extremely difficult for the commissioning parents to find anyone 
willing to act as a surrogate mother. They may well have to resort to a clandestine 
arrangement, which will expose the parties to the risk of exploitation. 
In addition, it is submitted that it may be advantageous to permit commercial surrogacy 
agencies to operate, provided they are subject to strict regulation. Agencies are able to 
provide valuable services, but the failure to control their activities has led to their being 











parties - a necessary function that would otherwise fall to a state funded body. As the 
thrust of health services is towards the provision of primary care, it is unlikely that the 













If properly regulated, surrogacy arrangements are of great assistance to those who are 
otherwise unable to have children. The regulation of surrogacy is both a method of 
control, and a way of legitimising the practice.676 However, as the decision to beget and 
bear children is clearly of a personal nature, it is submitted that the state should refrain 
from interfering in the exercise of that decision, except where absolutely necessary. 
Unfortunately, surrogacy arrangements can be abused, and accordingly in certain 
jurisdictions lawmakers have intervened to protect the interests of their citizens. 
However, the temptation is to over-regulate, a tendency that can have unfortunate 
consequences. Freeman refers to the Surrogacy Arrangements Act,611 which prohibits 
the practice of commercial surrogacy in the United Kingdom. 678 He notes that the 
prohibition of commercial surrogacy prevents commercial surrogacy agencies from 
operating. A non-profit organisation is operative but does not screen the parties, which 
leaves scope for 'the lurking suspicion that better ... arrangements may have been 
negotiated by the very agencies targeted by the legislation'.679 
676 MD A Freeman 'Responding to the Reproduction Revolution: Law Reform - Dilemmas and 
Difficulties'. In Sheila AM Mclean (ed) Law Reform and Human Reproduction (1992) 4 
677 Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 
678 M DA Freeman 'Responding to the Reproduction Revolution: Law Reform - Di lemmas and 
Difficulties'. In Sheila AM Mclean (ed) Law Reform and Human Reproduction (1992) 4 
679 MD A Freeman 'Responding to the Reproduction Revolution: Law Reform - Dilemmas and 











For women, the advent of the new reproductive technologies permits greater control of 
their reproductive capacities. However, Stanworth comments that '[m]edical and 
scientific advances in the sphere of reproduction - so often hailed as the liberators of 
twentieth century women - have, in fact, been a double edged sword. On the one hand, 
they have offered women a greater technical possibility to decide if, when and under 
what conditions to have children; on the other hand, the domination of so much 
reproductive technology by the medical profession and by the state has enabled others 
to have an even greater capacity to exert control over women's lives'.680 The control of 
reproduction is seen as a central concern in the struggle for gender equality, and in the 
past, the state's reluctance to intervene in matters considered to fall within the private 
realm has operated to the disadvantage of women.681 
Thus, it is submitted that the decision to regulate surrogacy arrangements should be 
approached with care, and where appropriate the individuals concerned should be left 
to order their own arrangements. However, lawmakers should not lose sight of the 
opportunities for exploitation, and should act to lessen the possibility of harm. In the 
context of surrogacy, lawmakers should also heed the results of studies that reveal that 
women who act as surrogate mothers are generally poorer, and have fewer financial 
resources than the commissioning parents.682 It is submitted that for this reason and 
because the surrogate mother is required to perform a task of an extremely intimate 
680 M Stanworth 'Reproductive Technologies and the Deconstruction of Motherhood'. In M Stanworth 
(ed) Reproductive Technologies: Gender, Motherhood and Medicine (1987) 15-16 
681 Jo Bridgeman and Susan Millns Feminist Perspectives on Law. Law's Engagement With the Female 
Body (1998) 110 
682 R. Alto Charo 'United States: Surrogacy'. In Sheila A M Mclean Law Reform and Human 











nature, that care should be taken to ensure that the interests of the surrogate mother as 
well as the child are protected. 
The South African Law Commission has recommended that any agreement that does 
not comply with the proposed legislation should be invalid. The effect of this is 
unfortunate, and appears to be contrary to the intentions of the Commission, which was 
to formulate a careful approach where the interests of the child are placed first and 
foremost.683 Where the contract is unenforceable, none of the parties are protected. For 
example, what will happen where a child is born physically or mentally handicapped, 
and the commissioning parents are unwilling to take responsibility? If the contract is 
invalid, then both the surrogate mother and the child are in a precarious position. 
This in turn raises the question of whether or not the commissioning parents should be 
able to compel the surrogate mother to relinquish the child. The Commission 
recommends that the commissioning parents be permitted to do so, and justifies its 
recommendation on the grounds that the surrogate mother is not genetically related to 
the child. It is submitted that this approach places too great an emphasis on the genetic 
aspect of parenting, ignoring the physiological and emotional tie between the surrogate 
mother and the child. Katz Rothman comments that in patriarchal society, 'women's 
rights to their children do not derive from having grown them in their bodies, with the 
blood of their bodies, passing them through their genitals, and suckling them at their 
breasts. These latter functions are interesting but irrelevant. What makes the child a 
woman's is that it is "half' hers; it has her genetic material as well as the man's 











material. The primacy of the genetic material is still the defining social relationship'.684 
Given the intimate nature of the relationship between the surrogate mother and child, it 
can be expected that a bond will form between them, and that compelling the surrogate 
mother to relinquish the child may be harmful to both. It is submitted that it is 
impossible to do justice to the all parties in the event of breach, and consequently the 
law should protect the interests of those parties who are most vulnerable, namely the 
surrogate mother and child. 
The Commission proposes that only married heterosexual couples be permitted access 
to surrogacy. The Commission's recommendation implies that a person, whose chosen 
lifestyle does not fit the definition of the 'nuclear' family, will not be permitted recourse 
to surrogacy. The Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee disagrees, and recommends 
that any suitable and competent persons be permitted access to surrogacy. Clearly, this 
recommendation is correct, as restricting surrogacy to married heterosexual couples 
would appear to be both unfair and unconstitutional. It is submitted that the merits of 
each case should be assessed, and the parties thereto thoroughly screened. If screening 
reveals that the particular individuals are unsuitable for parenthood, then they should be 
denied recourse to surrogacy. However, irrelevant characteristics such as a person's 
sexual orientation or marital status should not figure in the screening process. 
Both the South African Law Commission and Parliamentary Ad Hoc Select Committee 
propose that a written surrogacy agreement must be submitted for confirmation by the 
Court, before impregnation of the surrogate mother can take place. Presumably, the 
684 Barbara Katz Rothman 'Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy: A Feminist Perspective' (1991-











Court is to play the role of watchdog, although the Committee does propose that the 
Court is assisted by a state funded screening body, whose task it is to submit a report to 
the Court. The Commission's recommendations are vague in this regard, and the parties 
are given little guidance as to how they should go about convincing the court of their 
suitability. It is suggested that, as is the case in Israel, a panel of experts could evaluate 
the surrogacy contract. However, if the Court is to confirm the agreement, it will need 
resources to investigate each application, in which case the Office of the Family 
Advocate may be of assistance. 
Once the surrogate mother conceives, the commissioning parents may wish to prevent 
her from doing certain things. This is a difficult issue, as any attempt to restrict the 
surrogate mother's conduct is likely to involve a significant invasion of her personal 
freedom. Although the parties may provide for this in their agreement, in practice the 
commissioning parents are likely to find such terms difficult to enforce, as enforcement 
may mean constant surveillance, confinement or even forcing the surrogate mother to 
undergo medical procedures. Clearly, this cannot be permitted. Unfortunately, both the 
Commission and the Committee fail to address this issue. 
Similarly, in the case of abortion, it is submitted that the commissioning parents should 
not be able to compel the surrogate mother to undergo an abortion, nor should they be 
able to prevent her from terminating the pregnancy should she feel it necessary. This 
may appear harsh, but to permit otherwise may result in a situation where the surrogate 
mother is forced to undergo an invasive medical procedure against her wishes, or is 











as any other pregnant woman in this regard, and, in particular, forcing her to carry the 
child to term amounts to slavery. The Commission's recommendations in this regard 
are no longer applicable. However, in the case of non-therapeutic abortion, it 
recommends that the decision to undergo an abortion is that of the surrogate mother. In 
contrast, the Committee proposes that the parties make provision for abortion in their 
contract. It is submitted that this is unacceptable, as permitting the parties to regulate 
this aspect of the arrangement, does not adequately protect the interests of the surrogate 
mother. 
Determining which of the parties are the child's parents is difficult. As previously 
mentioned, the genetic, biological and social parents are all able to claim parenthood. 
In addition, Johnson's case introduced the notion of maternal intent to assign 
parenthood to the commissioning mother, 685 in effect providing for the specific 
enforcement of the surrogacy contract. The 'best interests' test has also been used to 
assign parenthood. However, application of the test is to a large extent subjective. In 
some jurisdictions, the best interest's test has been interpreted in such a way that the 
birth mother will almost always gain custody of the child.686 The factor of maternal 
bonding is heavily weighted, and unless the birth mother is an unfit mother, or does not 
want the child,687 she is likely to be the successful party in the event of a dispute. In 
other jurisdictions, the surrogate mother's willingness to participate in a paid surrogacy 
arrangement has counted against her, and this together with the fact that the 
commissioning father was able to offer a stable and affiuent home resulted in an award 
685 Johnson v Calvert 851 P 2d 766 (1993) 











of custody to him.688 The South African Law Commission also uses the best interests 
of the child to justify its proposal that the commissioning parents are deemed to be the 
child's legal parents. It states that '[i]t is of cardinal importance that the best interests of 
the child are considered before conception. Situations where a court has to decide 
thereon ex post facto should be prevented at all costs'.689 The Committee has a dual 
system for the assignment of parentage. In the case of full surrogacy, the 
commissioning parents are deemed to be the child's legal parents. This approach can be 
criticised for a number of reasons. In effect it provides for the specific enforcement of 
the contract, placing certainty above the interests of the child. It is possible that during 
the gestative period, the commissioning couple's circumstances have changed. These 
recommendations make no provision for this eventuality. Furthermore, it does not take 
into account the emotional tie that is likely to exist between the surrogate mother and 
child as a result of her carrying it to term. 
In the case of partial surrogacy, the Committee proposes a system of 'fast track' 
adoption that closely resembles the English model. Although this system provides the 
surrogate mother with a window period in which to make up her mind about 
relinquishing the child, this approach is problematical. The Committee provides that 
the child should be handed to the commissioning parents at birth. This means that 
should the surrogate mother decide not to relinquish the child, the child will have to be 
returned to her. As the window period is lengthy the child may have lived with the 
687 See Re C [1985] F.L.R. 846 
688see in Re Baby M 525 A.2d 1127 (N .J. Super Ct.1987). See also the Appeal Court's decision in Re 
Baby M 109 N.J. 396 A.2d 1227 (1988) 











commissioning parents for quite some time, and this separation is likely to be 
traumatic. It is submitted that the surrogate mother should have time to decide whether 
or not to relinquish the child, but that the period of time the Committee recommends is 
far too long. 
The surrogate mother's position is also precarious should the commissioning parents 
decide that they no longer wish to take the child. Although, she can request the court to 
enforce the contract, it is submitted that this is not a satisfactory solution as the child is 
not a chattel to be passed back and forth. The surrogate mother may succeed in an 
award for damages, but at the end of the day is burdened with the responsibility of a 
child she had not planned to keep. It is submitted that the surrogate mother should be 
able to compel the commissioning parents to take the child. It may seem unfair to force 
the commissioning parents to perform, and at the same time argue that the agreement 
should not be enforceable against the surrogate mother. However, Meyerson comments 
that 'this skewing of the distribution of advantages and disadvantages in the surrogate 
mother's favour is justified by the fact that she is more in need of protection than the 
commissioning parents, primarily because she has more to lose from the psychological 
point of view, but also because she is likely to be in worse financial circumstances'.690 
The Commission prohibits commercial surrogacy. The surrogate mother may be 
reimbursed for her expenses, but should not receive a fee for her services. While it 
recognises that it is almost impossible to prevent secret payments to the surrogate 
mother, it has chosen not to impose criminal sanctions in this instance. However, 
690 D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. In Christina Murray ( ed) Gender and the New South African 











commercial agencies are prohibited, as is advertising, and those who transgress are 
subject to criminal sanctions. It is submitted that the fear that permitting commercial 
surrogacy is likely to result in exploitation of women and children can be addressed by 
regulating the practice. Furthermore, it is argued that expecting the surrogate mother to 
perform without payment is exploitative in itself. In addition, the prohibition on paid 
surrogacy may frustrate attempts by the commissioning parents to find a woman 
willing to act as a surrogate mother. It is submitted that it is illogical to permit the 
practice of surrogacy, while placing unnecessary stumbling blocks in the path of 
prospective parents, and may encourage them to resort to clandestine arrangements 
with all its accompanying dangers. Furthermore, the fear that commercialism 
encourages inappropriate perceptions of women and children as commodities, is a 
moral concern. It is submitted that surrogacy is a valuable aid to infertile couples, and 
the prohibition thereof ignores this fact. 
As previously mentioned, it is impossible to do justice to all the parties. Meyerson 
suggests that lawmakers should focus on the prevention of disputes, and that in this 
respect screening and counselling are essential.691 The parties should be made aware of 
the dangers inherent in a surrogacy arrangement, and should be prepared for the 
possibility that the arrangement may go wrong. 
Finally, it is submitted that the surrogate mother should not be compelled to relinquish 
the child, whether or not she is genetically related to it. Giving her a finite and not too 











commissioning parents. Should she decide not to relinquish the child, it is also possible 
to recognise the relationship of the genetic parent or parents to the child, and make 
provision for their access to the child. It is submitted that in these circumstances, the 
commissioning parents should have the right to apply for custody of the child should 
the surrogate mother prove to be an unfit mother. 
691 D Meyerson 'Surrogacy Agreements'. In Christina Murray (ed) Gender and the New South African 
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